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iAbstract
The global political system forms the backdrop to the changing function of the state and 
the emergence of new governing systems. This thesis develops a particular governance 
narrative in relation to endogenous rural development within the South West of England 
through the European Union’s (EU) LEADER+ rural development programme. This 
programme is important because it sits firmly within a wider set of discourses on the 
‘new governance’. This discourse spans wider debates over emerging forms of 
deliberative democracy, European governance and globalisation. The LEADER 
programmes approach to governance is framed as a means to facilitate enhanced 
deliberative practice through ‘partnership’ arrangements at the local level, and in turn 
ensure ‘local people’ and their ‘communities’ develop in line with their strengths. This 
approach to governance, developed through the regional studies literature, is seen as a 
means to meet those challenges presented by the global economic epoch. There is a 
strong rhetoric on the potential of the LEADER approach, but this rhetoric does not result 
in effective deliberative processes and outputs. The LEADER programme fails to break 
free from its wider political contexts and the governmentalities of the state. These enable 
powerful actors to manipulate the political system and its objectives. This is possible 
through the even wider context of global governance, which helps us understand that 
relations of power no longer follow linear channels, that gateways once closed are now 
open (and vice versa), and that policy networks now stretch both horizontally and 
vertically beyond the traditional confines of state power. 
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
Sometimes the older ones among them racked their dim memories and 
tried to determine whether in the early days of the Rebellion, when 
Jones’s expulsion was still recent, things had been better or worse than 
now. They could not remember. There was nothing with which they 
could compare their present lives:  they had nothing to go upon except 
Squealer’s lists of figures, which invariably demonstrated that 
everything was getting better and better. (George Orwell, Animal Farm)
The Westminster model of government stands as a great epitaph to the British state. It is 
still seen as the basis from which we should understand the way state power operates 
within Britain. Hierarchy, centralised power, and the importance of this state structure to 
our national identity are just some of the precursory elements to this model. However, 
despite the importance we attach as a nation, to this mode of state power, there have been 
a number of changes underfoot over the last two decades that have ensured the sanctity of 
the Westminster model is no longer a certainty. We stand at a crossroads in terms of the 
British state; we know from where it has come, but many commentators are unsure as to 
where it is heading. Internal devolution, the growth of the EU and other supranational 
power agencies, global economic pressures, big business, and invariably neo-liberalism 
are ensuring that the British state faces a number of new challenges. These challenges are 
quite different to when Margaret Thatcher took power in 1979, although undoubtedly she 
did her bit to start the undoing of the Westminster model through her market reforms. 
2The political project enacted by New Labour since it came to power has been shaped by 
the inadequacies of the market, and the realisation that state/society interaction is an 
important enabling force within the realm of public policy, and for the good of the wider 
economy. 
The challenges faced by the state over the last two decades have spurred the appearance 
of new and emerging mechanisms of ‘rule’ or governing, whereby an ever increasing 
contribution to the governing of the state by multiple non-state actors and agencies has 
taken place, alongside more traditional governing bodies. This is seen as a means to bring 
about more consensual policy making between the state and society, breaking down the 
inequalities produced through market mechanisms and the rigidity of the Westminster 
model. This represents a shift from coordination through hierarchy, and less emphasis on 
competition; to coordination through networks and partnerships (Rhodes, 1997; Pierre 
and Peters, 2000). The hierarchical mode of government associated with the Westminster 
model, has been replaced as the defining narrative of the British state by the notion of 
governance. Governance is perceived to represent the bringing together of market, 
network and hierarchical modes of coordination. The focus within governance is 
increasingly upon networks and partnership, and although the market still sits squarely 
within the governance framework, the former have been enrolled more widely through 
public policy, principally in areas where the market finds it hard to reach effectively. For 
example, the formulation and implementation of specific policy initiatives have been 
coupled with attempts to bring policy closer to communities and citizens.
3This thesis looks to explore these changes within the political system through a case 
study of the EU led rural development programme Liason Entre Actions pour le 
Developpenment de L’Economie Rurale. This translates as ‘links between actions for the 
development of the rural economy’, but is more widely known by its acronym: LEADER. 
LEADER aims to promote bottom-up forms of rural development and is made up of a 
series of 893 Local Actions Group’s (LAGs) across the EU. These give the programme a 
community based focus by seeking local participation in the decision-making process. I 
chose to focus on the North West Devon LAG in the South West of England, which will 
hereafter be termed the focus LAG. I chose this LAG firstly, because it was the closest to 
my home in Cornwall and could be reached within two hours; and secondly, because it 
was managed by the North Devon and Exmoor Regeneration Company (RegCo), which 
offered an interesting insight into how a private organisation implemented the LEADER 
approach and handled public funds within the new governance. 
It is made clear over the following chapters that the LEADER policy programme reflects 
the changing political system in many ways. Not only can it be deemed a policy framed 
by new actor interactions across a multilevel governance framework, and developed 
around global policy influences that impact upon rural issues, but it is also a policy 
implemented at the ground level through a partnership form of governance. The 
LEADER approach to governance is evidence of new mobile interactions of power across 
a policy network, and the changing sites at which these interactions take place within this 
new system. The focus of this research is to ascertain how the LEADER approach to 
governance, set out in official discourse, is affected and conditioned by a set of socially 
4contingent processes.  These processes have been identified as the means by which linear 
flows of power are displaced, resulting in contradictions between policy discourse and 
policy practice.  The level of control collectivities have over network interactions, and the 
mechanisms they employ in their attempts to manipulate power, provides the primary 
focus of this research. 
Under New Labour, the state has placed itself as an enabling force, as a protector of 
communities and voluntary organizations alike, as the promoter of partnership, and 
through partnership consensual and participative forms of ‘democratic’ decision making 
at the local level (Blair, 1998: 4). As such New Labour presents the state as having the 
ability to command the tools of governance. However, within the governance literature 
there is much debate as to how much power the state has to coordinate its own territorial 
affairs. The emergence of governance is seen by some as a sign of the waning power of 
the state, with the pressures of the global political economy inducing new centres of 
power (Held, 1991, Brenner, 1997; Macleod, 1999). However, despite these power shifts 
there are some commentators who still believe strongly in the ability of the state to 
reconfigure power to its own advantage, whereby the tools of governance are very much 
still directed by the state through the art of steering (Pierre and Peters, 2000; Newman, 
2001: 13; Schout and Jordan, 2005). 
This debate is very much a part of the wider debate and narratives that exist in relation to 
the emergence of governance. Newman (2001) focuses on three narratives that draw out 
some of the key theoretical arguments in relation to its emergence. The first of these 
5narratives explores the global political and economic shifts that have limited the capacity 
of nation states to govern (ibid: 12). Rhodes (1996) is a strong advocate of the belief that 
governance is a result of the ‘hollowing out’ of the state, which implies that power has 
shifted outwards from the machinery of ‘big government’ to international financial 
markets, to global companies able to move capital and other resources from one site of 
investment to another, and to supra-national entities such as the World Bank or the 
European Union (also see Jessop, 1994). Within this conceptualization power has also 
shifted downwards to the sub-national level of cities and regions (Newman, 2001: 12). 
These changes have taken place within an ideological post-Fordist climate that is adverse 
to big government and all it implies in terms of policy failures, the growing complexity of 
the policy process and through the increasing importance of global economic trends. 
Ideologically the position of the ‘government machine’ had become untenable, especially 
in terms of economic governance, and so its fragmentation was top of the political agenda 
(ibid, 12). 
In sum, globalisation, internal devolution and the growth of supranational bodies has 
challenged the capacity of nation states to govern effectively, which has led to alternative 
governing strategies whereby governments have increasingly sought to influence a 
multiplicity of institutions and actors (ibid, 13). New strategies based on informal 
governmentality, means of enabling and regulation have become important to governing 
the modern state (see Dean, 1997; Jessop, 2002). Whether these new strategies are 
directed from new centres of power is open to debate, but it would be naïve to discount 
the role of the state in steering the new governance model. Governing still takes place 
6along hierarchical and traditional institutional lines, along side new forms of governance 
(Newman, 2001: 13). For some, governance represents an adaptation by the state to the 
challenges within the post-Fordist political economy, and as such should not be seen as a 
diminution of its power (Pierre, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 2000). 
The second key narrative identified in relation to governance is linked to the idea that 
markets, hierarchies, and networks form alternative strategies of coordination and 
governing within the post-Fordist world (Newman, 2001: 13). This shift has taken place 
against the backdrop of a post-war welfare settlement based on the conception of the 
British state as a direct service provider, resulting in large bureaucratic state led 
institutions forming a public sector predominantly based on hierarchy (ibid, 13). This 
state centric government machine came under attack ideologically under the neo-liberal 
project of the 1980’s and 1990’s (ibid, 13). Market mechanisms brought more fragmented 
and dispersed patterns of service delivery and regulation that required new forms of 
coordination (ibid, 13). This saw the engagement with privatization, contracting out, 
quasi markets, the removal of functions from local authorities, and the proliferation of 
quangos, and the separation between the policy and delivery functions in the civil service. 
As a consequence new control mechanisms have been employed by government in the 
form of framework documents, contracts, targets, performance indicators, service 
standards, contracts and customer charters (ibid, 14). These changes were not only felt 
centrally. Local government has also been identified as site where network-based modes 
of interaction have been enrolled to the extent that it may now be more appropriate to talk 
of local governance involving a plurality of organizations across the public, private and 
7voluntary sectors (ibid, 14). This form of coordination through inter-organizational 
networks and partnerships can be seen as a response to the decrease of local government 
powers, but it can also be argued that this form of coordination enhances the ability of 
local agencies to respond more flexibly to local need and their communities (ibid, 14).
The final key narrative of governance called upon here draws on the idea that governance 
reflects a response to the challenge of governing complex and fragmented societies, 
replacing direct forms of state intervention which have failed in the past (ibid, 14). 
According to Kooiman and van Vliet (1993) governing the modern state is primarily a 
process of coordination, and requires the ability to influence social, political and 
administrative interactions. Governance is seen as a means to provide the basis for more 
interactive governing processes and as such more appropriate forms of coordination for 
the modern state. Within this understanding no single agency, public, private or voluntary 
has all the knowledge necessary to coordinate state mechanisms effectively (Newman, 
2001: 15). Governments are increasingly engaging in co-regulation, co-steering, co-
production, cooperative management, public/private/voluntary partnerships within and 
across inter-state/state boundaries, along with other mechanisms that focus on the 
coordination of diverse networks of actors and bodies as a means to deliver an effective 
governing framework (ibid, 15).
The preserve of governance, within this theoretical conception of the term, is 
coordination. Coordination takes place at different levels of analysis, and within different 
domains (i.e. the local level, the regional level, the national level, the supranational level, 
8civil society, local economies, policy areas, democracy, political projects etc.) (ibid, 15). 
Within the governance framework, tools of coordination are constantly adapted and 
reconstructed as one tool is surpassed by another when one tool is deemed more effective 
than another, often as ideological perspectives change. This can be seen in the UK 
literature with the idea of a shift from markets and hierarchies towards networks and 
partnerships as more effective modes of coordination (ibid, 16). Governance then 
provides the framework for reflexivity; the tools of coordination are adaptive, but the 
focus remains the coordination of social processes, as a means to ensure effective 
governance. As such, within this understanding there is greater engagement with all 
aspects of social coordination. The focus is no longer on economic structures, or simply 
coordinating the private and public sectors together, but extending the concern for 
coordination to broader issues of citizenship, concepts of community, and social and 
cultural formations (ibid, 16). This is seen as a means to ensure coordination reaches out 
further than had been previously realized under state centric approaches to government or 
those focusing on the economy as a means of coordination. This new approach to 
governance is seen as fit to meet the challenges posed by the diversity and complexity in
the post-Fordist world. This is what Kooiman terms ‘cross modern’ societies, which 
require state/society modes of interaction and coordination1 (ibid, 16).
                                                          
1 As former Prime Minister Tony Blair states “In deciding where to act on behalf of 
the national community, whether as regulator or provider, governments must be 
acutely sensitive not to stifle worthwhile activity by local communities and the 
voluntary sector…The truth is that freedom for many requires strong government. A 
key challenge to progressive politics is to use the state as an enabling force, protecting 
effective communities and voluntary organizations and encouraging their growth to 
tackle new needs, in partnership as appropriate.” (Blair, 1998: 4)
9Partnerships and networks have been enrolled in the paradigm shift associated with 
governance, and as such they form an important element to any understanding of rule by 
governance. Partnerships, along with networks, are a primary form of coordination within 
the governance framework, representing the shift away from coordination through 
hierarchy and competition (Newman, 2001: 105; see Jessop, 2000: 11). The notion of 
partnership fits squarely within government rhetoric, inspired by the Third Way, on 
representation and inclusion (Newman, 2001: 105). Partnership governance is seen as a 
means to increase state/society interaction.  This form of coordination is married to 
governance through networks and partnership and has found its way to the local level 
through various community governance initiatives. These initiatives are linked to the 
increasing privatisation of local level services and the need to ensure strong line between 
new service providers and government. 
The focus of my research is on the governance of the LEADER rural development 
programme. The LEADER programme is an interesting case because it subjects 
traditional state-power configurations to new challenges through its multilevel character. 
The formulation of the programme and its general oversight take place at the EU level; 
and its implementation takes place at the local level through the notion of a ‘community’ 
led rural development partnership. The rhetoric attached to LEADER sits squarely with 
New Labour discourse on inclusivity and partnership as a means to form a more 
consensual basis for state/societal interaction and exchange of ideas (ibid, 23). Yet, 
despite the closeness of this rhetoric with LEADER, the programme was put together by 
the Commission at the EU level and has since been passed to the member states to 
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manage within their own territories. This has set the basis for a set of power relations that 
fit squarely within the governance framework through the programmes engagement with 
a diverse set of actors from a multitude of spaces. These actors and their organisations 
occupy vertical and horizontal networks characteristic of the new global order, or a new 
polycentric world (See Hirst and Thompson, 1995; Amin, 1997; Rosseneau, 2006)
The LEADER programme draws heavily upon the problems facing people working 
within the rural economy. Via the local partnership process, the inherent complexities of 
a post-Fordist rural economy are seen to be dealt with in a more effective manner through 
this governance framework than that offered solely through the market, or through direct 
government coordination. For example, a series of dominant trends have been identified 
in relation to the changing character of the rural economy, such as: the problems facing 
the agricultural industry; growing urban-rural migration; increasing economic diversity 
and land–use practices; and concerns over social exclusion (Marsden 1998; Gray, 2000; 
Shucksmith, 2000; Donaldson et al., 2002; Evans et al., 2002; Lobley and Potter, 2004). 
Nevertheless, government is keen to express the diversity of rural areas and the different 
problems they face.  Development programmes such as LEADER are designed to 
promote and develop diversity to ensure that rural areas have a more sustainable future, 
built on local strengths. As such, the LEADER programme appears to be built heavily on 
state/society interaction and coordination as a means to deal with the diversity and 
challenges within the rural economy. The LEADER programme fits into the governance 
framework through its multilevel ‘power play’; and its concern for community led, 
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‘bottom-up’ rural development through partnership. Both of these characteristics 
represent forms of coordination that sit squarely with the governance literature. 
Through my research I aim to develop my own particular governance narrative based on 
the LEADER programme, by showing how the programme is governed, and why this is 
significant in terms of wider issues in relation to the perceived changes within the 
structure of the state. As a means to achieve this I will be focusing on the character of 
LEADER’s ‘multilevel’ governance, giving specific attention to the power relations that 
exist at nodal points across the LEADER network. This will help identify how power 
operates and which power-centres across the network are the most influential. I also want 
to look at how effective governance is at the coordination of state/society interaction 
through LEADER and explore the claim that it offers a means to bring together private, 
public and voluntary actors and agencies to tackle complex socio-economic problems 
together. Finally, I want to position my governance narrative against those that dominate 
within the academic literature as a means to show that governance can only offer a 
framework for coordination, and that the tools attached to this framework vary between 
different programmes and policies; governance is then always in a state of becoming, and 
as such it is very difficult to build normative theories upon the notion of governance. As 
such this thesis focuses on the varied nature of governance, and attempts to stay clear of 
‘model-making’ by presenting governance as narrative. 
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1.1 Key Questions
I have identified four key questions with respect to my research, which I hope will help 
me achieve these aims. These are as follows:
1. What is governance, and how is it significant in terms of changing state structure?
2. How effective is governance in the coordination of state/society interaction in the 
context of LEADER?
3. What is the character of LEADER’s multilevel governance system and the power 
relations that exist?
4. How should we position the LEADER governance narrative in terms of those wider 
narratives that exist within the academic literature?
1.2 Chapter Outline
The thesis is structured as follows:
1. Introduction
2. Methodology: this chapter begins by introducing the network approach that is at the 
heart of my research, not only shaping the way I go about collecting my data, but also in 
the way power relations are perceived to play themselves out within the new governance 
framework. Following this my data collection methodology is introduced. This was 
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primarily made up of semi-structured interviews, workshops, and the collection of official 
documentation. In this section some of the problems associated with the data collection 
process are discussed, and how these were overcome. This discussion focuses on the 
problems and pitfalls of employing a snowballing method in building my sample of 
interviewees. I then go on to discuss the principal modes of analysis within my research: 
discourse analysis and narrative analysis. Discourse analysis is important to my research 
as it offers a means to develop an understanding of the functioning of the network and the 
power relations that exist through the way the discourse moves across the network and 
the function it serves. Narrative analysis is used to ensure that my research does not fall 
into the trap of seeing empirical study as the basis for normative conclusions on the 
functioning of the state in the post-Fordist world, and ensuring that governance is seen as 
a framework for control and not a model. The chapter is concluded by looking at the 
modes of political analysis that best support this kind of approach to the social sciences. 
3. LEADER: basic principles and structure: This chapter introduces the LEADER 
programme and its underlining objectives. It begins by introducing the structure of the 
LEADER programme, and introduces the locally based partnership responsible for 
implementing the area based approach. These partnerships are referred to as Local 
Actions Groups within the programme. The chapter moves forward by looking at the 
impetus behind the bottom-up approach within an EU setting, and the theoretical 
underpinnings of this approach by drawing upon the regional development literature. The 
chapter concludes with an overview of previous academic research into LEADER, which 
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provides a critical perspective on the LEADER approach. The focus of which is those 
critiques that relate most strongly to governance issues. 
4. Governance: A new world order?: It is in this chapter that a contextualisation of 
governance takes place. The notion of governance is developed in terms of changing state 
structure, neo-liberal policy agendas, globalisation/glocalisation, democratic governance 
and community engagement, among other factors. It begins by looking at the birth of 
governance, and develops by critically exploring where  the governance ‘project’ is 
heading, where it might end and whether it spells the emergence of a new world order. 
The attempt is made to relate these notions of governance to the LEADER programme. 
This is done by attempting to position the LEADER programme within the context of 
widely acknowledged changes to the structure of the state. It is argued that LEADER 
represents a valuable example of the wider changes to state structure, specifically in 
terms of rural governance and its new and emerging epoch. The chapter is concluded with 
some words of caution, principally in relation to the limits of the governance framework 
and the speed of which the governance project has taken root, the risks this poses to some 
of the positive principles found under the Westminster model relating to representative 
democracy, and the important sense of identity that it carries, both institutionally and 
symbolically, which could be linked to the national psyche.
5. ‘Post- agricultural’ policy, New Labour and the new rural governance:  This chapters 
looks critically at the evolution of rural policy in both the UK and EU context, and gives 
some context to changing state structures as part of the new governance. It does so by 
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looking closely at the policy networks that have come to define rural policy, and the 
influence they continue to play. The history of rural policy across Europe has been 
shaped largely by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) over the last thirty years, and 
its most recent reforms in 1999 and 2003 suggest that a more heterogeneous rural policy 
is emerging. The rise to power of New Labour in 1997 helped reinforce the idea that 
policy was ‘modernising’. However, this chapter explores how a number of domestic 
issues, most specifically the Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) ‘crisis’, have brought about 
retrenchment in domestic rural policy. In the shadow of this, New Labour’s project of 
modernisation is critically reflected on, and related to the LEADER programme, and its 
governance. 
6. ‘Bottom-up’ rural development: ‘spin’ democracy?: This chapter looks critically at the 
notion of ‘bottom-up’ rural development comparing government rhetoric with my own 
governance narrative as a means to explore the democratic credentials of ‘partnership 
governance’ within this ‘bottom-up’ mode of rural development. To start with, the 
meaning of ‘bottom-up’ rural development is explored through the narratives within the 
LEADER discourse and my interview data. Diverging understandings are identified, and 
whether these divergences relate to different nodal points along the LEADER network. I 
go on to look critically at how notions of inclusion, participation and partnership have 
been enrolled as a part of the governance project, and whether these tools should be seen 
in a positive light, offering a genuine alternative to representative democracy.   This will 
be done by focussing on the mechanisms enrolled within the LEADER programme, and 
the narratives that my interviewees and the participants at the workshops draw from 
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these. These mechanisms will then be related to those narratives on governance 
mechanisms found within the academic literature. This is to show that although these 
mechanisms are perceived to be a means to ensure effective control in the face of the 
global governance epoch, these attempts are at the expense of state power, and still 
further representative democracy. This argument is developed by arguing that 
government rhetoric may represent a smokescreen hiding the long term effects of the 
governance project. 
7. Multilevel governmental power play: This chapter seeks to identify the particular 
relationship that exists between the different levels of government across the network(s) 
of actors followed through my research. It aims to explore where power lies and how 
governmentalities operate to transfer this power both vertically and horizontally. The 
focus in this chapter is undoubtedly the LEADER network and how that operates. There 
is no doubt a tendency to predetermine the levels of governance that are the most 
important in terms of the situation of power (i.e. regional, national, and supranational). I 
hope to avoid this tendency by explicitly tracing the LEADER network, and focusing on 
the nodes of power along it as a means to get a more reflective understanding of power 
and power relations along the LEADER network. Nevertheless, there will still be an 
important focus on the role played by the institutions at the regional, national and 
supranational territorial levels, and how power travels through these institutions at these 
levels, and whether these relations produce significant nodal points. I finish this chapter 
by attempting to summarise the power play within the multilevel governance framework, 
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and what is significant about it in terms of wider assumptions made through other 
governance narratives.
8. Conclusion: Positioning ‘bottom-up’ rural development in the ‘new world order’: This 
chapter aims to develop what has been identified in chapters three to seven, through the 
governance narratives of LEADER. This provides the means to unpack and explore some 
of the tensions that exist within these narratives and an opportunity to try and understand 
some of the peculiarities of the LEADER case in the context of the wider governance 
literature. In a sense this chapter is a means to bring my analysis together and to think 
critically about broader governance issues relating to changing state structure and power 
relations through the LEADER case. The crux of this chapter seeks to use some of the 
conclusions drawn here on the governance of the LEADER programme, as a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to rural development, to explore how the notion of bottom-up rural 
development or community governance fits squarely within the notion of multilevel
governance and beyond this the new world order, as a means to meet some of the 
perceived challenges within the post-Fordist political economy. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
This study is based on a set of qualitative data, made up principally of a series of semi-
structured in-depth interviews, and the analysis of political discourse at the EU level 
downwards. In this chapter I want to explain the specificities of the data collection 
process I employed, the reasons behind this process and the problems I faced. I will then
explain how the data were analysed. I also aim to develop a philosophical and theoretical 
argument in relation to my decision to employ narrative analysis as the principal mode of 
interpretation within my work, and show how this mode of interpretation is employed in 
my study on the governance of LEADER. These narratives will be explored through a set 
of interpretative methods that underline my approach to political analysis. Before 
beginning this outline, I first want to outline the conception of power employed in the 
research, and the importance of a network approach to the study of public policy, and 
more specifically the new governance. 
2.1 Power 
Within the history of the social sciences, power has been perceived in a number of 
different ways (See Mills, 1956, 1959; Dahl, 1957, 1958, 1961; Lukes, 1974; Foucault, 
1975). Power is an important tool of government and governance, the oil between the 
wheels in terms of government, or the expression of flows and mobility within the new 
governance. It is important, given the nature of this research, to outline how power is 
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understood in this work and show how this conception of power supports a network 
approach to the study of the new governance.
Lukes’ (1974) conception of power, in which he develops three dimensions, is often cited 
as a classic approach to the subject. The first dimension is associated with the work of 
Robert Dahl, and to “the study of concrete, observable behavior” (Lukes, 1974: 17). As 
Polsby makes clear ‘In the pluralist approach . . . an attempt is made to study specific 
outcomes in order to determine who actually prevails in community decision-making’ 
(1963: 113). In Merelman’s opinion the pluralist methodology 'studied actual behavior, 
stressed operational definitions, and turned up evidence. Most important, it seemed to 
produce reliable conclusions which met the canons of science' (1968: 20). 
The second dimension of power is underlined as the result of political scientists Bachrach 
and Baratz’s (1970) critique of Dahl’s pluralism. This critique points to the ‘values, 
beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures (‘rules of the game’) that operate 
systematically and consistently to prevent potentially controversial issues from generating 
“observable conflicts” (ibid, 43-44). Consequently, in order to grasp this second 
dimension of power, “it is crucially important to identify potential issues which non-
decision making prevents from being actual” (ibid, 23). They write: 
Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of 
decisions that affect B. Power is also exercised when A devotes his 
energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and 
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institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public 
consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to 
A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all 
practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their 
resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences. (1970: 7)
Lukes accepts that the two-dimensional view of power represents an important advance 
over the one-dimensional view. ‘It incorporates into the analysis of power relations the 
question of the control over the agenda of politics and of the way in which potential 
issues are kept out of the political process’ (2005:24).  Nevertheless, the third dimension 
of power is developed by Lukes as a critique of both views behavioural focus. He moves 
away from ‘the study of overt, ‘actual behaviour’, of which ‘concrete decisions’ in 
situations of conflict are seen as paradigmatic’, towards the study of hidden forces that 
constrain the agenda and keep ‘potential issues’ out of politics (ibid, 25). 
It is important to acknowledge that although Lukes three dimensional view of power 
lends a great deal to our understanding of who holds power, it does not provide the basis 
from which a conceptual understanding of power relations and the ‘powers of 
association’ can be formed. I now want to turn to Foucault and show how his conceptual 
ideas on power, principally through his ideas on governmentality, offer students of 
governance a conceptual understanding of power, and how power relations are dominated 
by ‘technologies of the self’.
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Foucault’s (1978, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1982, 1987) writings have been highly influential 
in discussions over the subject of ‘power’, to the extent that his approach is said to have 
revealed ‘a fourth dimension’ (Digesser, 1992). Garland provides an excellent summary 
of this conception of power. It starts, ‘It is not to be thought of as the property of 
particular classes or individuals who “have” it, nor as an instrument which they can 
somehow “use” at will”. Instead Foucault’s conception of power connotes to 
the various forms of domination and subordination and the asymmetrical 
balance of forces which operate whenever and wherever social relations 
exist. These power relationships, like social relations which they invest, 
display no simple pattern since, for Foucault, social life is to be thought of 
as taking place not within a single overarching ‘society’, but instead across 
a multiplicity of fields of forces which are sometimes connected and 
sometimes not. His special focus is always upon the way these power 
relations are organised, the forms they take and the techniques they depend 
upon, rather than upon the groups and individuals who dominate or are 
dominated as a consequence. (...) power is a pervasive aspect of social life 
and is not limited to the sphere of formal politics or open conflict. It is also 
to be thought of as productive in its effect rather than repressive in so far 
as power shapes the actions of individuals and harnesses their bodily 
powers to its ends. In this sense power operates ‘through’ individuals 
rather than ‘against’ them and helps constitute the individual who is at the 
same time its vehicle (Garland, 1990: 138). 
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Foucault’s ideas on power have become increasingly important to social scientists, raising 
our awareness of the subtleties of ‘power’, the important role of social discourses in 
advancing ‘power’, and the role of the individual in expressing and advancing it. His most 
important work on power, as far as this thesis is concerned, comes from his work on 
‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1978). His ideas here come from the notion that power ‘is 
tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is 
proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms’ (1980c: 18). As such, 
‘governmentality’ develops ideas on the ‘technologies of power’, and the ‘technologies of 
the self’ through looking at how populations are administered within society by certain 
organisations and groups (including business), the way individuals shape their own selves 
and their own actions, and the invariable alignment of these processes. This notion of 
governmentality has been developed succinctly by a number of social scientists in recent 
times, and firmly related to the ‘powers of freedom’ and the liberal and neoliberal
techniques and rationalities of government (Barry et al., 1996; Rose, 1999; Dean, 2007). 
The notion of ‘governmentality’ is increasingly been mixed up with notions of 
‘governance’, and although both terms refer to distinct ideas, together they represent a set 
of intertwined governing processes and structures that enhance our understanding 
governance and power. 
Finally, Latour offers some important ideas on power, despite writing that ‘the notion of 
power should be abandoned’. He writes, it as ‘a convenient way to summarise the 
consequences of collective action’ but is critical of it on the grounds  that it does not help 
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‘explain what holds the collective action in place’ (1986: 266, 265, 278). Nevertheless, 
Latour’s ideas on power are crucial to our understanding of how power is modified as it 
passes across the network, and importance of every individual in ensuring an order is 
followed and given the energy to succeed. Unlike Foucault, Latour does not refer to 
‘technologies of the self’ or the ‘invariable alignment of these processes’, but focuses on 
the ‘powers of association’, to which we might add the conceptual framings offered by 
Foucault. 
Power, as set out by Latour, is based on the idea that the spread, in time and space, of 
claims, orders, artefacts and goods is dependent on a chain of people (Latour, 1986: 267). 
Latour uses a token to metaphorically depict power. Each individual has the capacity to 
act in a range of different ways – ‘letting the token drop, or modifying it, or deflecting it, 
or betraying it, or adding to it, or appropriating it’ (ibid, 267). Once the chain is broken, 
either because an individual chooses not to pass on the token, or there is no one there to 
take up the token, then the token simply stops (ibid, 267). The token begins life with no 
impetus, and displacement is only made possible through the energies of those people 
along the chain who choose to do something with the token (ibid, 267). As a consequence 
the initial force of the first in the chain is no more important than any other person within 
that chain, if the token is going to move then it is dependent on new sources of energy all 
the time (ibid, 267). The final important aspect of this perception of power is that ‘since 
the token is in everybody’s hands in turn, everyone shapes it according to their different 
projects’ (ibid, 268). 
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The obedience to an order given by someone would require the alignment 
of all the people concerned by it, who would all assent to it faithfully, 
without adding or subtracting anything. Such a situation is highly 
improbable. The chances are that the order has been modified and 
composed by many different people who slowly turned it into something 
completely different as they sought to achieve their own goals. How can 
we be sure of this? Simply because if it were not the case, then the order 
would not have been ‘obeyed’ in the first place, and the person who gave 
the order would be said to be powerless! (ibid, 268).
Power is a consequence of social action and not the cause. This perception of power turns 
common assumptions of power on their head. Orders are not obeyed because the first 
person in a chain has power; on the contrary power is given energy through a chain of 
faithful association. Networks and a network approach to the study of governance 
encourage us to look beyond the power of governments and their institutions toward the 
power that result from network interactions. 
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2.2 Network approach 
Our terrains aren’t territories... They’re networks, rhizomes (Latour, 1996: 46)
Follow the actors: that is the Law and the Prophets (ibid, 204)
Networks have come to be an important concept in the way we think about society and 
how it operates, and this is reflected widely in social science research. The interest in 
networks began with social network analysis dating back to Simmel (1908/1971), and has 
been developed through the works of White (1961), Mitchell (1969), Granovetter (1974), 
and Wellman (1998) (among others). Social network analysis takes a generic 
understanding of a network (‘a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons 
objects or events’) (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1991), and highlights how the nature of 
relationships across a network are important because they shape perceptions, beliefs and 
actions. In addition, social network analysis seeks to account for both relations that occur 
and those that do not exist across a network, and seeks to question why certain structures 
or norms may not be present within specific social relations (Mitchell, 1969).  The 
interest in networks has more recently been extended through actor network theory 
(ANT). ANT has expanded upon how we think about network relations, towards the idea 
of a heterogeneous network in which subjects and objects are intertwined and carry equal 
significance. The theory rests upon the idea that social interactions have both human and 
non-human causes, brought about by the integration of both material and semiotic 
influences across a network (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1996; 2005; Law, 1992).
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In political science, networks have been discussed predominantly in terms of policy 
networks2. Policy networks are discussed in detail in chapter four, but it is important to 
understand how they emerged and developed within the British literature. A great deal of 
the early British literature drew upon Heclo and Wildavsky’s (1974) work on British 
public expenditure decision making within the Treasury (See Richardson and Jordan, 
1979; Wilks and Wright, 1987). This work focuses upon ‘the personal relationships 
between major political and administrative actors – sometimes in conflict, often in 
agreement, but always in touch and operating within a shared framework’ (1974: xv).  
The result is a micro-level analysis of the Treasury, contending that policy is made within 
a community by a limited number of actors who interact on a regular basis and share 
common values (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). The idea of a policy community is adopted 
by Richardson and Jordan (1979) who see policy making taking place within sub-systems 
made up of government agencies and pressure groups, with each ‘segment inhabited by a 
different set of organised groups and generally impenetrable by ‘unrecognised groups’ or 
by the general public’ (1979: 74). Like Heclo and Wildavsky they stress interpersonal or 
micro-level relationships over the structural basis of these relationships. Richardson and 
Jordan also emphasise the disaggregated nature of the policy process due to divisions 
evident in government and the fragmented nature of society more generally. This notion
of fragmentation, as we will see in later chapters, has been widely applied to policy 
making within the new governance. 
                                                          
2 The focus here is on the British literature, but for a good account of the American literature on policy 
networks and its influence on the British perspective see Jordan (1990). The American literature tends to 
focus on the micro-level, such as the personal relations between key actors as opposed to the structural 
relations between institutions (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992).  
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The concept of a policy network was first developed by Rhodes (1981), who in a move 
away from American influenced ideas on sub-governments and interpersonal relations, 
developed a set of ideas that placed the structural relationship between political 
institutions as the central element within a policy network. He also places networks at the 
sectoral or aggregated level, as opposed to the sub-sectoral or disaggregated level (Marsh 
and Rhodes, 1992: 9). Since his first writings on policy networks, Rhodes has developed 
his ideas to account for the changing role of the state within the new governance (See 
Rhodes, 1997; Bevir and Rhodes 2003). However, it will become clear that although the 
work of Rhodes still holds an important place within political studies, ideas on 
governance and networks relating to policy making are becoming far more heterogonous, 
taking into account a wide range of disparate views and ideas that represent the 
complexity and disaggregated nature of the new governance. 
The network approach to governance has developed in line with the changing structure of 
state power and the increasing fluidity of interactions between actors. As indicated in the 
previous chapter, the new governance signifies a shift away from the well established 
notions of politics and brings in new sites, new actors and new themes.
There is a move away from the familiar topography of formal political
institutions to the edges of organizational activity, negotiations between 
sovereign bodies, and inter-organizational networks that challenge the 
established distinction between public and private. The disparate actors 
who populate these networks find nascent points of solidarity in the joint 
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realization that they need one another to craft effective political 
agreements. Their efforts to find solutions acceptable to all who are 
involved (and expand the circle of involvement) nibble and gnaw on the 
constitutional system of territorially based representative democracy. 
Notions of politics itself change as new themes occupy centre stage 
(Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003: 3).
In order, to have a better understanding of these relations it is necessary to look at the 
‘micro-sociologies’ of the actors behind these practices, and other actors within the same 
network(s). These different actors form parts of the same coalitions and alliances that 
stretch extensively along the network(s) through different nodes and across multiple 
scales (Gardner, 2004: 67). It is only through focusing on these actors and their practices 
that we start to comprehend the complex power relations that exist across the LEADER 
network. 
The study of networks as a means to explore the new governance illustrates the growing 
importance of informal policy networks, and the need to understand how they operate 
(Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003: 2). Within the politics of the EU, the importance of informal 
policy networks has been acknowledged, with analysts characterising the EU as a 
laboratory for the development of alternative forms of public policy (Wallace and Young, 
1997: 16). 
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Within the context of these changes, and through situating LEADER within this system of 
new and mobile interactions and interdependencies, it begins to become clear why a 
network approach to the study of governance is relevant to this research. Such an 
approach to governance does not follow the systematic boundaries and rules of the 
traditional constitutional political system. This is important for the study of the new 
governance as it enables more effective explanations of the interactions between actors 
and organisations, while also including those deliberative practices and mechanisms that 
are such a key feature of the new governance. This is important for my work on LEADER 
as I begin to explore a set of complex network relations, including what Mark Warren 
terms the secondary reality of ‘expansive democracy’ (Warren, 1992). This denotes the 
open-ended, legitimately opaque, ad hoc decision making arrangements that have come to 
characterise the new governance, such as partnership arrangements (Hajer and Wagenaar, 
2003: 3).  These arrangements go some way toward creating a ‘secondary reality’ in 
terms of ‘democratic’ decision making, and operates in conjunction or competition with 
the traditional hierarchical institutions of government based upon representative 
democracy  (ibid, 3). 
Network interactions induce a whole host of complexities. These complexities are 
embedded within a set of socially constructed rationalities that vary in time and across 
space, and in accordance with cultural, institutional, locational and historical contexts 
(Amin and Hausner, 1997: 11). The quality of networks and their design are important to 
the quality of the outcomes they shape, as we shall come to see in the following chapters. 
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Network design operates at a series of different levels across a supranational programme 
like LEADER. 
Amin and Hausner draw upon a number of features that allow for successful network 
outcomes. 
‘[S]uccessful’ networks are distinguished by at least three features: a high 
level of self organisation among specialised actor circuits; strong ground 
rules of governance which bind agents into a common frame of action; 
and a precarious balance between independence and interpenetration 
between state and non-state governance structures. Functional flexibility, 
diffuse reflexivity, strategic orientation and collective adaptability seem 
to be some of the key qualities of successful networks, allowing a course 
to be steered by governance by deliberative associations and by strategic 
leaders (ibid, 13).
In contrast, in those networks associated with criminality or democratic and economic 
transition we are more likely to see forms of interaction that favour reinforcement or 
resistance, rather than adaptation to change. These kinds of networks are more likely to be 
non-deliberative, hierarchical, centralised and fixed (ibid, 13). 
In drawing upon these ideas Amin and Hausner (1997) develop a broad typology that 
distinguishes between regressive and progressive networks, closed and open networks, 
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adaptable and non-adaptable networks, deliberative and non-reflexive networks, and 
centralized and decentralized networks. The features that come to define such networks 
are shaped by the rationalities that frame them. 
[T]he rationalities of networks will have a direct effect on the cognition, 
behaviour and capabilities of agents, which in turn, will have a direct 
bearing on the reflexive, strategic and adjustment properties of networks. 
Similarly, the strength of ties within and between networks will influence 
the degree of openness to new influences, the extent to which ties are a 
real source of organizational efficiency and cohesion, and the 
evolutionary or regenerative qualities of networks. The nature of power 
relations, too, has a bearing on the spread of authority and responsibility 
across networks, and therefore also the architecture of decision-making. 
Deliberative networks are likely to be flatter, more discursive and more 
democratic than command-based networks in which the main role of 
interaction is to transmit information and orders rather than to share 
power and duties (ibid, 14). 
In conjunction with the influence of these rationalities, the institutional set-up of 
networks, or ‘the enduring collective practices’ and organizations within networks are 
also important. ‘This includes formal rules and institutions of regulation and governance, 
as well as the embedded cultural and social practices, and conventions which constitute 
the reproductive framework of networks’ (ibid, 14). The enduring qualities of networks 
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can be explored through ‘their stability and degree of coherence, their collective efficacy, 
and above all their overall governance structure’ (ibid, 14). However, despite the potential 
for these ‘enduring qualities’ to exist, networks are embedded within a set of socially 
contingent processes and mobile interactions that require a reflexive mode of 
interpretation. In other words, although a network may contain a set of familiar social 
processes, rules and norms, it is still important from an interpretative point of view to 
remain open to those changes that occur due to social interactions that are governed by a 
wider set of social processes and individual interests. Interpretative methods ensure that 
we are mindful of these ‘micro-sociologies’ and I would now like to outline those 
interpretative methods that have been employed in this thesis in more detail. 
2.3 Modes of interpretation 
Having outlined the importance of taking a network approach to my work, it is important 
that the modes of interpretation used to explain my data reflect the mobility of those 
interactions across the network and the varied and unstable nature of these interactions. A 
positivist3 approach to the new governance should be neglected in the following regard:
[P]ositivism is not just a set of methodological principles, but (...) above 
all an attitude towards knowledge, with deeply intertwined ramifications 
                                                          
3The notion of positivism used here is particularly broad, and offers a convenient way to group together a 
set of methodological arguments that purport to offer pure facts in line with strict positivism or atomised 
facts in line with modernist empiricism (Bevir, 2001). It should be acknowledged that since Comte first 
coined the term ‘positive philosophy’, very few philosophers or social thinkers have willingly called 
themselves ‘positivists’, and there are clear differences between Comte’s views and the views of others to 
whom the label has since been applied (Giddens, 1974: 2). 
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that range from the barely articulated ontological understandings of 
reality, via methodological principles of how to collect data in a proper 
way, to a rhetoric of accepted ways of talking about knowledge and 
policy. In practice this means that positivism does not restrict itself to the 
conduct of the social sciences, but also, and more importantly, including 
normative beliefs and habits of governance and policy making. Far from 
being a straw man, positivism is above all a practice of policymaking that 
is deeply rooted in the institutions of modern government (Hajer and 
Wagenaar, 2003: 6).
It then comes as no surprise that the classical-modernist conception of the political system 
and its institutions is viewed like a set of Russian dolls. This metaphor highlights the way 
the government system is conceived to fit into one another (local fits into regional, fits 
into national, fits into international containers) and how political space is directly related 
to this system (ibid, 8). A typical example of positivism in political science is the 
Westminster model, defined as follows:
The characteristics of the Westminster model ... include: strong cabinet 
government based on majority rule; the importance attached to 
constitutional conventions; a two party system based on single member 
constituencies; the assumption that minorities can find expression in one 
of the major parties; the concept of Her Majesty’s loyal opposition; and 
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the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, which takes precedence over 
popular sovereignty except during elections. (Verney, 1991: 637)
In the words of Bevir and Rhodes the ‘notion of a model evokes a monolithic and 
unchanging object of study that fits well with positivist attempts to ignore meaning, 
difference and contingency’ (2003: 25). 
The new governance is characterised by a search for ‘multilevel governance’, ‘regimes’, 
or ‘transnational policy discourses’, configurations that do not relate to the classical-
modernist conceptions of systematic politics (ibid, 8). To reflect this I have chosen a set 
of anti-positivist methodologies based upon interpretative theory, hermeneutics and 
ethnology and post-structuralism. The basis for choosing these modes of interpretation 
will now be expanded upon, giving special attention to why I think they offer the most 
suitable insight to the fluid and hierarchical interactions across the LEADER network. 
2.4 Interpretative theory 
‘Nothing here but trees and grass’, thinks the traveller, and marches on. 
‘Look’, says the woodsman, ‘there is a tiger in that grass.’ (Collingwood, 
1939)
Interpretative approaches to political science begin from the insight that to understand 
actions, practices and institutions we need to understand the significant meanings, the 
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beliefs and preferences of the people involved  (This and the following paragraph are 
paraphrased from Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: pp1-21). It is these beliefs that frame actions, 
practices and institutions. This means that to study political life effectively we have to 
engage in the interpretation of the beliefs and desires of those we study.
Interpretative theory since the Second World War has taken a back seat to positivist 
approaches to political sciences. However, arguments have remained for the unavoidable 
importance attached to interpretation, based on strong criticisms of approaches which 
attempt to see political science modelled on the natural sciences. Interpretation has hung 
on, according to Bevir and Rhodes, because ‘people choose to act on some of their 
preferences in accord with beliefs they adopt for their own reasons’. Present day 
interpretative theory currently has two main strands. Firstly, there exists the more 
traditional mode of interpretation rooted in the humanities, predominantly history. This 
mode draws on hermeneutic and phenomenological philosophies. The second approach 
has developed out of the criticisms of positivist approaches to political science, most 
notably behaviouralism and structuralism. This approach draws on post-structuralist and 
post-modern philosophies. Hermeneutics and ethnology is associated with attempts to 
understand meaning, while post-structuralist and post-modernism forms of interpretation 
shift the focus from individuals and mind to systems of signs and how they work in 
society. I will now attempt to explain each of these in a little more detail.
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2.4.1 Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Ethnology
Husserl (1970), the forefather of phenomenology, considered it to be an epistemological 
concept concerned with the nature and grounds of knowledge. The emphasis is on 
reflective intuition to describe and clarify experience as it is lived and constituted in
consciousness (Husserl, 1970). For Husserl, consciousness represents a realm of absolute 
being, as a consequence the starting point for philosophical reflection is not through 
theory or history, but ‘a description of the presence of man in the world, and the presence 
of the world for man (Stapleton, 1983: 9). This understanding developed out of Husserl’s 
interest in the ideal of philosophy and its potential as a rigorous science (Ray, 1994: 119). 
He claimed that by using the method of bracketing (holding in abeyance) one’s 
presuppositions and ideas, and by deep reflection, one could seek the roots or beginnings 
of knowledge. Husserl (1970) believed these processes lay deep within the consciousness 
of the knowing subject to whom these phenomena appeared. Herein lay the roots of 
transcendental phenomenology.  
The transcendental subjective process is achieved by seeking to attain 
the genuine and true form of the things themselves. The realm of the 
transcendental being, thus, is that of pure ego and what it knows. It is 
called transcendental because of its presuppositionless relationship to 
the world (bracketing or suspended one’s presuppositions about the 
world) so as to come to know what makes a thing what it is, thus 
providing the basis for the world’s existential status (Ray, 1994: 120). 
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Phenomenology was reinterpreted by Heidegger as hermeneutical or interpretative, 
underlined by the ontological search for the nature and relations of being (Cohen and 
Omery, 1994: 136). The key difference between the Husserlian and Heideggerian 
approaches is that Heidegger argues presuppositions are not to be bracketed or suspended, 
but provide the possibility of meaning (Ray, 1994: 120). This suggests the basis of 
meaning should not be founded on transcendental notions in which we place ourselves of 
the world, but on our prior understanding, that can only come by being in the world. The 
meaning of Being is important within Heidegger’s work, and it is important to distinguish 
between Being, as presence in the world, and being, as ‘being there’ (Ray, 1994). 
For Heidegger, hermeneutics must take as its starting point the everyday mode of human 
being, as a means to recover and make apparent the sense of Being (Langan, 1970). 
Hermeneutics goal is discovery of meaning that is not immediately 
manifest to our intuiting, analyzing, and describing. Interpreters have to 
go beyond what is given directly. Yet in attempting this, they have to use 
ordinary, everyday given as a clue for meanings that are not given, at 
least not explicitly (Cohen and Omery, 1994: 146). 
Gadamer (1990), inspired by Heidegger, has since articulated hermeneutics in the context 
of temporality and the historicity of human existence. Central to this idea is the 
universality of language (text) as the carrier of those cultural-historical influences that 
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people incorporate in the process of understanding. Understanding thus originates in the 
linguistic experience of the world (Gadamer, 1990). In line with this hermeneutic 
theorists, typically, explore the existential nature of understanding through the 
interpretation of texts and actions, while also recognising that the nature of understanding 
is embedded in tradition.
An underlying feature of the hermeneutic interpretative approach is an appropriation of 
‘the unknown with the known through a process of constructive understanding’ 
(Gadamer, 1976: 15).In other words, ‘we understand things by fitting them into patterns 
of knowledge, events, and actions that we already posses, typically in narrative form, or 
that are at least available to us as members of a particular society (Fischer, 2003: 124). 
Greenleaf (1983a, 1983b, 1987) provides a good example of the application of 
hermeneutic theory to political science. Greenleaf plots the rise of collectivism, the 
ideological tensions that then surround the growth of government, and the impact of this 
growth on the political system. His analysis moves from the intimations of a tradition to 
the practices and institutions it inspires. 
Ricoeur’s (1981) conception of phenomenology and hermeneutics brings together 
Husserlian, Heidggerian and Gadamerian ideas by showing that belongingness to the 
world is the interpretative experience itself and that all understanding is mediated by 
interpretation. He states, ‘Phenomenology remains the unsurpassable presupposition of 
hermeneutics. On the other hand, phenomenology cannot constitute itself without a 
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hermeneutical presupposition’ (Ricoeur, 1981: 101). In a similar vein, van Manen (1990) 
has explicated a hermeneutic-phenomenological approach that advances the notion that 
human science research can not be separated from the textual practice of writing. His 
research has influenced social science research broadly by articulating the relationship 
between phenomenology, hermeneutics and semiotics, and the importance of textual 
reflection in contributing to our understanding of social action. 
Phenomenology provided sociologists and anthropologists with the means to try to 
understand the meanings people in their own or other societies attach to social practices 
(Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 21). It is this approach which is said to have inspired the 
ethnology of Berger and Luckman (1971) and Geertz (1973). For anthropologists such as 
Geertz (1973) ethnology provided the means by which meaning could be better 
understood. This is made possible through ‘thick description’ that helps reveal how we 
make constructions of others people’s constructions of what they and others are doing. In 
simple terms ethnology aims to see things from somebody else’s point of view by 
following social goals and values closely. For example, local cultural inferences may be 
deemed to have shaped or influenced a particular policy output. Ethnology commonly 
builds on ethnographic study by comparing and contrasting different cultures.
Ethnography first emerged in biblical scholarship, but has since evolved most 
prominently in cultural anthropology through its initial focus on small-scale societies 
(Boyle, 1994: 160). Two important ethnographies produced within anthropology are 
Malinowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1961) and Framz Boas’s The Kwakiutl 
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Ethnography (1966). As anthropology increased in popularity and the number of tribal 
peoples declined, anthropologist began to look at other suitable social units, and 
ethnography began to be more widely applied (Werner and Schoepfle, 1987). 
Due to the constant (re-)constructions made in any given social setting it is not surprising 
that the ethnographer cannot hope to be able to fully explain any form of social reality. 
Geertz acknowledges the difficulty of ethnography, while also highlighting the ability of 
this type of approach to help explain the constructions of social reality.
Doing ethnography is like trying to read (in the sense of construct a 
meaning of) a manuscript – foreign, faded, full of ellipses, 
incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious commentaries, 
but written not in conventionalized graphs of sound and behaviour but in 
transient examples of shaped behaviour (Geertz, 1973: 10). 
There are, of course, no grandiose claims of un-shrouded ‘truth’ made through this 
approach. However, Geertz does speak up in defence of objectivity, on the grounds that 
otherwise “one might as well let one’s sentiments run loose, while he remains hostile to 
the idea that objectivity beyond our individual reasoning is possible (1973: 30). This 
philosophy resonates clearly through the following passage.
The essential vocation of interpretative anthropology is not to answer 
our deepest questions, but to make available to us answers that others, 
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guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given, and thus to include 
them in the consultable record of what man has said (ibid, 30).
2.4.2 Post-structuralism and postmodernism
Post-structuralists and postmodernists provide the most recent opposition to positivism to 
have emerged. The interpretative theories inspired by post-structuralists and 
postmodernists represent a broad range of theorists. These theories are strongly 
associated with the work of Foucault (1991) (among others, including Derrida, 1976; 
Lacan, 1977; Lyotard, 1984: Rorty, 1980; and White, 1973, 1987). Foucault is opposed to 
the claims of the ‘modern project’ that assert that human experience and subjectivity are 
pure in nature. In this sense, Foucault is opposed to two modern concepts – the subject
and reason. It is at this point where postmodern and post-structuralist varieties of 
interpretation differ from hermeneutics (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 31).   Foucault rejects 
the idea of the autonomous subject. Foucault does not believe the subject has its own 
foundation or meaningful experiences, reasoning, beliefs and actions outside a social 
context. Instead, Foucault contends that ‘the subject is inherently a contingent product of 
a particular discourse, a particular set of techniques of government and technologies of 
the self’ (ibid, 24). Discourses are then a social product rather than a product of 
individual beliefs. Furthermore, his rejection of reason leads him to decentre discourses 
to show how they develop out of a series of random interactions of different micro 
practices (ibid, 24).
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Foucault believes we have experiences only within the context of a preceding discourse. 
For Foucault the best way to understand an object or action is to interpret it within the 
context of this wider discourse. Foucault suggests that discourses develop at random as 
products of time and chance. In this context, political scientists must interpret objects and 
actions through their historically specific circumstances (ibid, 23). These discourses 
consist of meanings that are endlessly multiplying, and are characteristically unstable 
(ibid, 23). Bevir and Rhodes state that “Human life is understandable only in a 
framework of meaning, and this framework of meaning cannot be reduced to an objective 
process or structure” (2003, 23). This statement clearly reflects the post-structuralist and 
postmodernist concern for the ‘web of meaning’ as opposed to the objective, positivist 
search for truth.
This does not imply that within the post-structuralist approach there are no human actors 
in politics or that political analysis must avoid talking about agency (Gottweis, 2003: 
254). There is still the need to follow the actions of individuals.
There is no question, for example, that a particular high-level 
administrator in the European Commission is in a powerful position and 
can act to mobilize support for his goal to impose strict regulations 
protecting the environment from hazards related to genetically modified 
organisms. And we can, and should certainly analytically, follow his 
actions. But we have to understand that this administrator does not act 
independently from European policy discourse which in many ways 
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provides critical influence on how this administrator views the world, 
defines his goals and structures his actions (ibid, 254).
A similar argument can be made in relationship to political entities, such as institutions. 
There is, for example, no need to deny the importance of the structure of a parliament in 
shaping a particular legislative act (ibid, 254). But how can we explain the strong 
involvement of a parliament in the shaping of the legislation in the first place? What 
created the dynamics for a policymaking process leading to legislation? These are the 
type of questions through which post-structuralism draws its analysis, and extends our 
‘focus beyond the organization of politics, but also to the politics of organization, not 
only to the actors of politics, but also to the politics of actors’ (ibid, 254). It is the 
‘semantic struggles and discursive constructions which define who counts as an actor in a 
particular policy setting – and who does not; which institutions are legitimized and 
authorized to take part in the shaping or the implementation of policymaking – and which 
are not’ (ibid, 254). Actors and institutions do matter in policymaking, ‘but these 
processes need to be understood within the discourses where actors are constituted and 
institutions framed as relevant in any given policy field’ (ibid, 254). After all, ‘power is 
not only articulated in interactions between actors in institutional biases or ideologies’, 
but in addition to discourses, representations, scientific statements or ‘public 
philosophies’ are critical articulations of power (ibid, 254). These ‘articulations of power 
construct subjectivity and position individual or institutional actors in the socio-political 
field and thus deserve a prominent place in policy analysis’ (ibid, 254).
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These modes of interpretation offer an appropriate means to study the interactions across 
networks. These modes carry no predetermined assumptions on the structure of the new 
governance, and how it relates to the classical-modernist conception of the political 
system. Network interactions are conceived around social practices and discourses, and it 
is these that shape the construction of social reality. Within this context, structure and 
agency will be viewed within the light of those discourses that constitute and frame the 
interactions and structures across the LEADER network. 
2.4.3 Narrative analysis 
These discourses will be explored using narrative forms of analysis. This form of analysis 
represents a means to unpack the socially contingent processes that emerge out of those 
interactions between actors, their institutions, and the world in which they live. In other 
words, narratives represent a means to reflect upon the stories we tell, a means to break 
down and reflect upon the processes that shape our thoughts and the webs we weave in 
our everyday lives. 
In political research, narratives are indicative of a shift from the old notions of 
‘preference’ and ‘institution’ to new, more discursive and cultural understandings of the 
state (Bang, 2004:158). Narrative analysis is based on the belief that the world around us 
is interpreted and constructed through ‘interactive talk’ (Wiles et al., 2004: 90). Within 
this shift, rule is considered ‘the contingent products of diverse actions and political 
struggles informed by the beliefs of agents as they arise in the context of traditions’ 
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(Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 198). The power and knowledge inherent within the everyday 
construction of narratives has now been widely recognised, and as such it is important 
that political research moves beyond the concepts of government and state (Bang, 2004:
158) that hide the complexity inherent within these concepts, and the stories that help us 
unpack them. The narratives within my research relate strongly to changing state 
structure, community governance and the related notions of partnership, participation and 
representation. These form the basic framework to my research, while interconnected 
discourses shape the particular focus of the story I am telling. 
The narrative approach employed here focuses on the multilayered and contextual nature 
of talk building on the basic evaluative mode of narrative analysis, which looks for 
patterns of difference and consistency in content and form (Wiles et al., 92-93). Viewing 
narratives as multilayered encourages an interpretation of narrative as something which 
operates on several interconnected levels (ibid, 92). Riessman (1993) refers to three 
interrelated levels at which we can understand individual narratives: ideational, 
interpersonal, and textual. Ideational meaning refers to the informational content that 
people intend their words to express. Interpersonal meaning refers to the particular 
relationship and role between the speaker and the interviewer; and textual content 
describes the way things are said syntactically and semantically. These levels of meaning 
encourage  interpretation of narrative that explores critically the way narratives are 
formed, by acknowledging the micro-sociologies at work between the speaker and the 
listener (or in my case the interviewee). However, these micro-sociologies are not always 
easily interpreted. For example, it is very difficult to understand how our own 
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positionality as the interviewee is seen by individuals telling the story, and although as 
the interviewee I may be able perceive my own position against that of the speaker, there 
is no certainty that the speaker views my positionality in the same way. Furthermore, 
although as the interviewee we can acknowledge difference in syntax and semantics, our 
own understanding of the meaning implied may easily be interpreted wrongly.
These levels of analysis are important, despite the fact that they are impossible to get to 
the bottom of, because of the need to highlight the complexity of the stories we weave, 
and remove any taken for granted notions of how these stories are produced. However, 
these are not the only levels at which we should try to consider meaning, and in my 
research the larger social context of what people say is highly important. The social 
discourses and politics that frame narratives are invaluable to my research, and must be 
included in any interpretation (Wiles et al., 2005: 92). Applying this social discourse and 
the politics that frame narratives is a subjective process on the part of the researcher. In 
the position of researcher we draw together to the best of our ability and knowledge, the 
social discourse and political influences we think have shaped a particular narrative. 
There is never any certainty that this is correct, but through this process we generate an 
understanding of complex social issues that may just help us understand in an ephemeral 
way the world we live.
The contextual nature of talk focuses on interviews and the particular context in which 
they take place. This builds on the idea that micro-sociologies take place between the 
interviewee and the interviewer. I have outlined above the difficulty in understanding our 
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own position against that of the interviewee, along with the fact that how we view our 
own position may differ markedly from how the interviewee views that position. I would 
now like to show how particular contexts can enhance or constrain a particular narrative. 
For instance, an interviewee and an interviewer may or may not have shared similar 
experiences, and this influences the way the interviewee is able to build a story, the kind 
of stories they can tell, and how easily they can convey their point or persuade the 
interviewer that what they are saying is knowledgeable and correct (Wiles, 2005: 93). In 
the same way, the presence of a recording device can affect the level of interaction within 
an interview (ibid, 92). During a number of my interviews, a number of interviewees 
found it very difficult to relax knowing that they were being recorded, while others saw 
the presence of a recording device as a signal for the need to perform, the consequence 
was undoubtedly a much enhanced narrative. 
2.5 Data collection 
2.5.1 Interviews
The focus of my research is the governance of the LEADER rural development 
programme. This programme is governed along a network that stretches from the 
supranational level to the local level. It is an EU led initiative, passed downwards to the 
national and sub-national level and finally implemented at the local level through area 
based partnerships. Given this multilevel framework, and the programme’s boundary 
crossing network, it was important to use a snowballing method within the interview 
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process. The movement of power and its relations along the network is made up of key 
governing actors and the nodal points where these actors reside and governed by a set of 
official policy discourses. As a means to identify the key individuals within this network 
it was necessary to apply a reflexive approach in order to be able to adapt to the 
complexities of the network. Before I began my research I was not aware how far the 
network would stretch. Of course I had some inclination of the type of actors within the 
network, but the subtleties of the network, and the relations and discourses that 
determined its character needed to be followed. The predetermination of interviewees 
could well have taken my research on a path that was divergent and misrepresentative of 
these power relations. As such a snowballing method was the most suitable approach to 
identifying complex relationships of power across the multilevel spatiality of the 
network. 
In total I carried out 26 in-depth interviews along this network. A majority of the 
interviews lasted between one and two hours. The interviews were semi-structured, and 
as such, I did ask numerous unstructured questions as a means to follow up interesting 
and diverging responses to my initial questions. The decision to use a semi-structured 
framework for the interviews was based on two factors. Firstly, it allowed me to trace the 
network interactions in a fluid way, reflecting a network approach, and; secondly, I felt it 
was appropriate given the widespread difference in the level of knowledge of the 
interviewees. For instance, the high level EU officials that I spoke to had a different kind 
of knowledge and understanding of LEADER, compared to the members of the LAG
partnership. As such, although the basic framework and the subjects covered remained 
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the same throughout the interviews, I tended to change the direction of the questioning as 
the responses became less and less informed, while some areas of questioning were 
simply not applicable to some of the interviewees, especially those questions designed to 
explore power relations at particular levels of the governance framework, and those 
questions to EU level respondents that dealt specifically with the theoretical and 
historical influences behind the LEADER approach.
In the process of following the LEADER network, using a snowballing method, issues 
regarding distance and cost also became important concerns. On some occasions it was 
possible to arrange to have two or, at the most, three interviews in a day, but quite often 
this simply wasn’t possible, as I was working around other people, not the other way 
around. This proved quite frustrating at times, and it was sometimes difficult to be 
motivated for a single interview knowing that I would spend the majority of the day to 
get to it. However, I understand that to fulfil the objectives for this type of research a 
prerequisite must be to follow any lead, however limited and time consuming it may 
initially seem, and I don’t think I fell into the trap of selecting interviews on the basis of 
logistical ease. 
Given the nature of the LEADER network it was also necessary to travel outside of the 
UK to Brussels. I only made this trip once, over a three day period, during which I carried 
out three interviews with different interviewees. This trip was very enlightening and 
crucial to the quality of my data. I left Brussels quite satisfied that I had spoken to the key 
people at the EU level along the network. However, I had hoped to secure one interview 
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with one other key individual at this level but I was not fortunate enough to hear from 
them until I returned from Brussels. As such, I faced a dilemma between securing an 
important interview and the cost involved to get back to Brussels. In this case I decided 
that a compromise was acceptable and I completed the interview over the telephone and 
recorded it using a telephone voice recorder. As this telephone interview and the 
recording tool did not seem to affect the quality of my data I decided to enrol it within my 
data collection methodology, and another four interviews were conducted in this way. 
A few other problems presented themselves, although these were not necessarily related 
to snowballing or following the network, but simply more general issues in relation to the 
interview process. One of the biggest problems I faced within this process was gaining 
the trust of the LAG manager. Initially this individual was very defensive and slow in 
putting information forward. In fact, for some time there is no doubt that this individual
operated as a ‘gatekeeper’ giving me limited access to the LAG meetings, while also 
giving me the contact details of only a limited number of the LAG members as a means 
to seek interviewees. This was, of course, frustrating but I understood that trust needed to 
be built, and I think that by the end of data collection process I had gone some way in 
achieving this, as the LAG manager was far more open about certain aspects of the 
programme than she had been in the past. However, at the same time, I did not expect to
face this kind of barrier, in a programme that was funded through public money. In fact, I 
initially expected these meetings to be open to the public, and accessible to all, as I was 
aware that a number of other LAGs in the South West held open meetings. This was not 
the case in North West Devon, which I found disappointing. 
51
A final observation about the interview process is related to dress code. I tried to dress in 
a similar code to the way I expected each individual interviewee to be dressed, as a means 
to help the interviewee feel at ease. This of course required guesswork on my part, and 
undoubtedly on occasion I got it wrong. On at least two occasions I felt as though I was 
somewhat over formally dressed, and not only did this appear to make the interviewees 
relate to me in a different way, but also made me feel uneasy and conscious of a position 
I did not feel comfortable occupying.
2.5.2 Problems and Pitfalls of a snowballing approach
Despite the fact that snowballing proved an effective means to trace the LEADER 
network, and collect data from actors along it, there were a number of problems and 
pitfalls with this approach that should be acknowledged. The most significant issue with 
this approach, and one that perhaps reflects the quality of the broader network, is that I 
found that individuals and organisations tended to operate in confined networks made up 
of actors who had mutual trust for one another, understood the rules of the game in a 
similar way, attached themselves to the same nodal points along the network, and had a 
long history of working together in various partnership organisations. These confined 
networks sat within the broader LEADER network, tending to cluster around nodal 
points, predominantly territorially based, which meant the relationships along the 
network were not always fluid or tangible. 
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Accessibility to potential interviewees often seemed governed by the nature of these 
networks, with each showing varying levels of openness. Those groups of actors or the 
organizations that were the most accessible throughout the snowballing process were 
undoubtedly those related to the EU and government. The European Commission, Defra, 
regional, and local government representatives were generally accessible through clear 
and direct channels. The same cannot be said for agencies employed at the European 
level to facilitate LEADER, local development agencies, members of local development 
partnerships, the LEADER management team and LAG members. In fact, many of those 
non-state actors and organizations now enrolled in the process of rural governance failed 
to show an adequate level of transparency and accessibility, and at times this made the 
snowballing process a rather testing experience. An adequate level of transparency would 
be achieved if there was a process or guidelines in place for making these new 
governance mechanisms accessible, as is largely the norm for traditional forms of 
governance, from parish councils upwards.
The actors and organisations within these confined networks tended to see the way 
LEADER was governed in similar ways, putting forward comparable narratives. I was 
aware that any form of significant difference in these narratives was missing, and this was 
a worry early in the research data collection process. As a means to overcome this 
problem, and search for those dissenting stories, which I felt as though were being hidden 
by these confined networks, I decided to search for new access points along the network. 
I did this by developing a new strategy whereby actors were enrolled who no longer 
played an active role in the network, but had once done so. Figure 1 represents the basic 
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shape of the North West Devon LEADER network. I also searched the documentation for 
names that had not been mentioned through the interview process, while I also looked to 
the authors of this documentation, and attempted to secure interviews with them. This 
documentation ranged from monitoring reports to official LEADER publications,
produced within various levels of governance. Despite this attempt to find dissenting 
voices as a means to get a more overarching overview of the LEADER programme, these 
voices were not easily uncovered. This strategy did deliver in some instances, with some 
interviewees openly critical of aspects of the way LEADER was governed, but this 
criticism was never quite as strong as I expected. This was either because I was guilty of 
looking for something that wasn’t there, as a means to be able to put together a
governance story that was full of fierce social relations and conspiracy; or because of my 
failure as a researcher. However, I would defend against this latter accusation, as I feel as 
though I employed the most effective means available to follow the LEADER network 
and get to grips with its complexities in the time available.
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Figure 1. North West Devon LEADER+ network
Time was an important factor in this process, because of the implications of following the 
network, principally due to the fact it has no agreed end to it. I have no doubt that I could 
have spent three years just tracing the LEADER network, but of course this would simply 
not have been possible. As such, I decided to give myself a ten month framework, during 
which I followed the network as far as I could.
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2.5.3 Coding
Following the transcription of my interviews I began the process of coding the interview 
scripts produced through this process. As a means to do this I identified three key themes 
that corresponded with the first three research questions outlined in my introduction, and 
then broke these themes down into important sub-themes that represented the key areas of 
interest within my research. For example, in looking at the effectiveness of governance as 
a means of coordination (research question two) I made a list of the potential narratives 
and their related discourses that I felt existed or may have existed within the data. In this 
case narratives relating to partnership, governmentality, accountability and legitimacy 
were all related to this question, along with a set of related discourses on democracy, 
participation, endogenous development, political rescaling and so on, which frame and 
construct these narratives and their discourses in particular ways. In simple terms, sets of 
related themes and their discourses were used to codify my data, and start the process of 
constructing my LEADER narrative. Many of the themes in these narratives and the 
discourses present overlap with one another, and so themes and discourses were often 
cross referenced and intertwined in this process, which I felt was indicative of the way 
powerful discourses produced power, action and belief across the LEADER network, and 
through the narratives I set out to explore. From the list of narratives, their themes and 
discourses I began the coding process. I found that certain narratives and forms of 
discourse soon became prominent within my data. This had the effect of focusing the 
narrative that I was looking to form, and also remove, what can only be described as a set 
of presuppositions on what the key themes and discourses would be. This does not mean, 
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however, that the final narrative will not reflect my own positionality, in both 
unconscious and unashamedly conscious ways.
2.5.4 Workshops and partnership meetings
As an additional source of data for this research, I also attended a series of four 
workshops held by the LEADER partnerships in the South West where general issues 
regarding the governance of the programme were discussed. These workshops raised 
some very interesting issues, and I was fortunate enough to be allowed to record what 
was said. These workshops were led by a private consultancy company, and the areas for 
discussion were formulated by Government Office in conjunction with the LEADER 
groups in the South West. As such I had no control over the direction of the discussion 
within these workshops. However, I was fortunate in that these workshops focused on 
ways of improving the governance of LEADER and, as such, many of the areas of my 
research were covered. These workshops were useful because they provided a fascinating
insight into the governance of other programmes within the South West in contrast to the 
programme I was focusing on, especially in relation to the process of putting the LAG 
together. I was also able to use the workshops as a means to trace the LEADER network 
vertically within the South West and build up contacts, a number of whom I interviewed 
at a later stage. These workshops were transcribed and coded in the same way as my 
interviews, outlined above. 
57
As part of my research it was important for me to gain access to the LAG committee 
meetings, but as I mentioned above this proved quite difficult. After several months of 
frustrating e-mails and phone calls I was eventually given access to a committee meeting.
This was an achievement given this initially looked unlikely to happen. It was only 
following my interviewing of the LAG Chairman that access was granted, and I have no 
doubt that it was he  who pushed the issue of gaining access to the LAG manager, which
resulted in me being allowed to attend. Up until this point I had heard nothing but silence 
on the issue from the LAG management team. The process of securing access was a 
drawn out affair, and the meeting I did eventually attend was one of the last at which 
decisions on project approval were made, because the current programme was drawing to 
a close. Nevertheless, despite the frustration of not being able to gain access to earlier 
meetings, the observation of a single meeting still gave me a great deal of insight into the 
decision making process at the local level, how individual actors and organisations 
interrelated, and the demographic make up of the partnership. I did not record the 
meeting, or take notes until I had returned to my car. I took this approach because I did 
not want to make the committee members feel guarded or uneasy by my presence. I felt 
this may have been the case if I was seen busily taking notes, and as a consequence I may 
not have observed the typical way that these meetings unfolded. 
2.5.5 Discourse 
Discourse plays a primary role by constructing and framing the narratives associated with 
the new governance, and the LEADER programme. The official and non-official 
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discourses on LEADER are of great importance to my research, as a means to frame and 
support the issues identified through the narratives evident in my interview data. The 
focus on LEADER discourse was used as a means to get to the heart of the key principles 
behind LEADER and to establish what was important through the LEADER approach to 
rural governance. The prime focus within this analysis of the discourse was the principle 
of ‘bottom-up’ rural development, and what this meant in terms of governance. I also 
attempted to explore, through this analysis, if and where the emphasis on these principles 
change between the discourses produced at the different levels of governance within 
LEADER. I also used these data, along with information on previous LEADER 
programmes to try to identify where the LEADER approach came from, and how its 
principles were founded. These data sets were used to show how LEADER fits into the 
wider narratives on the shift from government to governance, and notions of state 
restructuring, and why these shifts are taking place. These narratives can be found within 
the academic literature, which unequivocally forms the backbone of my research by 
putting forward a means by which we can understand what governance might be, and 
why it may have emerged, through both empirical studies and normative theory within 
the literature. The narratives formed within this literature are enrolled within my research 
to explore the nature of the LEADER governance framework. The mobile and 
unstructured character of governance networks ensures that discourse plays a key role in 
keeping the governance network together by structuring thinking and action across the 
wider network (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005: 343). If this be the case then the governance 
discourse provides a means to explore this proposition further, and use it as a means to 
look closely at the importance of discourse in the conditioning of power relations.
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2.6 Conclusion
I have set out a range of research and data collection methods that best support the aims 
of my research. By framing my analysis through these interpretative approaches, and by 
acknowledging that through this work I will be creating my own particular narrative on 
the governance of the LEADER programme. I hope to be able to show that any 
understanding of the new governance is dependent upon a set of mobile discourses that 
interact differently with different policy sectors creating a specific set of narratives. This 
is poorly reflected in the academic literature on the new governance, and I hope to be able 
to show through employing these methods, that the new governance reflects the varied 
and mobile policy networks that support it. This accounts for the potentially varied nature 
of the new governance, and its reflexive parameters that support powerful narrative(s). I 
believe that my data collection methodology has provided sufficient empirical data and 
the basis from which to draw out a LEADER narrative that reflects the social processes 
that are responsible for its construction. The next chapter begins this process by 
introducing the LEADER programme in more detail and by looking at the official 
discourses that frame a particular set of narratives in relation to the LEADER 
programme. 
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Chapter 3: LEADER: the basic principles, structures and 
interpretations
The LEADER programme was first announced by the Commission on 19 March 1991, 
and largely derived from the 1987 reform of the Structural Funds which introduced the 
concept and practice of ‘Community initiatives’ (Bryden, 2006). Community initiatives 
enabled the Commission to allocate funds of particular interest to the Community (ibid, 
6). The LEADER programme is coordinated by the Directorate-General for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (DG Agri). The LEADER acronym was taken from the French 
title ‘Liaisons Entre Actions de Développment de l’Economie Rurale’ translated as 
‘Links between actions for the development of the rural economy’ (European 
Commission, 1999). Between 1991 and 20064 three programmes have followed one 
another. It began with LEADER I (1991-93), followed by LEADER II (1994-99), and 
most recently LEADER+ (2002-2006). Table 1 gives an outline of each LEADER 
initiative. 
Table 1. LEADER initiatives 1991-2006
Leader initiatives       Number of LAGs          Area covered                              EU funding
Leader I                               217                           367 000 km2                           EUR 442 million
Leader II                              906                        1 375 144 km2                           EUR 1 755 million
Leader+                               893                         1 577 386 km2                          EUR 2 105.1 million
Source: LEADER factsheet (2006)
                                                          
4 Funding for projects allotted under LEADER+ (2002-2006) must be spent by the end of 2008
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The current programme5 funds three areas of activity called ‘actions’ and these are made 
up of the following:
Action 1 – Integrated, pilot rural development plans – This action assists 
local action groups in rural areas in developing and implementing high 
quality, innovative and sustainable development plans.
Action 2 – Co-operation between rural areas – Local action groups are 
required to work on joint projects with other groups in the UK, European 
Union, or other countries, by pooling skills and resources to achieve the 
objectives set out in their development plans. 
Action 3 – Networking – All local action groups exchange ideas and 
share good practice through a national LEADER+ network (Defra, 2001).
In conjunction with these actions the LAG puts together a development plan built around 
one or more of the following broad themes:
1. The use of ‘know how’ and new technologies to make rural products 
and services more competitive 
2. Improving the quality of life in rural areas
                                                          
5 The current programme refers to LEADER+ which ran from 2002-2006, although LEADER funding was 
still available through the LAGs up to the summer of 2008. There is now a new LEADER programme 
(2008-2013) ran by the Regional Development Agencies (RDA’s), but as this thesis was largely written 
while the LEADER+ programme was still in operation it was appropriate to refer to this programme as the 
current one.
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3. Adding value to local products
4. Making the best use of natural and cultural resources
The current LEADER programme (LEADER+), like its forerunners, operates around 
territorially defined areas with a guideline population of no less than 10,000 and no more 
than 100,000, with a population density not greater than 120 inhabitants/km. In each area 
a partnership of local actors is put together, as a means to consider proposals and 
implement LEADER objectives. The way these partnerships are put together differs from 
area to area, but it is common for the local authority to play a lead role in structuring the 
partnership by first putting out calls of interest and then appointing a LAG manager to 
organise interested parties. According to Defra this partnership ‘must comprise of a 
balanced and representative selection of partners from the different socio-economic 
sectors in the local area concerned’ (Defra, 2001). These partnerships or LAGs are the 
means through which the LEADER programme boasts its credentials as a ‘bottom-up’ or 
endogenous approach to rural development. Defra states that LAG areas must be small, 
homogenous in social, economic and geographical terms (Defra, 2002). There are 
currently 893 LAGs in operation throughout the EU 15 with a projected budget of EUR 
5046.5 million for the entirety of the programme, including all match funding (European 
Commission, 2002). England has 25 LAGs in operation with a projected budget of £98 
million for the 2002-2006 period (This is broken down as follows: EU £38m, Defra 
£16m, other public sources £28m, and the private sector £16m). 
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At the outset of the programme the Commission passed guidelines for the implementation 
of the programme to the member states, and each member state formed a process of 
implementation based on these guidelines. In order, for an area to be able to 
accommodate a LEADER group in the current programme there was a period of open 
competition, which saw a bidding process in operation, whereby areas could apply to be a 
part of the programme. Some areas had the advantage of having operated a LAG during 
either the LEADER I or the LEADER II programmes or both. This was advantageous 
because these areas already had a managing structure in place, and had experience of 
putting together a LAG and meeting the programmes objectives. During previous 
programmes bidding was also open, but confined to West Cornwall and North Tamar 
during LEADER I, and to Objecive 5b areas during LEADER II. 
Defra is the managing authority for the current programme in England, and it works 
alongside the various regional government offices on its implementation.  As the 
managing authority, Defra was initially responsible for interpreting the LEADER 
guidelines passed down from the EU, but as the programme has developed its role has 
focused on the financial aspects of the programme, by ensuring funds passed down from 
Brussels are spent appropriately and on time before the programmes closure. The 
approach of regional government tends to differ from region to region dependent on the 
number of LAGs within a region, and as a consequence the resources made available to 
oversee its implementation. As I briefly outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the 
focus of my thesis, is the South West region of England, and within that the North West 
Devon LAG. The focus LAG has selected the national theme of: ‘Improving the Quality 
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of Life in Rural areas’, and has also the unusual step to create a further local theme to 
‘Optimise the use of our natural and human resources to sustain and enhance local 
communities’ (LAG development plan, 2005). It is not common for the LAGs to expand 
upon the broad themes set out in the programmes guidelines, and this may say something 
about the particular direction the North West Devon LAG would like to see the 
programme take.
In conjunction with this theme the LAG has set out the following objectives to help focus 
the activities of the programme: 
1. To promote sustainable development that conserves and enhances the 
environment, strengthens the local economy and has the support and involvement 
of local communities 
2. To encourage innovation amongst businesses, community groups and individuals
3. To improve local skills and abilities, and build the capacity of communities in 
support of the LEADER + theme
4. To encourage local and external markets for existing and new local produce and 
products creating new local networks and outlets
5. To encourage cooperative working and information exchange within the 
LEADER + area and with other rural areas in England, the UK, Europe and 
Worldwide (LAG development plan, 2005).
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The focus LAG has a budget of £4.6 million. The South West has six LAGs in total, 
which is more than any other region in England, and as a consequence it is seen as a lead 
region, and has been used by Defra to sound out the quality of new delivery mechanisms 
and approaches to policy issues. The regional manager for the South West, employed by 
Government Office South West, oversees the LEADER programme in the region. This 
individual works closely with Defra and the LAGs to ensure the rules and regulations are 
followed properly, to ensure financial regulatory, and manage regional networks and 
cooperation.  Within Defra, there are currently two representatives responsible for the 
programme across England. The Defra team is also facilitated by a desk officer (and 
team) in Brussels who is available to give varying levels of support to Defra as the 
managing authority. Running alongside this governance structure is the UK LEADER+ 
network, which aims to ‘facilitate co-operation and exchange of experience within the 
UK, as well as with the rest of Europe’ (LEADER+ network). The UK network is 
supported by a constituent of The European Observatory Contact Point, which is 
responsible for the promotion of networking at the EU Level. It is organised and ran by 
the Kantor Group, a private international consultancy firm who were awarded the 
contract to do so worth EUR 8million (Kantor group). It should also be noted that at the 
regional level and the national level there is a programme monitoring committee (PMC), 
whose role is to primarily monitor the financial expenditure of the programme, although 
the regional groups do appear to offer some scope for general discussion and exchange of 
ideas, probably because there is wider participation from LAG managers and LAG 
members. 
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The legal basis for the LEADER+ programme lies in Council Regulation (EC) No 
1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds. 
However, the regulation only refers to LEADER on three occasions, and on none of these 
is LEADER directly tied into the legal statute of the regulation itself. The regulation 
refers us to the guidelines set out by the Commission for the LEADER+ programme, and 
it is here that the implementation procedures that the LAGs and their managing 
authorities are expected to follow can be found. The guidelines refer to the strengths of 
the LEADER approach, its context and objectives, the importance attached to an area-
based approach, and the programmes key actions. It also gave clear guidelines in respect 
of the balance of the LAG partnership, stating:
Local action groups must consist of a balanced and representative 
selection of partners drawn from the different socioeconomic sectors in 
the territory concerned. At the decision-making level the economic and 
social partners and associations must make up at least 50 % of the local 
partnership (European Commission, 2000). 
The guidelines, despite acknowledging the importance of the LEADER approach, and the 
need to mobilise local people, fail to empower the partnership process. Given that the 
guidelines are not deemed legally binding it is surprising that the Commission is not more 
ambitious in developing the partnership process attached to programme, given its 
importance to the LEADER approach. The guidelines state that the partnership process 
should be assessed in terms of its “transparency and clarity”, along with the 
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“effectiveness of the operational” features of the partnership. This does little to defend 
the ‘bottom-up’ principles attached to LEADER, and ensures the member states can take 
a broad interpretation in implementing the programme and monitoring it. 
The relevance and effectiveness of the partnership is to be assessed in 
terms of the transparency and clarity in the allocation of tasks and 
responsibilities. The capacity of the partners to carry out the tasks 
assigned to them, and the effectiveness of the operational and decision 
making arrangements must be guaranteed (European Commission, 2000).
The governing structure, and the institutional makeup of the programme, is relatively 
light. This reflects the size of the programme in terms of its financial outputs. It is 
important to note that large parts of the programmes administration have in effect been 
contracted out to the Kantor Group, the LAGs and their managing authorities.  The small 
nature of the programme should not, however, take anything away from the importance 
of this policy initiative, and its significance in terms of the new governance and the 
emergence of an area based approach in rural development. The ongoing history of 
agricultural exceptionalism within the EU has seen agriculture take priority over other 
rural economic activities, particularly in terms of how much financial support it receives, 
and the wider cultural significance it is perceived to have in rural areas. This history of 
exceptionalism gives the LEADER programme a level of precedence that we may find it 
does not deserve in the final analysis. A great deal of this precedence comes through the 
perceived benefits of networks and partnership to the development process, facilitated 
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through the new governance. However, whether these mechanisms can actually show an 
alternative means to secure the future of rural communities is far from clear, but what is 
clear is that LEADER remains a signifier of change for rural development across the EU.
The perceived benefits of the LEADER approach to rural development will be outlined in 
more depth below, but first it is necessary to outline the structure of the LAG partnership 
I chose to focus on in the South West region. I decided to focus on the North West Devon 
LAG, which from this point will be referred to as the focus LAG. The focus LAG, as it 
name clearly implies, covers the whole of North West Devon, with the exception of the 
town of Barnstaple. The territory of the focus LAG is not a district in its own right, but 
instead, as shown on the map below, combines both North Devon and Torridge districts.
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Map 1. Districts of Devon
Source: www.devon.gov.uk
These districts are very similar in terms of their geography, demography and economic 
focus. The key features of the area are outlined in the Appendices to North West Devon 
LEADER+ proposal (2001). The most notable features include: 
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 A very rural area with a low population density and only 1% of land classified as 
in urban use.
 Access to basic services is poor with six rural wards showing in the worst 1% of 
wards in England having very limited access to GPs, Post Offices and public 
transport.
 Lower than average educational attainments both at GCSE and adult education 
levels. Particular difficulties centre on poor literacy and numeracy and access to 
further education.
 A low wage and therefore low GDP per capita economy. 
 Has a high preponderance for micro businesses 
 Is an area that attracts in-migration by those aged 50+ but suffers out migration 
from those under 25.
 In agriculture between 1995 and 1997 there has been a significant shift from full 
time employment into part time employment although the overall agricultural 
workforce has remained static.
 Tourism is a major industry with the main asset being the outstanding natural 
scenery. 
 Has a high preponderance of agricultural holdings of less than 49 hectares (70%).
 There are significant issues surrounding the continued operation of small scale 
farming enterprises.
Like many rural areas the area of North West Devon faces a number of economic, social 
and cultural challenges. Agriculture has for a long time shaped the landscape and the 
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economy of the area, while also instilling strong cultural ties between communities and 
the land. It is increasingly apparent that agriculture must play a different role if the 
economy of the area is to grow and develop, and sustain itself well into the new century. 
LEADER provides some impetus in this direction through its focus on innovation, while 
also providing the means by which those micro businesses can grow and develop new 
ideas as part of an adaptive global economy. 
As outlined in the introduction to my thesis the focus LAG is managed by RegCo, a not-
for-profit organization that receives its core funding through the two district councils. 
RegCo had been fortunate enough to have had the experience of managing a LEADER II 
group prior to the current programme. As a development agency RegCo has also been 
responsible for a number of different projects within the area of North West Devon. The 
table below details this involvement. 
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Table 2. North Devon and Exmoor Regeneration Company (RegCo)
RegCo manages the North West Devon LEADER+ programme, which has supported over 50 
projects, worth over £6.5m. This programme has supported over 450 individuals, businesses 
and community groups.
Acts as the accountable body for the Devon Renaissance Programme, around £7m of regional 
funding, which will bring in a minimum of £20m of funding from other sources.
Acts as the accountable body for the Ilfracombe and District Neighbourhood Management 
Programme, ‘Transform’, a seven-year programme, intended as a template for other 
communities.
Manages a Technical Assistance project to assist projects to apply for European Objective
2 funding - since March 2004, the project has supported 65 funding bids,
contributing to the attraction of £14.5M funding in Torridge and North Devon.
Runs the Empowering Communities project in Ilfracombe, supporting the development of 
community enterprises, financial inclusion and community development.
Source: North Devon+
RegCo clearly holds a high level of experience of both public and private development 
work among its staff, and has is strongly established in the area of North West Devon. 
The current LEADER programme is headed by a team of three people that work within 
the premises of RegCo. This team was put together to manage the programme, and is 
headed by the LAG manager who was appointed at the outset of the current programme. 
Any individual or organisation who resides within the area of a LAG can apply for 
LEADER funding. Project applications must meet the programmes broadly defined 
objectives, and although LEADER has a preference toward innovative ideas, many 
approved applications do mirror similar projects in other LAGs. There is also a 
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stipulation in the programme regulations that any project funding must not have a 
negative effect on other nearby projects, or businesses. This regulation is widely known 
across the LEADER network as State Aid. 
There are a wide range of projects which have successfully gained LEADER funding. In 
North West Devon three project examples include: (1) the youth surfer development 
project, a transnational project linking Brittany in France, Donegal in Ireland and North 
West Devon through a training exchange programme for young surfers. ‘The aim was to 
give selected young surfers an opportunity to learn all about the surf industry, improve 
their level of surfing and benefit from cultural exchanges. Emphasis was also placed on 
marine environmental awareness and sea safety issues’ (North West Devon LEADER+, 
2007); (2) project self-build, provides opportunities for 16-25 year olds to become 
‘trainees' in straw bale construction and sustainable housing techniques; (3) North West 
Devon Economic Partnership - Long Term Vision for Rural Regeneration, received 
funding to develop and document a long-term vision for the economic and social 
regeneration of the North West Devon Area. The series of grant schemes ran by the focus 
LAG have included: the business development fund, business start-up grant, local 
learning grant, community projects fund and the arts action grant, among others. These 
grants provided support to over 450 businesses, community projects and individuals 
(North West Devon LEADER+, 2007). 
The LAG management team work full-time in guiding the project application process by 
ensuring applicants are aware of the programmes objectives, and meet its specified 
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targets. This team is also responsible for the monitoring of individual projects, and serves 
to ensure that a LAG is in place and working effectively, along with its small grant 
schemes that are ran in conjunction with the main programme. The LAG manager must 
also lead on producing a business plan for the group outlining information on the 
structure of the programme and its implementation. The focus LAG accommodates a 
partnership that operates in the form of a committee. It is chaired by an experienced 
chairperson, and project applications are considered through a process of deliberation and 
consensus. These meetings take place on a quarterly basis, and last two hours. The focus 
LAG is made up of local actors from the voluntary, business and public sectors, along 
with two members of RegCo, not including the LAG management team. The focus LAG 
also has statutory membership from four local district council representatives, although 
these representatives do not participate on a regular basis within the LAG meetings. 
There are also a series of sub-committees split by various themes that process the small 
grant applications. The following diagram shows the corporate structure of the LAG.
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Figure 2. The corporate structure of the LAG
At the outset of the programme a number of letters were sent out to actors in the local 
community who might be interested in, or have a history of being involved in, 
governance partnerships and civic groups. Out of this process the focus LAG gained a 
great deal of support, although many of these calls of support did not come from people 
now involved in the focus LAG, and  is indicative of the LAGs fluid membership over 
the course of the current programme. This fluidity comes about for a number of reasons, 
but quite often, as is shown in Chapter 6 people tend to find that other commitments get 
in the way of their participation with LEADER, such as work, family and their 
participation in other civic groups and partnerships. This is evident through the change of 
chairperson, and the need for the LAG manager to advertise for LAG members in the 
local press. This situation seemed to stem from changing personal circumstances rather 
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than any particular problems with the LAG itself. Within the focus LAG between 15 and
30 people generally turned up to the partnership meetings, and in theory any member of 
the local community could join the partnership. However, as I will show in chapter 6 the 
partnership process was relatively closed off from the general public, and in this sense the 
partnership operated more like a private committee. The focus LAG was seen by Defra 
and Government Office as a good example of an effective LAG. RegCo and the 
management team were held in high regard at the national and regional level because of 
the focus LAGs bureaucratic efficiency. However, the LAGs focus on efficiency and 
effective management appears to have taken away some of the emphasis within the 
LEADER programme on endogenous or bottom-up decision making functions. This point 
will be expanded more vigorously in chapter 6, but as a precursor to this I will now 
outline the importance of the ‘bottom-up’ approach, and the persuasive arguments in its 
favour as a source of rural development. 
3.1 The birth of endogenous rural development
The timing of the introduction of the LEADER programme is seen as significant because 
‘It was introduced at a time when the process of ‘globalization’ was widely felt to be 
intensifying as a result of the collapse of the USSR both as a political reality and as an 
alternative model of social and economic organisation’ (Bryden, 2006: 6). There was an 
increasing emphasis within rural policy on carving out a relationship between the local 
and global (ibid, 6). A common response to this challenge from local areas was to attempt 
to ‘sell the local to the global’ through market based strategies in an effort to attract 
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mobile, both public and private, investment (Peck and Tickell, 2002). According to 
Bryden
‘Such ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ strategies (to gain advantage at the expense 
of the other party), were increasingly doomed to failure, and rural 
development practitioners concluded that the competitive advantage of 
‘their’ rural area increasingly depended on less mobile and less tangible 
resources which were locally rooted and were hence better protected 
from global competition’ (2006: 6).
LEADER is then cited by many in EU policy making circles as part of a policy agenda to 
overcome the challenges of the global economy. This is based on a more strategic 
approach to governance that engages with the local level in an attempt to tame the 
implications of increasing liberalization and a global marketplace. LEADER has been 
used to reinforce ‘local identity and self respect (cultural capital)’, through the 
development of initiatives that have promoted ‘regional products and local labelling, 
linked local sectors formerly isolated from each other such as farming and tourism, 
commercialised cultural and environmental assets such as nature parks and cultural 
festivals, developed new applications of information and communications technologies, 
and revived particular local skills such as boat building and stonewalling’ (ibid, 6). There 
has clearly been an attempt through the LEADER programme to commodify all aspects 
of the rural economy, to give it a higher market value, by drawing on social capital, 
cultural capital, environmental capital and local knowledge capital (ibid, 6). In this 
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respect, LEADER represents an attempt to add value to rural products so that they are 
more attractive on a global market. At some point in this process the governing 
mechanisms have sought market solutions to socio-economic problems by directing 
policy down the cultural/social/environmental/natural capital route and through the 
extension of the rural policy network downwards to local actors and communities, while 
the implementation of LEADER represents the extension of these networks upwards to 
the EU, and its associated bodies.
The LEADER programme provides an example of the shifting nature of rural policy, and 
the changing ideology within the post-Fordist rural economy. LEADER promotes the 
principles of subsidiarity and partnership, principles not previously associated with policy 
implementation in rural areas. The ‘corporate relationship’ between agricultural 
ministries and farmers’ unions, as will be discussed in chapter 5, has been cited as the 
main feature of power relations within the passing Fordist rural economy. However, 
within the post-Fordist rural economy these corporate relations are held to be gradually 
being broken down as formerly politically marginal actors (such as environmental groups 
or local grassroots organisations) are enrolled into policy-making and decision making 
networks (Wilson, 2004: 462; See Winter, 1996). This can be linked to broader notions of 
regulatory transformation in advanced capitalist societies as the shift from Fordist to post-
Fordist modes of accumulation takes place6 (ibid, 462). Within this context commentators 
                                                          
6 The shift from Fordist to post-Fordist modes of accumulation represents a move away from the reliance 
on mass production as a means of achieving national economic prosperity, along with the focus on 
standardised, ‘machine like’ processes, towards flexible modes of production based upon a mobile 
technologically advanced workforce, adaptive in terms of both its size and output to the demands of the 
market. This shift has also seen a reduction in the influence of organised labour unions on the political 
system, while also heralding wider cultural influences throughout society such as changes within
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have attempted to follow the changing levels and trajectories of governance that have 
resulted through the perceived empowerment of local stakeholders and the changing role 
of government within the policy making process (ibid, 462). 
The principles of subsidiarity and partnership are supported through the ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to policy making ‘supporting local solutions, helping local communities to play 
a fuller part in their affairs through capacity building and developing well-balanced, 
representative partnerships’ (Defra, 2001). This process is facilitated through the LAGs, 
which are seen as a means to identify local needs, develop local strategy and select the 
projects to be implemented in their area. The LAG enters into a legally binding contract 
with Defra to ensure that each LAG is accountable and operated effectively. This 
structure, in theory, is a far cry from the corporate power structures associated with the 
passing Fordist mode of accumulation. The ethos of the LEADER programme sits well 
within the broader rural policy framework set out in the Rural White Paper (2000) and 
the Rural Strategy (2004)(See Lowe and Ward, 2001). However, whether in practice 
registers of power within the LEADER programme actually reflect this emerging ethos 
need to be questioned, along with the notion that this is a bottom-up policy through 
exploring the way power travels through this network. 
The LEADER approach to rural development can be placed within the context of the 
‘new world order’ through the evolution of the new governance within rural policy. This 
evolution has been heavily influenced by a number of policy crises, many of which can be 
                                                                                                                                                                            
communities and to their traditions, changing educational demands and career opportunities, and the 
opening-up of society to wider cultural diversity (Bullock and Trombley, 2000). 
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linked to the opening up of markets and policy arenas to multiple scales of influence. This 
has resulted in a political system characterised by the potential for disaggregated 
complexity (this point is developed further in chapters four and seven). It would be naive 
to look at LEADER and the focus LAG, without placing it within this wider perspective. 
The focus LAG is part of a much wider story, and it is this story which will invariably 
dictate as to whether the programme is a success or not. Given the linkages between the 
global policy environment, New Labour’s policy agenda and the emergence of a ‘rural’ as 
opposed to an ‘agri-centric’ policy arena there is a great deal of significance in tracing the 
evolving governance framework and the rhetoric used to outline this within the policy 
sphere. LEADER may well be an anomaly in many respects. It differs markedly through 
its focus on endogenous rural development and extensive network arrangements 
throughout the EU, compared with other rural policies.  However, there is also a strong 
argument that sees LEADER as a testing ground for the future of rural policy in Europe, a 
way forward in this increasingly contested policy arena. This point is confirmed through 
the mainstreaming of the LEADER approach in the new Rural Development Regulation 
(2007-2013).
The central rationale for the LEADER programme and rural development more generally, 
within the EU, is the existence of socio-economic disparities among regions that could 
cause inconsistency in the functioning of the Single Market, which the EU embarked on 
in 1987 (Van Depoele and Ebru, 2006: 21). It was this rationale that led to the 
development of economic and social cohesion  within the EU through the Single 
European Act (1987), and this commitment was subsequently strengthened through the 
81
Maastricht Treaty (1993) (ibid, 3). The Maastricht Treaty laid the legal basis for EU rural 
development policies, placing them squarely with the EU’s efforts to achieve economic 
and social cohesion by adding the words “including rural areas” (ibid, 3).
The need to improve the economic situation in rural regions, in order to facilitate 
cohesion policy was initially expressed through the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP).  The CAP sought to achieve social equity for farmers and improve efficiencies 
within the agricultural sector paying no reference to other economic sectors, or indeed the 
occupants of rural areas outside of the agricultural sector (Gray, 2001:34).  The policy to 
assist rural society solely through supporting the development of those involved in the 
agricultural industry was under increasing pressure throughout the 1980’s, as calls for a 
shift away from a sectoral approach, towards a territorial one, became prominent. 
The publication of ‘The Future of Rural Society’ (European Commission, 1988) 
recognised these calls for change by bringing into focus the heterogeneity of rural areas, 
and its ‘complex economic and social fabric’ (European Commission, 1988: 15).  A key 
feature of this document was its call for an ‘area based integrated approach’ to improving 
the economic, social, environmental and cultural well being of rural areas. Rural areas 
were defined as territorial entities with a coherent economic and social structure of 
diversified economic activities7 (European Commission, 1988: 5, 16). The document 
                                                          
7 Rural policy in the EU remains highly sectoral, and although area based initiatives have found their feet, 
through the CAP, a sectoral approach still dominates the rural policy arena. This approach, despite the 
reduced share of economic activity represented by agriculture, is enforced through the perception that the 
interdependencies between agriculture, natural resources, landscape and cultural heritage (i.e. the 
multifunctional nature of agriculture) means that agriculture still has a valuable contribution to make, and 
must be seen in this broader context (Van Depoele and Ebru, 2006: 5).
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recognised that local communities must be more widely engaged in order to help identify 
how those problems facing rural areas can be best tackled (European Commission, 1988). 
Wider community engagement was seen as the best means of avoiding ‘the number of 
errors of diagnosis that are all too common when planning is carried out from the outside’ 
(European Commission, 1988:62).
The Cork Declaration in 1996, although not a formal policy paper, reinforced the need for 
a multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral approach, and importantly the principle of 
subsidiarity was attached to rural development, focusing on the need for an  emphasis on 
participation and a ‘bottom-up’ approach as a means  ‘to harnesses the creativity and 
solidarity of rural communities’ (European Commission, 1996). The results of subsequent 
reform efforts through Agenda 2000 and the 2003 CAP reform have seen a further 
emphasis on assisting a heterogeneous rural economy and rural communities and not just 
farming. Nevertheless, farmers and agri-environmental schemes still take up the vast 
majority of funding for rural development through the CAP .
Coinciding with the publication of the ‘The Future of Rural Society’ in 1988, the EU 
Structural Funds underwent reform, which resulted in the emergence of four key 
principles for future structural intervention: concentration, partnership, programming and 
additionality (Bache and George, 2006: 465). Concentration focused funds on areas of 
greatest need, and it was through this principle that the identification of ‘objective 
regions’ took place; programming required regions to develop strategic multi-annual 
plans to ensure coherence between projects; partnership required that funds be 
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administered through regional partnerships within each state, consisting of 
representatives of national government, regional (or local) government and the European 
Commission; and the principle of additionality ensures that EU Structural Funds may not 
replace the national expenditure of a Member State (Bache and George, 2006).
The LEADER Initiative was first introduced into those regions identified as ‘objective’ 
and lagging behind other regions within the EU. The emergence of the LEADER 
programme, and the key principles attached to endogenous rural development can be 
associated with a set of theoretical and policy changes within the field of regional policy. 
In fact, it is difficult to ignore the influence, in particular, of these theoretical influences 
on the development of those features that make up the LEADER approach. As such, I 
will now briefly discuss the links that should be made between this theoretical output and 
the LEADER approach. 
3.2 Theoretical underpinnings to ‘bottom-up’ rural development in the EU
The theoretical underpinnings of endogenous development rest on the broad assumption 
that ‘the capacity of any given territory to embed increasingly global processes of 
economic development partly rests on sub-national, social, cultural and institutional 
forms and supports’ (Van Depoele and Ebru, 2006: 6; See also Amin, 1999; Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998; Storper, 1997). This set of work argues that economic development is 
facilitated by networking and interaction between a plural set of actors that represent 
business and non-capital interests and relations (Van Depoele and Ebru, 2006: 6). It is 
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argued that through these interactions, and through the process of coalition building,
rogue behaviour is limited, while the identification of a common territorial agenda is 
given a more coherent platform. Furthermore, the consideration of rural space as a 
territorial identity facilitates the construction of a local or regional economy made up of a 
plurality of economic concerns (ibid, 6). 
The bottom-up approach to economic development represents a shift away from regional 
policy based on Keynesian economics, and more recently the neo-liberal approach to 
economic development (Amin, 1999: 365)8. The Keynesian approach is characterised by 
firm-centred, standardized, incentive-based and state driven initiatives that were common 
in the majority of advanced economies after the 1960’s (ibid, 365). In terms of regional 
development, the passing Keynesian system focused on ‘income redistribution and 
welfare policies to stimulate demand in the less favoured regions (LFRs) and the offer of 
state incentives (from state aid to infrastructural improvements) to individual firms to 
locate in such regions’ (ibid, 365). The neo-liberal approach, by placing its faith in the 
market, has sought to deregulate markets, most notably in relation to labour and capital, 
and to promote entrepreneurship in the LFRs through incentives and investments in 
training, transport and communication infrastructure, and technology (ibid, 365). Both 
these approaches, despite their fundamental differences over the necessity of state 
intervention and over the  ‘equilibrating powers’ of the market, share a common belief 
that top-down policies can be applied universally to all types of region (ibid, 365). 
                                                          
8 This development has also been reflected in the ‘new urban politics’ with its focus on local economic 
development as opposed to the welfarist orientation of urban political institutions during the post-war 
period, and is further evidence of a changing global order (For an account of this see Harvey, 1989; and 
Brenner, 2003).
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Keynesian regional policies, without doubt, helped to increase 
employment and income in the LFRs, but they failed to secure increases 
in productivity comparable to those in the more prosperous regions and, 
more importantly, they did not succeed in encouraging self-sustaining 
growth based on the mobilization of local resources and 
interdependencies (by privileging non-indigenous sectors and externally-
owned firms). The ‘market therapy’ has threatened a far worse outcome, 
by reducing financial transfers which have proven to be a vital source of 
income and welfare in LFRs, by exposing the weak economic base of the 
LFRs to the chill wind of ever enlarging free market zones or corporate 
competition and by failing singularly to reverse the flow of all factor 
inputs away from the LFRs. In short, the choice has been between 
dependent development or no development (ibid, 165). 
The emphasis within rural economic development has been largely shaped by Keynesian 
welfarism under the rubric of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Even with the 
advent of neo-liberalism rural economic development has diverged little from a set of 
founding principles that place agriculture at the heart of the rural economy. This made 
rural economic development a one sided affair in that the level of support for agriculture 
was not matched among other economic sectors within ‘rural’ areas. This was a huge 
oversight by EU policy makers, and meant that many economic interests outside of 
agriculture, within areas defined as ‘rural’, did not receive the same level of support, 
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despite the growing realisation that agriculture no longer dominated regional economies 
as it had in the past. It was the recognition of this situation that led to calls for a more area 
based approach and the changing rhetoric, previously discussed, at the EU level.
The failings of rural policy within the EU reflect the wider failings of regional economic 
development found through the application of both neo-liberal and Keynesian 
approaches, dependent upon a top-down approach applied in a  universal manner. As a 
response to the failures of regional economic development, an alternative approach, 
informed by the experience of a number of prosperous regions characterised by strong 
local economic interdependencies (e.g. Italian industrial districts, Baden Württemberg), 
sought to mobilize the endogenous potential of a region, building on regional strengths as 
a means to promote economic development (ibid, 366). This approach is not based on a 
single coherent economic theory, but instead on a recognition of ‘the collective or social 
foundations of economic behaviour’ (ibid, 366). The recognition of the importance of 
collective action on economic development has its roots in institutional economics, from 
which three sets of ideas are relevant here. 
Firstly, economic sociology offers the idea that markets are socially constructed (See 
Bagnasco, 1985) and that economic behaviour is embedded in networks of interpersonal 
relations. Network properties, such as mutuality, trust and cooperation, or indeed the 
opposite of these can have a significant effect on economic outcomes (see Dore, 1983; 
Granovetter, 1985, 1995; Grabher, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Misztal, 1996). Granovetter 
contends that weak ties offer more dynamism than strong ties in economic development. 
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Social structure, especially in the form of social networks, affects 
economic outcomes for three main reasons. First, social networks affect 
the flow and the quality of information. Much information is subtle, 
nuanced and difficult to verify, so actors do not believe impersonal 
sources and instead rely on people they know. Second, social networks
are an important source of reward and punishment, since these are often 
magnified in their impact when coming from others personally known. 
Third, trust, by which I mean the confidence that others will do the 
"right" thing despite a clear balance of incentives to the contrary, 
emerges, if it does, in the context of a social network (Granovetter, 1995: 
33)
The ability of social networks to aid economic development has been reinforced by the 
increasingly influential actor-network theory (ANT) (Amin, 1999: 367), proponents, of 
which, seek to look at the relationships of power across networks by stressing the 
contingent relationships between ‘people and things’ that determine social and economic 
outcomes (Latour, 1986; Callon, 1991).
Second, comes the idea from evolutionary and cognitive psychology (Cosmides and 
Tooby, 1994; Plotkin, 1994) and the behavioural tradition in economics (Simon, 1959) 
that across networks different actor rationalities produce different forms of economic 
behavior and decision-making. The proponents of these ideas distinguish between 
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instrumentalist, procedural and recursive rationality. An instrumentalist approach favours
reactive responses to problems, but these responses tend to be framed by rule-following 
behavior (Amin, 1999: 367). This kind of response is not held to be effective within 
changing and unpredictable environments given its rule driven nature (ibid, 367). 
Procedural rationality, on the other hand, ‘seeks to adapt to the environment, drawing 
upon perceptive powers and generally more complex cognitive arrangements for solving 
problems’, whereby possible solutions are  put forward based on perception and 
conscious design (ibid, 367). Both these rationalities offer a problem-solving perspective 
based upon an ‘invariant’ view of the world , in that problems are always expected and 
responded to, as and when they arrive, rather than seeking them out before they do so 
(ibid, 367). Recursive rationality is based on the assumption that the particular 
environment that problems emerge from can be anticipated and to some extent 
manipulated (ibid, 367). As such, this form of rationality supports creative actor networks 
with the capacity to shape the environment through its ability to think and act strategically 
(ibid, 367). It is these rationalities that are seen to frame ‘the creative, learning and 
adaptive capacities of economic agents’ within their constituent actor-networks (ibid, 
367). 
Third, from Hodgson’s relatively recent explication on the importance of ‘old’ 
institutional economics (Hodgson, 1988; 1998) comes the proposition that the economy is 
shaped by complex and enduring collective forces. Hodgson shows how these collective 
forces represent an instituted process, not a mechanical system or set of individual 
preferences (Hodgson, 1998: 179). These collective forces ‘include formal institutions 
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such as rules, laws and organizations, as well as informal or tacit institutions such as 
individual habits, group routines and social norms and values’ (Amin, 1999: 367). Under 
these terms institutions can be formed around ‘micro-level’ interrelationships, as much as 
through those rules attached to large organizations. As such, institutions are formed 
around the various means by which information is communicated (Hodgson, 1998: 183). 
Hodgson highlights that ‘regularities or stability at the systemic level may arise not 
despite, but because of variations at the micro-level. In complex systems, macro-stability 
may depend on micro-chaos. Or systemic constraints may prevail over micro-variations’ 
(ibid, 171). It is important to recognize that in the field of development these institutions 
can be seen as either a template for effective communication and development or 
represent a constraint upon it (Amin, 1999: 367). The endurability and framing influence 
of institutions over individuals and actor networks forces a recognition of the path- and 
context-dependent nature of economic life (ibid, 367). From a governance perspective 
one might conclude ‘the wide field of institutions beyond markets, firms and states … 
need to be addressed by policies seeking to alter the economic trajectory’ (ibid, 367).
These three perspectives, founded on institutionalist thought, represent a set of important 
principles that have heralded an ‘institutionalist turn’ in regional development studies. 
There is clearly a preference, through these perspectives, firstly, for policy actions that 
are designed to strengthen networks of association, instead of actions that focus on the 
individual (Amin, 1999: 368). Secondly, the role of policy action may cover the 
encouragement of ‘voice, negotiation and the emergence of recursive rationalities, in 
order to secure strategic vision, learning and adaptation’ (ibid, 368). Third, there is an 
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acknowledgement that effective economic governance extends beyond both the state and 
market institutions, and as a result there is a focus on the need to mobilize a plurality of 
autonomous organizations (ibid, 368). Fourth, the stress on intermediate forms of 
governance extends to a preference for building up local ‘institutional thickness’ through 
systems of support, such as political institutions and social citizenship (ibid, 368). These 
systems are often aligned with network forms of governance, which have developed out 
of the inadequacies of state and market led forms of governance. This relationship is 
developed in a later chapter. Finally, a key institutionalist concern is that solutions or 
action must ‘be context specific and sensitive to local path-dependencies’ (ibid, 368). It is 
from this that the concern with endogenous or ‘bottom-up’ forms of development has 
found theoretical support. At this point it is worth highlighting that although such forms 
of development offer a great deal of potential, the process of design and implementation 
is often steered by government bodies in some form, and their perception of local path 
dependencies are subjected to wider discourses and influences. In sum, identifying these 
dependencies gives ‘the powerful’ the ability to construct the context of development.
The institutional turn in regional studies has been heavily influenced by these underlying 
concepts, which have gone on to influence the emergence of a new set of ideas and policy 
in relation to regional development, in conjunction with a series of studies on dynamic 
regional economies and industrial districts, outlined above. The basis upon which these 
ideas have been built rests on the thinking that the region exists as an important site for 
the growth of economic capital within the increasingly competitive global economy 
(Scott, 1995; Cooke, 1997). Two important areas of thought have emerged in line with 
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this premise. The first, explores the advantages of the spatial clustering of interrelated 
industries, skilled labour and technological innovations, in terms of growth and 
competiveness based on the enhanced ability for related economic concerns to be able to 
exchange resources (Porter, 1994; Krugman, 1995). This line of thought has been 
criticized for failing to develop an explanation of the sources of those advantages 
emanating from the spatial clustering of interrelated economic concerns (Martin and 
Sunley, 1996). This point has been taken on by a second strand of theorists, made up 
largely of economic geographers, who have attempted to show that the source of any 
advantages lie in the character of social, cultural and institutional arrangements (Amin 
and Thrift, 1995; Sunley, 1996; Storper, 1997). Storper (1997) is a key exponent of this 
view by suggesting that a key feature of those places, in which globalization has resulted 
in positive outcomes, has been their ‘relational assets’ or ‘untraded interdependencies’. 
These resources draw on the social properties of networks in which economic agents 
operate, and ‘include tacit knowledge based on face-to-face exchange, embedded 
routines, habits and norms, local conventions of communication and interaction, 
reciprocity and trust based on familiarity and so on’ (Amin, 1999: 369). These two 
strands of thought, at the heart of the ‘new regionalism’, help develop the importance of 
regional level industrial configurations and institutional arrangements in securing 
economic success in a globalizing economy (ibid, 370). These ideas have stretched 
beyond regional policy into the area of rural development, as witnessed through the 
principles attached to the LEADER programme. 
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There are a number of commentators who have contested the claims made through these 
theoretical perspectives. Criticism is based on the reality and desirability of the shift 
towards an endogenous approach and towards an increasing role for local actors in the 
decision making process (Outlined in Terluin, 2001: 49-51). For example, Slee 
(1994:193-4) rejects the existence of an endogenous development model despite 
acknowledging that development agencies have recognized that more sustainable 
development gains are likely to be found by encouraging local entrepreneurship. He 
warns against over emphasizing the capacity of endogenous development by indicating 
the need to recognize that the same means of infrastructure development, grant aid, loan 
finance, and support services, as in the exogenous development model, are employed. As 
such, he contends that the shift from a broad strategy towards support for local 
entrepreneurs and partnerships does not alter the fundamental nature of the development 
process. In sum, ‘external forces remain the principal determinants whereas endogenous 
forces may colour the nature of the process’ (Terluin, 2001: 49-51). Along similar lines, 
Vanhove (1999:330) argues that an endogenous development strategy does not need to be 
perceived in terms of an alternative, but as a complementary strategy to that of exogenous 
development. Efforts to attract projects from other regions and continents remain 
important and should not be neglected; and therefore, continued attention should be given 
to marketing the region and sustaining efforts to bring inward investment. 
Bowles and Gintis discuss development in terms of ‘community governance’. This offers 
solutions to problems that cannot be handled by individuals acting alone or by markets 
and governments (2002: 421). Their discussion centres on the role of ‘community 
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governance’ within economic development. They are keen to stress that the problems of 
social exclusion can be enforced through community governance. They state, 
‘Communities work because they are good at enforcing norms, and whether this is a good 
thing depends on what the norms are’ (ibid, 428).
This point enforces the idea that collective forms of capacity building, through 
participative forms of decision making are conditioned through social relations. Within 
this framework these relations are able to enforce norms, questioning the altruistic nature 
of ‘bottom-up’ rural development. There is then a need to question LEADER’s ‘bottom-
up’ approach on a number of fronts. 
In the case of LEADER there have been various studies already undertaken on the 
potential of this approach within the realm of rural development that will be discussed 
below. These studies have increasingly shown that tensions exist between the endogenous 
and exogenous elements within the approach. Despite an emphasis on endogenous rural 
development, the LEADER approach attempts to bring together both endogenous and 
exogenous features. The effects of this will be explored in time, and I will begin here by 
looking to those accounts of the LEADER approach already in circulation. 
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3.3 The LEADER experience
The EU’s approach to the Structural Funds through the notions of local participation and 
local empowerment are now widely known across the EU. However, various analyses of 
LEADER groups show that the emphasis on a bottom-up approach in rural development 
is reliant upon a set of cognitive governing processes that are not easily discernable 
among those actors along the LEADER network, and as a result these processes are little 
understood and often poorly applied (Mannion, 1996; Barke and Newton, 1997; Ward 
and McNicolas, 1998; Saraceno, 1999; Storey, 1999; Bruckmeier, 2000; Clark et al., 
2000; Ray, 2000; Scott, 2004). This is no surprise given the confusion that exists around 
key concepts like ‘governance’, ‘partnership’ and ‘community engagement’ within the 
LEADER programme. As we will see in Chapter 6, members of the focus LAG were as 
equally unaware of the type of processes that might ensure social mobilisation, and in 
turn an effective ‘bottom-up’ governing process. In the same chapter I will explore the 
tendency for powerful groups to reinforce the current ‘status quo’, and ensure their 
dominant position is not threatened. This is achieved by withholding information, and 
ensuring the partnership process is protracted, and as closed as possible.
Commentators have described the nature and extent of participation within the LEADER 
programme as ‘variable’, contending that it ‘may well be more valid to view current 
developments in terms of a process of incorporation rather than a move to a ‘bottom-up’
participatory model’ (Storey, 1999: 307). This gives the impression that powerful groups 
at the local level are engaging with those ideas pertaining to bottom-up forms of 
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development and social mobilisation, and are incorporating new deliberative practices in 
to the decision making process, but there is little impetus to ensure that these practices are 
effective.   This critique may stem from the way local partnerships have been allowed to 
develop their own governing processes on the condition that they follow national/regional 
and/or EU financial, administrative, monitoring and evaluation procedures and criteria 
(Terluin, 2001: 49-51). These bureaucratic requirements imply that ‘ultimate’ power is 
largely retained at the national level, camouflaged behind a rhetoric of participation, 
empowerment and subsidiarity (ibid, 49-51). This ‘reality’ supports claims that ‘it may be 
more valid to view current developments in terms of a process of incorporating local 
activism in a top-down strategy than a move to a bottom-up approach’ (ibid, 49-51). In 
essence, there is a need to distinguish ‘rhetoric from reality’, and investigate the strategic 
implications of these rhetorical claims.
On reflecting on these claims it has been argued that the LEADER programme represents 
a process, subsumed within wider state processes, whereby the ‘principle of command is 
being replaced by one of competition and negotiation as the system shifts from hierarchy 
to market’ (Osti, 2000: 172). 
LEADER may be an instance in which the regulation of the development 
of peripheral areas based on public command or neo-corporatist 
agreements gradually gives way to something similar to market 
regulation, so that the public authority does no more than establish the 
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rules with which a multiplicity of public and private actors must comply, 
if fair completion is to be ensured (ibid, 173). 
A defining feature of the of the LAG partnerships has become the level of participation 
each LAG has sought. Osti has identified two polar models through his empirical 
research on the type of LAG partnerships evident in Italy. The first is identified as a 
technocratic model. This model is seen as a means ‘to stimulate the rapid and effective 
decision-making that springs from the ‘simultaneous’ participation of the main actors 
involved in the development process’ (1999: 177). Participation is developed here as an 
‘instrument’ in order ‘to reduce transaction costs by eliminating certain bureaucratic 
procedures, or as the power of ex-post veto exercised by some or other interest group’ 
(ibid, 177). In this context, partnership resembles a corporate team, that has the ability to 
take decisions in ‘real time’ (ibid, 177). The second, is the pluralist model, which seeks to 
bring about the participation of an extremely broad range of actors (ibid, 177). This 
increased level of participation is seen as a means to bring out the needs of the 
population, producers and excluded groups within a ‘community’ more distinctly than in 
the past (ibid, 177-178). The technocratic model, or at least many of it traits, can be 
identified throughout a large proportion of these partnerships. This system is facilitated at 
the EU level by only passing general guidelines to the member states, and hence, 
allowing the LEADER programme to be implemented at their own discretion (Ray, 2000: 
165-166). 
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It comes as no surprise, given the technocratic nature of a large number of LAG 
partnerships, that the partnership process attached to LEADER has been criticized.
Shortall found that the tendency to see partnership as empowering, based on the 
assumption that such partnerships are locally based and as a result shift power away from 
central bodies, is misplaced (2004: 120). She found that a critical ‘feature of the 
partnerships studied is that they do not emerge from the grassroots. They are initiated at a 
higher level by statutory organisations’ (ibid, 120). As a result, ‘their make up is 
predetermined; usually including a mixture of elected representatives, the private sector 
and the voluntary sector’ (ibid, 120).
The state chooses those external agencies that seem most appropriate to 
the delivery of particular governmental objectives and programmes. 
There is evidence that power struggles, contradictions and dominant 
ideologies are transferred by the state to the sub-national levels in how 
these structures are completed. There are groups that are rarely 
represented, and an exercise of power is evident in the very construction 
of the partnership (ibid, 120).
External influence has also been seen as result of restraints enforced through 
administrative processes. Barke and Newton (1997) have commented on the short time 
period local partnerships have had to put forward their business plans, and the general 
requirements to support their application for the LEADER programme. This may be one 
factor (among many) resulting in the insufficient form these partnerships have taken in 
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terms of engaging widespread local interest (ibid, 337). In such cases, the business plans 
have been found to be the product of external influences, rather than the product of the 
local area (ibid, 337). This was evident in LEADER I where there was an overarching 
trend within the LAGs concerning the desire to promote rural tourism, often with little 
reflection on local needs and concerns (ibid, 337).
Mannion reinforces the general critique of the area-based partnership approach by 
highlighting ‘the danger of local development ending up in the hands of the few’ (1996: 
3). 
A small group of able people who have the skills and experience to carry 
forward local development may continue to do so with little or no 
reference to the members of the community which they purport to 
represent. The challenge for LEADER groups and partnership companies 
is how to avoid institutionalizing a system of ‘devolved patronage’ (ibid, 
3).  
This statement can be related to wider concerns over the democratic legitimacy of such 
partnerships within the governance framework. Fundamentally, it also highlights that the 
LEADER partnerships represent a set of intricate relationships between a range of 
different actors across the LEADER network. The ‘bottom-up’ principle at the heart of 
the LEADER approach can be challenged at any number of sites across this network, 
from the local to the supranational, especially given the flexibility enshrined within this 
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approach. It may come as no surprise that there have been calls to ensure that the 
partnership approach is facilitated by rules of engagement at the local level (Scott, 2004: 
58). It might also be appropriate to instigate a more valid appraisal of what constitutes 
endogenous rural development, and what level of engagement is sufficient in order to 
achieve this. Once such appraisals have been made, we can begin to show that the 
technocratic approach followed by many managing authorities at the local level is 
anything but endogenous.
Furthermore, the LEADER programme has been criticised because of the way the 
discourse elides community with territory as an unproblematic and homogenous 
‘community of place’ (Shucksmith, 2000: 208).  According to this view there is a 
tendency within endogenous development to emphasize communities as territories rather 
than focus on the individuals within these territories. Community is then seen as a group 
of people living in the same geographical area with common interests and a strong sense 
of ‘community spirit’ (ibid, 209). It is within such a context that differences according to 
gender, ethnicity and class are obscured (ibid, 209). Furthermore, this territorial approach 
can also lead to the masking of inequalities and power relations between social actors due 
to the focus on consensus within these communities (ibid, 209). Although the LEADER 
objectives refer to ‘communities’ it is still far from clear that LAGs are in fact able to 
represent different communities or more importantly individuals within these 
communities. Ray argues that symbolic construction is at the heart of the LEADER 
programme. 
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Local cultural identity, far from being a fixed or reactionary concept, 
can form the basis of a dynamic, ‘progressive’ and flexible approach to 
endogenous development in the era of globalisation. [In LEADER,]   
the shift to the territorial approach brings the act of territorial 
construction to the forefront of the development process…It is 
territories and cultures that are key to reflexive development (Ray, 
1999a: 526).
The symbolic construction of LAG territories, that has the effect of eliding community 
with territory, immediately threatens the potential benefits that may have ensued from the 
LEADER approach. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the focus LAG, covering 
North West Devon, encompasses the territories of Torridge and North Devon District 
Councils, but does not include the town of Barnstaple. This area covers a population of 
approximately 125,000 people. Chapter 6 shows that this territorial construction has had 
the effect of reinforcing a set of dominant power relations that do not represent the 
territory. As a result the development process is starved of potentially valuable forms of 
cultural capital. This implies that even if a territory does encompass a ‘community’ or 
group of communities theoretically, the rationalities and the interactions of power across 
the LEADER network ultimately influence whether this network is closed or open to 
certain groups within the territory. As such, these territorial constructions have the effect 
of hiding the rationalities and interactions that represent the LEADER network and its 
endogenous web of relations. This point further recommends a network approach to the 
study of the new governance. 
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3.4 Interpretations of LEADER and its Governance 
The governance of the LEADER programme has been interpreted in a number of 
different ways within the academic literature. Nevertheless, it is broadly framed in two 
distinct ways. The first sees LEADER governance as that framed through the ‘LEADER 
approach’ to governance. This approach, set out at the outset of this chapter, sees 
LEADER as a largely endogenous process, whereby local communities draw upon 
community resources to build capacity and develop local economies.  The second, 
interprets LEADER governance by linking in a set of wider influences from the local to 
the global level. Much of these interpretations attach a great deal of significance to the 
fact that LEADER is a supranational policy arrangement which draws upon countless 
different policy discourses. In this light, the endogenous nature of the LEADER approach 
to governance is brought in to question through a diverse set of different influences that 
are deemed to effect and shape governance arrangements in multiple different ways 
across different nations, regions and LAG territories. As a means to reinforce this point it 
is important to outline the existing interpretations of LEADER governance so that these 
can be drawn upon when framing the LEADER narrative constructed in this thesis. 
Bocher (2008) begins “The main question is whether or not ‘regional governance’ is just 
a fashionable scientific term. Can we really observe impacts of the regional governance 
discussion on policies for sustainable regional development in rural areas in Germany?” 
In his response to this question Bocher develops a complex multifaceted view of 
LEADER governance. LEADER is constructed as a “combination of hierarchical top-
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down steering (government) and a bottom-up approach (governance)” (ibid, 385). Bocher 
argues that regional cooperation is dependent on incentives from the outside and political 
support. As a result, local government and institutions play a pivotal role in whether 
programmes like LEADER are a success or not. He states, 
The practical implementation of regional governance faces particular 
problems as a result of the tense relationship between the network 
structures of regional partnerships that it supports and the traditional 
structures of the German federal political system, as well as local 
government level (governance versus government). The LAG’s lack of 
formal legitimacy seems to weaken the governance structures in 
LEADER+. Nevertheless, the EU’s hierarchical steering strengthens 
regional governance, as it gives an incentive, through financial means, 
for government and administration on a local level to participate in 
LEADER+, despite their reservations and conflicts (ibid, 384). 
The potential complexity of network structures at the regional or local level is brought to 
our attention. The level of complexity associated with the new governance is not 
predefined, nor is it easily discernible. Adapting network structures to hierarchical 
government is not a linear process, and it is doubtful whether the complexity inherent in 
network structures can ever be truly reconciled by hierarchical steering. This is a point 
that will be considered in greater detail later in the thesis. 
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Ray (2001: 280) builds upon this by offering a slightly different focus. He describes how 
“local and extralocal forces interact in order to create rural development entities each 
with their own identities”. The focus is different, but the implications of this statement 
are very similar to that drawn up by Bocher. The interactions that take place at the local 
and extralocal level shape the new governance, in the same way that interactions between 
network and hierarchical structures shape the nature of governance. Crucially, Ray 
acknowledges “that local development initiatives are also, and inevitably, tied-in to all 
manner of policy and public funding frameworks, capitalist relationships on regional, 
national, European and even global scales, and to global social movements such as 
environmentalism” (ibid, 280). At this juncture it is worth highlighting this fact and 
stating that hierarchical state government does not only have to reside alongside local 
network structures. Governments are interconnected to a series of networks that stretch 
from the local to the global level. Economic and regional integration at both the 
supranational and global level means that governments have to reside alongside much 
wider and more powerful network structures as part of the global financial system. As a 
result Ray outlines the need to be aware “of the danger of subscribing too readily to the 
rural development rhetoric which surrounds the LEADER approach for, in the political 
economy of ‘rural development Europe,’ the potential exists for new power constellations 
to emerge” (ibid, 286).
Ray goes on and links the ‘new rural development model’ with Taylor’s (1995, 2000) 
research on global cities. 
104
Global cities emerge not so much as a function of the accumulation of 
more inhabitants than their rivals but through an accumulation of 
superior commercial capacity, especially in the service sector. Cities 
are connected to each other and to their respective global regions 
through commercial networks and it is the relative net flows of 
business volume, public/private investment and aid funds and 
information (‘intelligence’) through these networks to city-nodes 
which dictate a city’s position in the hierarchy of commercial power 
and influence. The political economy of global cities in the era of 
contemporary globalization provides us with three important notions. 
First, commercial vibrancy is a function not solely, or even primarily, 
of local enterprise creation but of the collective ability of a city to 
create connectivity with other nodes in networks so as to be able to 
profit from net inflows. Second, this results in an hierarchy of city-
nodes. Third, the logic of this international connectivity is that the 
opportunities for a city’s development are not restricted to within its 
regional or national boundaries. Global cities do not (or no longer) 
emerge as a function of ‘central place theory’; they can be centres for 
distant global regions (for example, London’s relationship to the 
African and Middle East regions). (Ray, 2001: 286). 
Ray goes onto argue that rural territories have the same potential to position themselves 
and take advantage of overlapping network structures. The rural ‘territories’ of Europe 
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will develop at different rates in this analogy, and ‘growth’ will be dependent on a 
territories ability to take advantage of network arrangements. The most successful of 
these will presumably be those that can infiltrate global networks and markets. Some 
territories will be better placed to do this than others, and undoubtedly in those territories 
that are well placed to enter the global market place, hierarchical structures of 
government will be increasingly challenged. 
Buller (2002) also refers to the tensions that exist within the LEADER approach to 
governance in his study of the programme in France. 
[T]he ‘bottom up’ philosophy and territorial focus that underlie 
LEADER have arguably created a series of tensions both in a 
horizontal sense, between spaces, territories and political or local 
administrative structures, and in a vertical sense, between local and 
extra-local forces, be they regional, national or European (ibid, 191). 
In addition, Buller outlines how endogenous responses to rural development continue to 
be dependent on exogenous policy frameworks (ibid, 197). These policy frameworks are 
framed by multiple interests, within and beyond the state. The governance of LEADER in 
this interpretation is clearly constructed to show that the impacts or success of 
endogenous rural development is conditioned by a complex set of local and extralocal 
governance mechanisms and influences. Buller supports this point, stating 
“decentralization has had complex and often contradictory impacts upon local 
106
government and territorial capacities leading in some domains to a reinforcement of State 
roles, in others to a more genuine subsidiarity” (ibid, 197). This reflects the opportunity 
for territories to position themselves within new network structures, both vertical and 
horizontal. For those territories without the capacity or desire to reposition themselves 
within the new world order there appears to be a tendency to continue to depend on the 
state, and state led governing processes. 
Buller also argues that the shift from LEADER I to LEADER II, which brought about a 
new role for regional authorities in coordinating the LEADER programme9, has seen the 
de-localisation and de-Europeanization of the programme.
This, one might argue, has provoked, first, a de-localisation of the 
policy, in that local territories become the instruments of a broader 
region-wide policy space whose dynamics and concerns are arguably 
less ‘endogenous,’ and second, and perhaps paradoxically, a de-
Europeanization in that the formerly direct links with the European 
Commission and other leader territories within the Union now pass 
through the regional echelon which, as has been shown above, 
becomes the primary administrative framework. The conflict here is 
between two dynamics; the need to find a suitable territorial focus for 
                                                          
9 The shift from LEADER I to LEADER II gave saw regional authorities across the EU take responsibility for 
overseeing and coordinating the LEADER programme. Prior to this the LEADER programme was based on a 
direct relationship between the Commission and each individual LAG. This transition is discussed in 
Chapter 7 of this thesis. In general terms this transition is significant because it strengthened the role of 
the state in coordinating and governing the LEADER programme. 
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social organization and partnership and the need to maintain a suitable 
mode of State regulation (ibid, 197). 
This transition represents an interesting phase in the history of the LEADER programme. 
However, Bocher’s work outlined above on the LEADER+ programme implies that the 
potential for ‘territories’ or LAG’s to position themselves within wider network 
structures has not been limited by this shift to regional governing structures, and by the 
‘loosening’ of ties with the Commission. 
Lee et al. (2005: 227) highlight the complexity of structures across Europe and the effect 
they have on the LEADER programmes governance: “[I]t is necessary to be aware of the 
context of governance within which development takes place. There are a variety of 
national and local structures in Europe that affect development processes in different 
ways”.  Shucksmith (2009) outlines how LEADER is much more than simply a new 
approach to rural governance.
[I]nitiatives such as the EU’s LEADER programme might be recast 
explicitly as a transnational experiment in doing ‘disintegrated rural 
development’, addressing the challenges of neo-endogenous rural 
development, multi-scalar governance, an enabling, generative state 
and the transformation of mainstream policies (2009: 1). 
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LEADER is then constructed as a ‘catch-all’ approach to governance. The LEADER 
approach based on this understanding is designed to mitigate forces emanating from all 
possible multi-scalar governance channels, while also providing a new platform for 
participative policy-making. In this respect the LEADER programme is very ambitious, 
but success is dependent on the ability of the LAG’s to position themselves within those 
network structures that provide opportunity to break away from state led governing norms. 
Lee et al.’s interpretation of those influences on the LEADER approach to governance is 
supported by Marsden (1998). 
[W]e have to conceive rural spaces as ensembles of local and non-local 
connections, of combinations of local actions and actions ‘at a 
distance’, situated in regional economies and different institutional 
contexts. In this sense, different rural spaces have different 
combinations of networks which they are connected. In developing an 
understanding of these we not only have to consider the lateral or 
spatial degree of differentiation (i.e. between the preserved and 
contested bits of the countryside). It is also necessary to combine this 
with an analysis to the ‘vertical’ chains of connection which are 
incorporated in each, through, for instance, the largely ‘at a distance’ 
food chain relationships, or the wider markets of rural consumer 
demand associated with housing, tourism and leisure (1998: 109). 
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The linkages different rural areas make with wider network structures in the 
‘differentiated countryside’ is highly varied. This means the governance of rural areas is 
incredibly varied and conditioned by the nature of particular rural economies, their 
cultures, traditions and their overall ability to position themselves within new and varied 
social, economic and political network structures. Goodwin (1998) draws upon Jessop’s 
notion of ‘tangled hierarchies’ to further pay lip-service to the complex web of 
interdependencies that frame the new rural governance.  Goodwin outlines how this has 
enabled “actors at the local level have…formed a number of coalitions and partnerships 
which have also transformed the institutional structure of government. 
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the current LEADER programme through the basic principles 
and structures of the focus LAG; the exogenous influences on the birth of this approach; 
the theoretical underpinnings to endogenous rural development found within regional 
development studies; and through a set of pre-existing work on the LEADER programme 
and its governance. By exploring these narratives I have been able to draw out some of 
the tensions within the LEADER approach between structure and agency, theory and 
practice, and endogenous and exogenous influences on development. These tensions 
represent the rationalities and socially contingent processes behind LEADER and the 
mobile interactions between discourses of power, institutions and structures, cultures and 
individual agency. In other words, the LEADER approach is framed exponentially by a 
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number of different possible components, resulting in possible variations in form. The 
variation between LAGs is enhanced by the endogenous networks within the programme 
at this level. It is then inevitable that those studies exploring the governance of the 
LEADER programme vary not only due to the ability on the part of the researcher(s) to 
explore the rationalities, and those socially contingent process that frame a particular 
LEADER narrative; but also to the extent that the local level is considered and seen as 
functionally important. Within the following chapters I hope to be able to put forward my 
own LEADER narrative that takes into account these components framed by discourses 
of power. 
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Chapter 4: Governance: A new world order?
4.1 Understanding Governance
A common approach within the governance literature is to outline the different ways in 
which the notion of governance can be understood (See Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Kjaer, 
2004; Rhodes, 1997). Governance is a promiscuous term, beyond the comfortable 
confines of understanding associated with its popular synonym ‘government’, within the 
English speaking world. It is not necessary here to outline each key understanding of the 
term, especially given the extent to which some of these understandings stretch and 
diverge strongly from how governance is used and understood here. The focus here is on
the analysis of changes within the functioning of the British state, the forms of 
coordination employed to govern LEADER and wider considerations posed by the 
perception of an emerging global order. 
I begin by outlining how the emergence of the new governance, both in domestic and 
international contexts, is linked to the changing function of the state (Dean, 2007: 48; 
also see Hirst and Thompson, 1995; Jessop, 2002; Morgan, 2007). The emergence of 
governance, as a concept, helps us understand changes within and beyond the British 
state over the last thirty years and is underscored by a number of propositions that are 
seen to have brought about these changes. I begin this chapter by outlining the changes 
that are perceived to be the most important within the governance literature, and by 
showing how the notion of governance should be seen as a framework for 
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conceptualising these changes. I attempt to show how governance has transcended state 
boundaries to include notions of multilevel, European and global governance. This is in 
conjunction with the strengthening of regional and community level of action within 
policy terms through the related concepts of partnership and community engagement. 
Networks have become increasingly important to the concept of governance, as stressed 
in chapter two. It is important to recognise that looking at the coordination of policy 
through a network approach positions the policy network as a complex field of actors and 
organisations that transcend state boundaries. Any mixture of these actors and 
organisations, or the discourses they produce, might be involved in the framing of a 
particular policy at any one time. This ensures that policy networks should be positioned 
within the ‘new global order’, and although not all policy networks actively interact in 
‘global network relations’, all networks are subject to a set of socially contingent 
processes, similar to those that frame the global political economy.
4.2 Governance in Public Administration and Public Policy
The notion of governance I am engaging with in this work began to emerge from 
widespread public sector reform in the 1980’s and 1990’s. During this period the post-
war welfare settlement in public administration was under increasing strain. This post-
war settlement saw the state as the principal service provider with large bureaucratic state 
organisations forming a public sector predominantly based on hierarchical forms of 
governing (Newman, 2001: 13). Even by the 1970’s there was some concern that the 
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structure of the public sector was not in line with the tasks the state had begun to perform 
since the end of the Second World War (Kjaer, 2004: 22). The British state had changed 
from being mainly a regulatory state, principally concerned with the preservation of law 
and order and providing basic infrastructure, to the provider of a more expansive set of 
services in health, education, pension programmes, unemployment schemes and other 
schemes that ultimately led to an increase in the size of the British state, and the cost 
incurred to run it (ibid, 22).
The reforms, begun in the 1980’s by the Thatcher government, saw dramatic changes 
within the British welfare state that went on well into the 1990’s. These reforms have 
come under the heading of The New Public Management (NPM), and were also 
implemented in other countries, most famously under Reagan in the USA, but countries 
like Australia and New Zealand also followed suit in large scale state reform under the 
rubric of NPM (ibid, 25). NPM can be characterised by a series of trends within public 
administration, these include: the transfer of private sector management principles to the 
public sector, privatisation, agencification, competition and decentralization (ibid, 25-31). 
These trends required new forms of coordination and control to be developed due to the 
more fragmented and dispersed pattern of service delivery and regulation under the rubric 
of NPM, spearheading the neo-liberal political project at that time (Newman, 2001: 13). 
These mechanisms included framework documents, contracts, targets, performance 
indicators, service standards, contracts and customer charters (ibid, 14). One of the most 
important consequences of these changes was an increasing dependence of governments 
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on a range of new institutional arrangements across the private, public and voluntary 
sectors (ibid, 14). 
This dependence on a new set of actors and organisations led some analysts to refer to the 
‘hollowing-out’ of the British state (See Rhodes, 1997; and Weller et al., 1997). This was 
seen as an unintended consequence of the NPM reforms and more broadly the neo-liberal 
project set out by the Conservative party, as it was felt that central government 
departments increasingly saw their primary position within governing networks diluted, 
while ‘steering’ was made even more difficult by the increasing number of networks 
involved within public policy (Rhodes, 1997: 23). The realisation that central government 
departments no longer took such a central role within public policy, and that their role
within governing networks had changed, was a major turning point for the study of the 
British political system. These changes were intensified by the increasing importance of 
‘globalization’, as global markets held back the autonomy of the state in economic 
decision making (Kjaer, 2004: 32). Increasing European integration during the mid 
1980’s and early 1990’s had also begun to have an influence on the autonomy of the 
policy making process at the state level (ibid, 32). This led some commentators to talk 
about the external hollowing-out of the state (ibid, 32). 
It was through this pluralisation of public policy making and administration that it 
became appropriate to talk of a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. This shift can be 
directly related to the NPM reforms set out by Thatcher, along with the increasing 
importance of supra-state forms of policy making. Governance has become associated, 
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‘whether in domestic or international contexts, to the narrative of the decline of the 
national state and its capacities’ (Dean, 2007: 48). Governance emerged from the political 
shifts that culminated in the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980’s, as a means to overcome, or 
at least develop the capacity to govern a free wielding economy. Whether the emergence 
of governance can be seen as an unforeseen consequence of these reforms; or whether 
these changes were foreseen and deliberately embraced; or whether the state set out to 
transform the nature of its own power through a deliberate pluralisation of politics is open 
to debate. What is important to recognise is that governance has arrived, and its 
significance over the last two decades has increased greatly. It has not only become the 
darling of the market economy, as the bridge between the harsh realities of the market 
and the softer outputs the state is still expected to provide through public policy, but its 
capacity to provide the means of effective rule, have also seen governance at the forefront 
of the network society that began to emerge in the mid 1990’s. Governance has become a 
‘buzz’ word for so many of the changes that have taken place, and are taking place within 
domestic and global politics. It carries with it a set of subliminal meanings, like other 
‘grand’ political concepts, such as ‘democracy’ or ‘globalization’, where meanings are 
diffuse and much contested. In its simplest form it is a plural form of governing through 
the engagement of varied actors and organisations, but empiricism has bred a notion of 
the concept which is incredibly varied in form and intent. 
The defining feature of the various understandings of domestic governance is the level of 
involvement by the state, or the extent to which the state is able to ‘steer’ public policy 
effectively. Governance is a concept which has changed over time, and has adapted to 
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changing political realities. In Britain its development mirrors ideological changes within 
mainstream politics, from the NPM of the 1980’s to the ‘Third way’ of the mid 1990’s, 
including developments in between and beyond. This has led to a great deal of empirical 
work on governance, and the ‘modelling’ of various normative characteristics. 
Governance has become a concept that is seen to hold differing particularities among 
academic scholars.
Following the conception of governance as the NPM, as stated above, the concept has 
evolved over time to incorporate ever changing modes of regulating society, principally 
through forms of market, network and hierarchical forms of regulation.  I will try to show 
here that a mixture of all three of these modes is the most prominent, with a tendency for 
one or two of these to dominate over another at any one time, or within a particular policy 
arena. The idea that markets, hierarchies, and networks form alternative strategies of 
coordination and governing within the post-Fordist world is a common theme within the 
governance literature (Newman, 2001: 13). 
4.3 Networks and network governance
The idea of ‘networks’ or ‘network governance’ has dominated the public policy 
literature since the mid nineties and has become increasingly important to empirical 
studies on governance. This is often linked to the inadequacies of both the market and 
hierarchical forms of governing.  The idea of the ‘network’ within public policy literature, 
as explained in Chapter 2, began to emerge in the 1980’s through Rhodes (1981) typology 
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for a study of British central-local relations. This work built on similar academic 
developments in the related literature on interorganizational theory (see Heclo and 
Wildavsky, 1974; Hanf and Schapf, 1978), and another set of work influenced by the 
research of Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) on British public expenditure decision making 
within the treasury (see Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Wilkes and Wright, 1987) (Rhodes, 
1997: 35). Rhodes (1981) developed a theory of power dependence through his work on 
central-local relations in Britain, which he later developed alongside Marsh to form what 
he later calls the Marsh and Rhodes typology (1992). The typology treats policy networks 
as a generic term. This typology was based on the idea that policy communities and issue 
networks represented different types of relationships between interest groups and 
government (Rhodes, 1997: 43). These networks are placed within a continuum. Policy 
communities occupy one end of the continuum and involve close relationships; while 
issue networks are positioned at the other end of the networks and involve loose 
relationships (ibid, 43). This typology is best explained through a description of both a 
policy community and an issue network.
The characteristics of a policy community include:
 A limited number of participants with some groups consciously excluded
 Frequent and high quality interaction between all members of the community on 
all matters related to the policy issues
 Consistency in values, membership and policy outcomes which persist
 Consensus, with the ideology, values and broad policy preferences shared by all 
participants
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 All members of the policy community have resources so the links between them 
are exchange relationships
Whereas an issue network has the following characteristics:
 Many participants 
 Fluctuating interaction and access for the various members
 Limited consensus and ever present conflict
 Interaction based on consultation rather than negotiation or bargaining 
 An unequal power relationship in which many participants may have few 
resources, little access and no alternative 
(Rhodes, 1997: 44-45)
This approach to policy networks has been described by Bevir and Rhodes as ‘interest 
intermediation’ (2003). Policy networks, in this generic sense, are defined as sets of 
resource dependent organisations, and so to achieve their objectives different 
organisations have to exchange resources (ibid, 50). ‘Rules of the game’ regulate what 
strategies actors employ in the exchange of resources, as actors look to position 
themselves to achieve the best possible outcome (ibid, 50). These networks are seen as 
institutional-like structures ‘which limit participation in policy-making, define the roles of 
actors, decide which issues to include and exclude from the policy agenda, shape the 
behaviour of actors through the rules of the game, privilege certain interests not only by 
according them access but also by favouring their preferred policy outcomes, and 
substitute private government for public accountability’ (ibid, 50). 
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This approach, although still relevant, focuses on the type of networks that exist within 
public policy, and the relationships of power dependence that characterise them. More 
recently the focus on ‘networks’ has shifted greatly. The conception of policy networks 
has been incorporated into the process of governing through the ‘new’ governance of 
social and economic relations. Networks are no longer solely a means of analysing 
interorganizational relations within public policy, but are now, as previously stated, seen 
to be increasingly enrolled, either, alongside, or as alternatives to, markets and hierarchy 
in the process of governance and meta-governance.  Networks are increasingly being 
viewed in more generic ways, linked to the fluid conception of power relations set out in 
chapter two. The theoretical work on policy networks discussed above still has relevance, 
despite these changing parameters, due to the insights offered on the dependencies that 
are evident through interactions across networks. However, the growing importance of 
informal policy networks, identified in the previous chapter, is intended to highlight that 
mobile points of solidarity are increasingly more likely than solid network structures.  
Networks have become synonymous with the changing power relations of the state, and 
beyond, within the post-Keynesian global economy. Networks offer an alternative to 
markets and the hierarchical limitations of the Westminster model of government. For 
many commentators ‘networks’ are ‘governance’. 
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4.4 ‘Networks as governance’
During the late nineties the British Economic and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) 
Research Programmes on Local Governance and Whitehall found that ‘the system of 
government beyond Westminster and Whitehall changed from a system of local 
government into a system of local governance involving complex sets of organisations 
drawn from the public and private sectors (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 52; see Stoker, 1999, 
2000). The term ‘network’ starts to be used to describe the range of actors involved 
through interdependent relationships in the delivery of services (Rhodes, 1997: 51). 
The creation of government agencies, the use of special-purpose bodies to deliver services 
and the encouragement of public-private partnerships contributes to networks becoming
an increasingly important element in the process of governing, challenging the 
Westminster model of government (ibid, 51). Governance was then seen to be about the 
management of networks (ibid, 52), instead of a reliance on hierarchy or the market. In 
the same way as hierarchy and markets, networks became synonymous with co-ordination 
and the allocation of resources (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 53). Rhodes defines network 
forms of governance as ‘self-organizing, interorganizational networks’. He draws on 
Kickert (1993) to help explain how networks have become self organizing and 
autonomous.
The control capacity of government is limited for a number of reasons: 
lack of legitimacy, complexity of the policy processes, complexity and 
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multitude of institutions concerned etc. Government is only one of many 
actors that influence the course of events in a societal system. 
Government does not have enough power to exert its will on other actors. 
Other social institutions are, to a great extent autonomous. They are not 
controlled by any single superordinated actor, not even the government. 
They largely control themselves. Autonomy not only implies freedom, it 
also implies self-responsibility. Autonomous systems have a much larger 
degree of freedom of self-governance. Deregulation, government 
withdrawal, and steering at a distance... are all notions of less direct 
government regulation and control, which lead to more autonomy and 
self-governance for social institutions (Kickert, 1993). 
Rhodes concludes that ‘integrated networks (my emphasis) resist government steering, 
develop their own policies and mould their environments’ (1997:52). The challenge for 
the state, is seen as the ability to find the appropriate tools, in an attempt to steer these 
networks from a non-sovereign position (ibid, 58; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 53). 
4.5 The new governance and the state
Governance is seen, by some, as a system characterised by interactive socio-political 
forms of governing, responding to the challenges posed by complex social problems and 
fragmented societies (Newman, 2001: 14). This line of argument is taken up by Kooiman 
and van Vliet (1993): 
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The purpose of governance in our societies can be described as coping 
with the problems but also the opportunities of complex, diverse and 
fragmented societies. Complexity, dynamics and diversity has led to a 
shrinking external autonomy of the nation state combined with a 
shrinking internal dominance vis-a-vis social subsystems... Governing in 
modern society is predominantly a process of coordination and 
influencing social, political and administrative interactions, meaning that 
new forms of interactive government are necessary (Kooiman and van 
Vliet, 1993)
This conception of governance questions the ability of state-centric modes of governing, 
and placates notions of a central sovereign authority (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 47). It is 
felt that there are a variety of actors involved within policy making in any given policy 
field out of necessity (ibid, 47-48). This necessity derives from the inability of 
government, or any single body for that matter, to have all the knowledge and 
information required to solve complex social problems (Kooiman, 1993). This has meant 
that, rather than government acting alone, it is increasingly promoting forms of co-
steering, co-regulation, co-production, cooperative management and public/private 
partnerships (ibid, 15). Within the lines of this conception of governance the task of 
‘steering’ public policy is no longer the sole preserve of government, but has been 
enrolled by a wide ranging set of agencies, organizations and individuals within the 
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public, private and voluntary sectors, either in conjunction or in combination with each 
other (ibid, 15). 
A related conceptualisation of governance is offered by Luhmann who believes there is 
an undeniable “centrifugal tendency inherent in all modern societies” (Luhman, 1982). 
He claims we live in a ‘centreless society’, within which ‘the tasks of government are to 
enable socio-political interactions, to encourage many and varied arrangements for 
coping with problems and to distribute services among several actors’ (ibid, 1982: xv). 
These new patterns of interaction are represented in Britain by public-private 
partnerships, co-operative management, and joint entrepreneurial projects, among others.
The new political economy approach to governance, as titled by Bevir and Rhodes, 
explores both the regulation of the economy and the boundaries between civil society, 
state and the market economy as they are seen to become increasingly blurred (2003: 48). 
Bevir and Rhodes outline two approaches under this heading: a positivist and a neo-
Marxist approach. 
The positivist approach is drawn from Lindberg et al. (1991). They contend that 
governance refers to ‘the political and economic processes that coordinate activity among 
economic actors’ (1991: 3). Through exploring the ‘transformation of the institutions that 
govern activity’ they identify six ideal type mechanisms of governance: markets, 
obligation networks, hierarchy, monitoring, promotional networks and associations (ibid, 
5). In discussing these mechanisms they also draw on social control understood as 
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‘struggles over strategic control and power within economic exchange’ along with a 
focus on which ones promote economic efficiency, and under what conditions (ibid, 5). 
They contend that the state plays an important role, and should not be seen as just another 
mechanism of governance. Instead, the state is seen as a gatekeeper to ‘outsiders’ through 
its ability to promote and inhibit economic activity. An explanation of this role is offered
by describing how the state apparatus provides arenas through which those groups whose 
participation in governance is not already institutionalized are able to participate (1991: 
30). They give the example of the courts, which are seen as a ‘common gate-keeping 
mechanism that determine what effects, if any, outsiders, such as consumer and 
environmental groups, have on sectoral governance’ (ibid: 30). As such, the state has an 
important role in shaping the nature of governance through this type of mechanism 
according to this positivist account of governance.
The neo-Marxist perspective on governance, drawn from Jessop (1997, 1999, 2002) and 
Le Galès (1998) sees governance as ‘the complex art of steering multiple agencies, 
institutions and systems which are both operationally autonomous from one another and 
structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal interdependence’ (Jessop 1997: 
95), or more simply put the ‘coordination of interdependent social relations’ (Jessop, 
2002: 52) Jessop distinguishes three areas of social relations, the coordination of which 
represents a system of governance, these include the familiar notions of market (anarchy 
of exchange), hierarchy, and networks (heterarchy of self organisation) (ibid, 52).
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According to Le Galès, the state within the classic framework of public policy studies is 
largely defined by the power it is able to exert over society and the economy in a given 
territory (1998: 494). Within the neo-Marxist perspective on governance there is no such 
primacy accorded to the sovereign state, instead only the ideas of leading, steering and 
directing are recognisable (ibid, 495). The issue of governance, from a neo-Marxist 
perspective, and within the context of the new political economy calls for a ‘re-
examination of the interrelations between civil society, state and market and of the re-
composition of these different spheres whose boundaries have become blurred’ (ibid, 
495). In Jessop’s work this view is expressed through his strategic-relational approach 
that views the state as a social relation (2002: 40).
This implies that the exercise of state power (or, better, state powers in 
the plural) involves a form-determined condensation of the changing 
balance of forces. In other words, state power reflects the prevailing 
balance of forces as this is institutionally mediated through the state 
apparatus with its structurally inscribed strategic selectivity. Adopting 
this approach, the state can be defined as a relatively unified ensemble of 
socially embedded, socially regularized, and strategically selective 
institutions, organizations, social forces and activities organized around 
(or at least involved in) making collectively binding decisions for an 
imagined political community (2002: 40)
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As such, Jessop believes that it is vital that the circulation of power is traced through 
wider and more complex sets of social relations both internal and external to the state 
(2002: 41), given the fact that social relations (i.e. market, hierarchy and networks) are 
constantly re-produced in line with forms of capitalist accumulation (2002: 52). 
4.6 The new governance: hierarchies, markets, networks and their co-relationship
Jessop goes on to develop a notion of meta-governance, which attempts to look more 
closely at the ‘complexity, plurality, and tangled hierarchies found in the prevailing 
modes of coordination’ (2002: 242). From a governing perspective meta-governance ‘is 
the organization of the conditions for governance and involves the judicious mixing of 
market, hierarchy and networks to achieve the best possible outcomes from the viewpoint 
of those engaged in meta-governance’ (ibid, 242). Jessop outlines four modes of meta-
governance that relate to governance by markets, hierarchies and networks. These modes 
of meta-governance include: First, meta-exchange, which involves ‘the reflexive redesign 
of individual markets and/or the reflexive reordering of relations among markets by 
modifying their operation and articulation’; Second, meta-organization, which ‘involves 
the reflexive redesign of organizations, the reordering of inter-organizational relations, 
and the management ecologies (in other words, the organization of the conditions of 
organizational evolution in conditions where many organizations coexist, compete, 
cooperate and co-evolve)’; Third, meta-heterarchy, which refers ‘to the organization of 
the conditions of self-organization by redefining the framework for heterarchy or 
reflexive self organization’; and finally, there is meta-governance, which ‘involves the 
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rearticulating and collibrating different modes of governance’ or ‘governance of 
governance’ (ibid, 240-242). 
This understanding of meta-governance or the ‘governance of governance’ help us think 
more strategically about the way different forms of governance are enrolled by the state 
and other organisations and actors. There is no doubt that the state plays a significant and 
increasing role in meta-governance (ibid, 242).
They provide the ground rules for governance and the regulatory order in 
and through which governance partners can pursue their aims; ensure the 
compatibility or coherence of different governance mechanisms and 
regimes; act as the primary organizer of the dialogue among policy 
communities; deploy a relative monopoly of organizational intelligence 
and information with which to shape cognitive expectations, serve as a 
‘court of appeal’ for disputes arising within and over governance; seek to 
rebalance power differentials by strengthening weaker forces or systems 
in the interests of system integration and/or social cohesion; try to modify 
self understanding of identities, strategic capacities and interests of 
individual and collective actors in different strategic contexts, and hence 
alter their implications for preferred strategies and tactics; and also 
assume political responsibility in the event of governance failure. (ibid, 
242-243)
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Dean believes this represents a paradox given that ‘governance is presented as a solution 
to failures of states and markets’, and yet ‘states still play a central role in the exercise of 
meta-governance’ (Dean, 2007: 49). This represents the changing relationship of the state 
with society, as public policy becomes increasingly pluralistic. However, Jessop is keen 
to stress that markets, hierarchies and hetararchies (self-organization) still exist but in the 
context of ‘negotiated decision making’ (2002: 243). In other words, a balance is 
negotiated between these three modes of regulation in an attempt to find the most 
appropriate solution to a problem. Undoubtedly there are winners and losers in this type 
of negotiated decision making, with the state no longer ‘the sovereign authority’, it is just 
seen to add its own ‘distinctive resources to the negotiation process’ in the same way as 
the other organisations and actors across the policy network (ibid, 243). Jessop does not 
dismiss the ability of states to command governance and meta-governance, but makes 
clear that the process of governing has become fluid through the opening up of the policy 
making process and the repositioning of the state as an arbiter by removing the 
dependency on hierarchy, and searching for the means of ‘governance of governance’.
The differences that exist with the governance literature mirror the changing ideological 
trends over time, which has seen the development of governance from the NPM (see 
Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 46) towards the more recent conception of ‘meta-governance’, 
and its constituent subtleties in the facilitation of self-organizing networks and their 
structural development (Dean, 2007: 49-49; See Jessop, 1998). Governance is often seen 
either ‘in the narrow sense of managing self organising networks’;  or more broadly in the 
‘sense of managing rules and patterns of coordination, organizing the complex structures 
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of hierarchies, networks and markets’ (Kjaer, 2004: 48). The later conception of the term 
has more recently been aligned with the notion of meta-governance. However, to some 
commentators governance has always been about more than managing self organising 
networks. Kooiman and van Vliet (1993, 1995), for instance, believe that self-
governance, co-governance (or ‘heterarchical’ governance) and governance through 
hierarchy are likely to co-exist in any society. In this sense governance is a structural 
‘game’, and as such no conception of governance should be seen to stand alone. Kjaer 
makes this point in relation to network governance, but this argument should also be 
extended to all those forms of governance discussed here and their interrelationships 
(2004: 49).   
4.7 Going supra-national: international interdependence – European and global governance 
An important area of the governance literature explores the global political and economic 
shifts that have limited the capacity of nation states to govern (Newman, 2001: 12).  The 
ideas of the ‘hollowing-out’ of the state, multilevel governance, and European 
governance have brought valuable insight into how we should perceive the importance of 
governance beyond the confines of the state, and how we should understand the 
relationship between the state, their governments and the proliferation of supranational 
and even global institutions that have emerged in conjunction with the decline of 
Fordism, the decline of the Westphalia system or state led intergovernmental relations, 
and the rise of an increasingly market led global economy.
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The notion of the ‘hollowing out’ of the state has been used to summarize many of the 
changes which have taken place in the British state (Rhodes, 1997: 17). ‘It refers to the 
loss of functions upwards to the European Union, downwards to special purpose bodies 
and outwards to agencies’ (ibid, 17). For many, such as Held the notion of ‘hollowing-
out’ of the state is directly related to the processes of globalization, and is not specifically 
a function of Europeanization. He identifies four processes of ‘disjuncture’ that are 
limiting the autonomy of nation states: the internationalisation of production and financial 
transactions, international organisations, international law and hegemonic powers and 
power blocs. Held states that: 
The ‘disjunctures’ reveal a set of forces that combine to restrict the 
freedom of action of governments and states by blurring the 
boundaries of domestic politics; transforming the conditions of 
political decision-making; changing the institutional and 
organizational context of national polities; altering the legal 
framework and administrative practices of governments; and obscuring 
the lines of responsibility and accountability of national states 
themselves. From these processes alone one can say that the operation 
of states in an ever more complex international system both limits their 
autonomy and infringes ever more upon their sovereignty (Held, 1991: 
157).
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The processes of globalization, internal devolution within states, and the growth of 
international bodies like the EU, and the World Bank is felt to have weakened the powers 
of the state, effecting their ability to govern. 
Saward (1997) argues that the ‘hollowing-out’ thesis hides the extent to which this 
process was an outward effort by the state to get rid of some of its functions, separating 
politics and administration, as a means to exercise more effective control. However, 
Rhodes argues that the motives the state draws upon for giving up some of its internal 
functions are not the critical point. ‘A function willingly lost is still a function lost; the 
centre can no longer do something it used to do. (Rhodes, 1997: 17). ‘Intentions all too 
often disappear in a flurry of unintended consequences’ (ibid, 17). This sentiment is 
drawn from policy research Rhodes carried out alongside Marsh through which they 
found there is a ‘marked disparity between legislative intent and the policy as put into 
practice’ (ibid, 17). 
The nation state is still seen by many to play a central role within the ‘global’ governance 
model, by providing the conditions for effective international interdependence. Hirst and 
Thompson call this process ‘suturing’, whereby, the policies and practices of states in 
distributing power upwards to the international level and downwards to sub-national 
agencies are the structures that will hold the system of governance together (1995: 423). 
The nation state then appears as a ‘source of constitutional ordering’, providing a set of 
standards in a world of diverse political forces (ibid, 435). In the next section I explore 
whether the EU should also be seen as a source of constitutional ordering.
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4.8 Governing the EU ‘state’
The EU, as a supranational governing body, has the institutional capacity to take on the 
functions that are deemed to have been passed upwards from the state. I would now like 
to spend some time exploring the extent to which these functions have passed to the EU, 
and what significance this carries for the way domestic policies are now governed. 
Within the European Studies literature there are two main ways in which the concept of 
governance is understood: multilevel governance and European Governance (Kjaer, 
2004: 108). 
Multilevel governance refers to a system of coordination involving regions, states and the 
EU.
Multilevel governance refers to the evolving policy mode in the EU, in 
which the state no longer monopolizes EU policy making. Multilevel 
governance is a model in which decision making competences are shared. 
The Commission devises programmes in partnership with local and 
regional authorities. Individual state executives lose a significant degree 
of control over rule enforcement, and sub-national arenas are not 
restricted to acting only within the limits of the state. The regions act 
increasingly at the EU level, they have established their own offices in 
Brussels, and they also pressure the Commission through the European 
Parliament (ibid, 109). 
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The study of multilevel governance rests heavily on the power relations that exist 
between the regional, national and supranational level. Within the theory of multilevel 
governance there is no assumption that the state is the dominant actor, instead all 
participants operate, drawing heavily on the policy network approach, as resource 
dependent organisation where the balance of power can be equal or unequal (ibid, 109). 
Multilevel governance developed as a concept in line with the growth of distributional 
policies at the EU level, exemplified through the commitment of the EU to pay attention 
to economic and social divergence within its territory (ibid, 109). The EU’s cohesion 
policy empowered sub-national authorities through the implementation of structural funds 
to address social disparities in the regions (ibid, 110). This had the effect of breaking 
down hierarchical systems of governing at the EU level and promoting the regional level 
as a new institutional partner, along with less formal network governance arrangements 
(ibid, 110). 
The theory of multilevel governance rests heavily on assumptions about the process of 
governance based upon social and economic policies of redistribution (Ibid, 110). Kjaer 
argues that this undermines the more significant role the EU plays through the regulation 
of markets (2004: 111). European Governance offers an alternative to the multilevel 
governance approach and examines the various forms of governance evident in the EU by 
referring to ‘the complex, non-hierarchical nature of policy making’, while not presuming 
‘governance to be necessarily multilevel’ (ibid, 108). As Kjaer points out the EU budget 
is very modest compared to the budgets of national governments, and has very little 
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influence over national legislation in areas such as poverty, family policy, urban policy or 
old age (ibid, 111). Yet, its role in the regulation of the economy is clear, given that 
around 70% of all business administration in the UK is authorised in Brussels (ibid, 111). 
Add to this the increasing influence of the EU over other areas, such as the environment 
and consumer protection, along with the fact that those EU regulations agreed by the 
Council have primacy over national legislation we begin to see that many of the 
regulatory practices that characterise European governance reflect a form of top-down 
centralised governance as opposed to multilevel governance per se (ibid, 111). 
The key strength of the European Governance theory rests on its recognition of the 
different regulatory forces within the EU and its member states. Scharpf (1996) compares 
the harmonization of product standards and the area of industrial relations to show the 
variance within the regulatory processes of the EU. In the former, the Commission takes 
a lead role in organising committee arrangements for representatives from each member 
state, through the process of ‘comitology’ (ibid, 528). Comitology refers to the complex 
system of committees made up of national civil servants within the EU. These 
committees oversee any delegated acts from the European Parliament or the Council to 
the European Commission for implementation. This replaced the process of 
intergovernmental bargaining, through which unanimity was often difficult to achieve. In 
contrast, in industrial relations Scharpf felt that a pattern of interest representation was 
emerging that did not represent a horizontal network of many members. This was 
exemplified through the prevailing existence of national collective bargaining, where 
national institutional frameworks still differ greatly (ibid, 528). As such, the traits of a 
135
hierarchic non-competitive system of corporatism were still in evidence through certain 
aspects of EU governance.
The notion of European Governance is expanded further by a form of policy coordination 
that the EU calls ‘the open method’ (Kjear, 2004: 112). This form of governance has been 
particularly related to economic policy.
The open method of coordination is about consensus-forming among 
member states, involving a common assessment of the economic 
situation, agreement of the appropriate policy response, acceptance of 
peer pressure and, where necessary, adjustment of the policies being 
pursued, the process of the open method involves a Council Committee 
that sets guidelines, establishes performance indicators and benchmarks 
tailored to each member state, and monitors periodically through peer 
review, with the emphasis placed on a process of mutual learning. The 
targets are not legally binding, but they are a result of policy learning and 
policy transfer between member states. This type of governance thus 
involves member states in policy areas where there is no transfer of 
power to the EU. Yet it represents a sort of deliberative supra-
nationalism, in that inter-administrative governance leads to common 
ideas among a club of national ministers and key officials (ibid, 113). 
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Thinking about European Governance has also been developed by Sbragia (2000a, 
2000b). She argues that there is too much focus on the ‘crisis’ of the welfare state, which 
neglects the fact that states continue to play an important role in the facilitation of 
markets. Out of this argument develops the idea that the EU provides the platform for this 
‘transformation’ through ‘non-majoritarian’ institutions such as the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the European Court of Justice. These institutions enjoy more autonomy 
within the executive than those actors traditionally concerned with the policy making 
process, and as such are not subject to the same levels of scrutiny. 
The “rule of law” is critical for a market economy, and the absence of 
well-defined legal and judicial mechanisms for resolving conflicts among 
parties is an almost insuperable barrier to the construction of a 
functioning economy. The state therefore builds markets – shapes them 
in a variety of ways – as well as regulates them. Markets just like the 
welfare state, are absolutely dependent on public authority (Sbragia, 
2000b: 245).
Central banks are perhaps one of the most pivotal institutions for the state 
as a “market builder”. Central bankers dominate much of the policy 
discourse related to market activity, shape policy debates, and provide 
rationales for their policy activity that implicitly or explicitly present a 
theory of the functioning economy (Sbragia, 2000b: 249).
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This implies that ‘actors in non-majoritarian institutions are able to act in ways that might 
not have the support of democratically elected officials, the electorate, or political parties’ 
(Sbragia, 2000b: 248). This has important implications for the way we view European 
Governance, and is highly indicative of the increasingly complex nature of governing the 
state under the auspices of market led governance networks. In a period of global 
economic crisis it might be advisable for commentators to look more closely at the role 
played by non-majoritarian institutions, and relate these to the wider challenges of 
governing, while also drawing out some of the positive implications of ‘majoritarian’ 
democratic policy making and governance. 
4.9 Global governance
Roseneau offers a perspective on global governance that can be used as a means to 
comprehend the complex processes of governance in an international setting. This 
understanding of governance may help put the complexities of European Governance into 
perspective.
I treat the world not as national or international arenas, but as a 
globalized space – a space that is not disaggregated in terms of specified 
geographic territories so much as it consists of a wide range of fast 
moving, boundary-spanning actors whose activities cascade erratically 
across amorphous ethnoscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes, technoscapes, 
and financescapes. For the foreseeable future, therefore I view this 
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dissagregated system of diverse transnational collectivities as a multi-
centric world that competes, cooperates, or otherwise interacts with the 
state-centric world and, as such, constitutes the new world order (my 
emphasis), an order that is so decentralised that it does not lend itself to 
hierarchy or coordination under hegemonic leadership (2000: 172-173).
Roseneau attempts to show that the role of the state has been eroded by ‘transnational 
collectivities’ in a ‘multi-centric world’. He is conscious that his analysis is unlikely to 
win over the ‘litany’ of the state centrists, but presses on in an attempt to highlight the 
complexities of global life (ibid, 174). However, it is not the case that the importance of 
the state is lost within Rosenau’s work, but simply ‘that many new collectivities and 
structures have emerged as equally important that keeping states exclusively at the 
epicentre tends to blind us to the underlying forces and processes that sustain the 
evolution of global politics’ (ibid, 187). Roseneau believes there are a set of dialectical 
processes taking place that ensure change and complexity do not unfold in a linear way 
(ibid, 177). 
It is the nature of change and complexity that neither unfolds in a linear 
way... both evolve along paths marked by reversals, sideward 
movements, feedback loops, and a variety of other non-linear dynamics 
that make it difficult to both practice and trace the exercise of 
governance. Perhaps most notable in this regard are the worldwide 
tensions that derive from the simultaneity of dynamics promoting 
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integration, centralization, and globalization on the one hand, and those 
generating disintegration, decentralisation, and localization on the other 
hand (ibid, 177). 
Roseneau contends that these tensions define the emerging epoch, which he terms 
‘fragmegration’ as a means to capture the ‘interactive causal links between fragmentation 
and integration’ (ibid, 177). Under this view the process of governance is non-linear and 
takes place within ‘a multi-centric world that competes, cooperates, or otherwise interacts 
with the state-centric world’ (ibid, 172-173). This understanding of governance is a useful 
interpretation when used against the notion of European Governance. Governance 
operates through multiple channels within the new world order, through the markets that 
occupy the global and the local, and the interconnections between these two; through 
hierarchical structures and processes at the national level and beyond; and through 
horizontal networks that spread across state and international boundaries. These processes 
are characterised and overlain by a complex web of activity by states, institutions, 
business and other actors who find themselves jockeying for positions of power, or 
acceptable compromise in the new world order. At the forefront of these efforts are 
attempts to control financial flows within the global market, and the command of 
consumer values through various forms of rhetoric, ideology and attempts to influence the 
media. 
This notion of a new world order has found its way into the wider political science 
literature and thought. The features of this new order have been used to try to explain a 
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number of features and events in world politics over the last decade or so. Fukuyama has 
shown how the weakening of states within this new world order, has operated in 
conjunction with the growth of market and civil society governing functions. He argues 
that these functions have not been effectively implemented, resulting in weak states and 
many of the world’s most serious problems (2005: xvii). This feature of the new world 
order does not only have important resonance for developing countries, but it is also 
significant for developed liberal democracies as power is being increasingly devolved to 
new governing functions and mechanisms. 
Many states in the twentieth century were too powerful: They tyrannized 
populations and committed aggression against neighbours. Those that 
were not dictatorships nonetheless impeded economic growth and 
accumulated a variety of dysfunctions and inefficiencies due to excessive 
state scope. The trend therefore has been to cut back the size of state 
sectors and to turn over to the market or to civil society functions that 
have been improperly appropriated. At the same time, the growth of the 
global economy has tended to erode the autonomy of the sovereign 
nation-states by increasing the mobility of information, capital, and to a 
lesser extent, labour. (...) For individual societies and for the global 
community, the withering away of the state is not a prelude to utopia but 
to disaster (Fukuyama, 2005: 160-161).
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Fukuyama believes a certain level of institutional development is crucial for economic 
development, and provides an important framework for developing countries. This 
passage also implies that state power is under threat from two separate directions. On one 
hand there have been conscious efforts on the behalf of the state to downsize and devolve 
their functions, while on the other hand the increasing mobility of capital and power 
relations has brought about new pressures, which has tempered the ability of states to 
steer the devolution of its functions in a linear direction. This implies a polycentric world 
which supports state power through the organisational apparatus of the new governance, 
yet at the same time the state is simply another actor in a highly competitive political 
economy, and as such state power is an unstable commodity in an increasingly contested 
world order. 
4.10 Conclusion
This chapter has set out a series of narratives that relate to the new governance. These 
narratives provide a crucial basis for our understanding of how these governance 
mechanisms feed our understanding of the LEADER programme. In Chapter 2 it was 
made clear that an interpretative approach was to be employed in this study. The 
discourses evident within this academic output has been used to unpack the ‘cultural-
historical’ influences incorporated in this work, and to show how new strong governance 
narratives are emerging. These play a significant role on in framing our understanding. In 
understanding governance there is a tendency, as outlined in Chapter 2, to group our 
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understanding into ‘patterns of knowledge, events and actions’ we already posses. This 
tendency is clear within the governance literature. By employing an ‘interpretative lens’ it 
is possible to unpack these patterns, and be aware of new and diverging narratives within 
the discourse. In the discourse reviewed here it is clear that there is increasing awareness 
of the polycentric nature of the new governance, and the power held by those network 
structures that stretch beyond traditional state institutions. 
It is important to start to frame the LEADER programme in the context of these wider 
narratives. From a Foucauldian perspective if we are to fully understand the LEADER 
approach to governance it is important to consider it within the context of this wider 
discourse. The discourses discussed in this chapter increasingly turn the emphasis away 
from concepts of government and the state. These concepts have dominated political 
science for a long time, and it is important that new narratives are formed around network 
based governing structures. In exploring a number of differing narratives on the new 
governance and networks, particularly from a British and European perspective, the 
attempt has been made to develop a diverse understanding of these concepts and lay the 
foundations for placing the LEADER programme within a more discursively relevant 
understanding of the new governance in the thesis. The proceeding chapters add to these 
narratives by building a contextual layer around the LEADER programme, relating to the 
development of rural policy in the context of national and supranational priorities, 
participatory democracy, and a closer  look at those discourses that frame European 
governance specifically. 
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This chapter has also introduced ‘networks as governance’. The discourse on networks 
within the governance literature is become to dominate governance narratives. 
Increasingly, governing activities are taking place away from the centre and involve 
negotiations between sovereign or private actors. The focus LAG is a form of network 
organisation, but is based on continuing regulatory ties with the centre. Networks as 
governance, as introduced here, offers a broad understanding of this mode of governing. 
It does not show how this approach to governance is conditioned by complex 
relationships between organisations, individuals and wider societal discourses. Over the 
course of the thesis it will become clear that network relations play a key role in the 
LEADER programme. Network structures are particularly adept at producing varied 
outcomes, and differentiated outcomes across time and space. This was made clear from 
the insight provided by existing interpretations of governance outlined in the previous 
chapter.  
The study of network forms of governance, as discussed in Chapter 2, is dependent on a 
methodology that is reflexive and capable of following complex social relationships and 
the micro-sociologies that frame interactions. There is also a need to be mindful of those 
powerful discourses and narratives that are produced within networks and carried by 
actors across it and beyond it into other networks. In adopting snowballing approach to 
this research it was possible to follow the network interactions that took place. These 
interactions often took place at nodal points across the network, and this was represented 
through the geographical location of interviewees. One of the main challenges of 
adopting this approach is identifying the nature of interactions, especially when state and 
144
non-state actors come together. There is a temptation to view state involvement in 
networks as an attempt at steering. In order not to make any unqualified judgements in 
this regard it is wise to frame these particular interactions through prior discourses and 
narratives of existing research. This is possible by building up our understanding of those 
discourses relating to the new governance. This chapter and the proceeding chapters 
attempt to do this to ensure an interpretative eye can be cast on the nature of the 
interactions that took place.  In this chapter the notion of ‘integrated networks’ is 
introduced, this is one of many possible interpretation of network relations. Given the 
differentiated nature of endogenous rural development across Europe there will be no 
attempt to prescribe the networks that make up this study to other LAG’s or rural 
development programmes. 
Power is the inescapable means by which governance is understood. From a state-centric
perspective power is framed through a Foucauldian perspective on ‘governmentality’, as 
outlined in Chapter 2. However, the notion of governmentality also provides a useful 
insight into the way non-state actors can utilise the ‘technologies of the self’. Power does 
not always reside in the same place or sets of hands, and this ensures that governance 
narratives will continue to change and differ over time. The ability to hold onto power 
and the use that is made of it by those that hold it underpins the discourse discussed in 
this chapter. Power is an incredibly discursive term and the narrative that is built up over 
the proceeding chapters underpins this. A full and detailed understanding of power 
relations is developed in line with the focus LAG and its governance. Power no longer 
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simply resides with the powerful institutions of the state, and this becomes clear as the 
power relations that underpin the focus LAG are explored. 
The Latourian perspective on power, as outlined in Chapter 2, helps explain how power is 
dependent on each actor’s willingness across a network to pass power forward to the next 
actor. As power passes between actors it invariably changes shape. The key point is that 
whatever the nature of power across a network, it is driven forward by multiple bodies; it 
does not ‘stand-up’ on its own, and can stop moving at any time. What is often 
overlooked within the current governance discourse is the instability of power, especially 
within a network setting. The state can frame discourses of power through institutions 
and the rule of law, and yet nothing moves. In the same context, the EU can frame 
policies, guidelines and regulations, and yet not a lot happens as a consequence. These 
ideas will be brought out in the rest of this thesis, and this chapter spearheads the ongoing 
process of interpretation and discourse framing which takes place over the following
chapters. 
As outlined in this chapter, governance is made up of hierarchical, market and network 
forms of coordination, or any mixture of these three. The rich discourse that has emerged 
in relation to network forms of governance does not mean that market and hierarchical 
modes of coordination are no longer important, but instead it reflects current political 
ideas and trends. Networks as a mode of coordination should not be confused with the 
network approach. The network approach is used to look at social relations across 
networks, while network forms of coordination occupy specific policy networks, often 
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framed by tools associated with meta-governance. Nevertheless, network forms of 
governance are fluid by nature because they involve a wider range of actors, and as such 
there is greater potential for new forms of actor interaction. Network forms of 
coordination may well be restricted by existing hierarchical and/or market led structures, 
along with community based institutions and their cultures. It is at this juncture where 
tensions can form around the ability of network forms of coordination to interact with 
other forms of coordination, and their pre-existing structures. It is here that network flows 
become increasingly non-linear or stall, as a result of conflicting discourses. 
The state does not have a predefined role within the new governance. Its position is 
dependent on its ability to steer the market and networks either through hierarchical 
structures, or through a set of tools that come under the heading of meta-governance. 
These tools are not exclusive to the state. Network and market forms of coordination have 
opened up policy networks to a set of global influences, further weakening the position of 
states across networks. This has spurred a new global order characterised by international 
interdependencies. A good example of this is the EU, which has seen international 
interdependencies constitutionalised through a series of treaties, which are the basis for an 
ever expanding supranational regulatory system. I explored the potential for theories of 
European governance and multilevel governance to help explain how the EU system of 
governance operates, and what role the state now holds within this new world order. It 
was tentatively suggested through Roseneau that the new world order is multi-centric, 
defined by the character of interactions between new transnational collectivities and the 
state-centric world. This is reflected in the theory of European governance, which 
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provides an explanation for the widely varying forms of interaction and coordination 
within states and across state boundaries. I also outlined the theory of multilevel 
governance, and the need to view this empirically based theory as a good example of the 
differentiated nature of governance within the new world order,  a point returned to in 
later chapters. 
In the next chapter, I look at the history of the rural policy arena. This arena has been 
dominated by agriculture, and despite pressing global and domestic pressures, and calls 
for a more heterogeneous policy that reflects wider rural interests, the policy community 
still proves difficult to break down. This provides an interesting case study for the 
complex relationships that exist in this arena between domestic, EU and global interests. 
The history of rural policy in Britain and the EU provides an important context for 
LEADER, not only is the LEADER approach seen as an important element for future 
rural policy, but it has also played an important role in inspiring CAP reform in the mid-
nineties.  As such, the following chapter forms an important aspect of any LEADER 
informed narrative of governance. This chapter also looks closely at the influence New 
Labour has had on rural policy, and how its strategy relates to the LEADER approach. 
148
Chapter 5: ‘Post-agricultural’ policy, New Labour and the new rural 
governance?
5.1 The agricultural policy community and resistance to change
As outlined in the previous chapter, the new governance operates within a global context. 
Territories provide the infrastructure for policy settlements and the constitutional 
legitimacy for mobile associations of power. The state continues to hold an important, but 
not necessarily sovereign, position among a plurality of other actors and organizations, 
across potentially global policy networks. The rural policy arena and its governance have 
changed in a number of ways since the conception of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) (now the EU) in 1957. These changes have been in line with the 
changing modes of coordination employed by the state (markets, hierarchies and 
networks), and increasingly through the influence of supranational bodies like the EU and 
the WTO. The coordination of the rural policy arena during this period has been 
dominated by the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP has for a long 
time, as expressed in the previous chapter, sought to coordinate rural economies and 
communities through agricultural exceptionalism. Even in the face of growing pressures 
from market led forms of coordination, and the increasing neoliberalisation of advanced 
economies throughout the early 1980’s, agricultural exceptionalism has continued along 
with price distorting ‘subsidies’. 
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In Britain, agriculture has largely dominated rural policy following the Second World 
War (Woods, 2005: 132). This is reflected through academic research on rural politics, 
which has tended to focus primarily on the politics of agriculture (Grant, 1990). Smith 
(1993) has highlighted how the agricultural policy process could be used as ‘the paradigm 
case of a closed policy community’ spearheaded by the National Farmers Union’s 
(NFU’s) close relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF). 
Policy communities, as outlined in the previous chapter, are characterised by a limited 
number of participants with some groups consciously excluded;  frequent and high 
quality interaction between all resource rich members; consistency in values, membership 
and policy outcomes; consensus, with the ideology, values and broad policy preferences 
shared by all participants (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). 
Winter (1996) outlines some of the underlying beliefs typifying the common culture of 
the post-war agricultural policy community, as follows. Firstly, the participants shared 
underlying ‘moral’ values of farming and country life, and a belief in its central role in 
the nation’s future prosperity. Secondly, there was a shared economic interest in 
increasing agricultural production – it was important for the state to ensure food supplies 
were adequate due to increasing food security concerns, while electoral prospects where 
dependent on food security issues, along with wider economic concerns. These concerns 
were also shared by key interest groups who depended on agriculture for their livelihood. 
Thirdly, there was a consensus among the policy community that agriculture should be 
entitled to public investment and expenditure. Fourthly, there was a shared interest in the 
application of management economics to the farming industry, as a means to increase 
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efficiency and reduce food imports. This was dependent on publicly funded education 
and research. Further advances were also seen to be dependent on the application and 
development of scientific principles. In both cases the state was happy to provide the 
resources and support to ensure these advances could be realised. 
Through these shared beliefs the NFU ‘became a classic example of an insider interest 
group’ and ‘its relationship with MAFF was sufficiently close that the Ministry became in 
effect the NFU’s advocate within government’ (Woods, 2005: 134). Britain’s accession to 
the European Economic Community (EEC) saw British agricultural policy subsumed into 
the CAP, but this did little to dent the close relationship between the NFU and MAFF, 
and the closed nature of the policy community. The policy community was able to direct 
the implementation of the CAP at the national level, and determine the British position 
within the EEC (ibid, 134). In fact, the NFU’s close ties with the MAFF were mirrored in 
Europe through the close relationship between COPA (Committee of Professional 
Agricultural Organisations), the Europe-wide federation of farm unions, and Directorate 
General for Agriculture, the department responsible for agricultural policy within the 
European Commission (Winter, 1996). 
The Brussels policy community shared many of the objectives that underpinned its 
counterpart in Britain. At the heart of the CAP was the desire to increase agricultural 
production and maintain the standard of living for farmers. The objectives of the CAP 
were set out in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, and were as follows:
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1. to increase productivity, by promoting technical progress and ensuring the 
optimum use of the factors of production, in particular labour; 
2. to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural Community; 
3. to stabilise markets; 
4. to secure availability of supplies; 
5. to provide consumers with food at reasonable prices. 
The result of these measures saw increasing agricultural intensification across the EU 
throughout the three decades following the Second World War, driven by intense 
capitalization. This resulted in significant levels of investment in farm machinery and 
farm infrastructure, and the increasing use of agri-chemicals, while farm efficiency 
became of paramount importance and resulted in the creation of much larger farming 
units (Woods, 2005: 135).
However, despite significant improvements in the level of production throughout the EU, 
the agricultural policy community had not anticipated the wider problems brought about 
by agricultural intensification. It began to become increasingly clear that the policy 
community’s overemphasis on agriculture was creating a whole host of separate problems 
that it was not well equipped enough to deal with. These problems included the 
detrimental effect farming practices were having on the landscape, particularly the 
process of removing hedgerows and ponds, and the ploughing up of meadows to increase 
productivity. Pollution and poisoning from agri-chemicals had become increasingly 
common, and was closely linked to reductions in farmland birds, and other native flora 
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and fauna (Harvey, 1998; Woods 2005). In addition, the nature of livestock farming was 
increasingly scrutinised, and the idea that animals could be ‘factory farmed’ was severely 
challenged by animal rights activists, while consumers began to question the quality of 
such produce (Woods, 2005: 135). The success of farmers to dramatically increase levels 
of production also brought an unexpected challenge for policy makers. By the 1970’s 
farmers were producing more key agricultural commodities than the market could cope 
with, this forced the European Commission to intervene and buy surplus produce at a 
minimum price threshold. The cost of buying surplus produce, along with the added 
financial burden of storing it, saw the CAP represent 70%  the EU’s budget in 1984 
(Winter, 1996). As a result there were increasingly strong calls for CAP reform. 
The first significant reform initiative came about through the publication of three papers 
by the Commission between 1980-1982, these included: Reflections on the Common 
Agricultural Policy, Report on the Mandate, and Guidelines for European Agriculture
(Commission of the European Communities, 1980, 1981, 1982). These publications had 
little immediate effect, with the Council of Ministers blocking the proposals, in favour of 
substantial price increases in both 1981 and 1982. Nevertheless, at last there was some 
recognition of what was needed to be done. Winter (1996) outlines the necessary 
requirements that were agreed to in principle:
1. the need to reduce the level of guaranteed prices, especially where particular 
member states were supporting their domestic agricultures beyond the level 
agreed by the Community;
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2. the need to increase exports from the EC;
3. the need to improve structural policies so as to support poorer farmers and regions 
without recourse to across-the-board price increases. 
In 1983 it began to become clear that the necessity for reform was not abating, as dairy 
stocks escalated. Alongside this, the Thatcher government, driven by the principles of the 
free market, continued to insist that budgetary discipline be maintained. These calls were 
acknowledged by Chancellor Kohl, acting as president of the European Council, and 
together they brought enough pressure on the Council to call for new measures to reduce 
the limit of agricultural spending (Winter, 1996: 143). This resulted in the introduction of 
milk quotas on 31 May 1984. Over the course of the remaining years of the 1980’s 
further progress in terms of CAP reform was limited. In 1985 a new publication entitled 
Perspectives for the Common Agricultural Policy was produced (Commission of the 
European Community, 1985), which heralded a co-responsibility levy for cereals in 1986, 
and budget stabilisers in 1988. These were designed to impose stringent limits on the 
growth of CAP expenditure, but it was soon discovered that these measures were not as 
effective as milk quotas. 1988 also saw, for the first time, the introduction of voluntary 
set-aside, giving arable farmers the option to leave some of their acreage fallow in return 
for compensatory payments (ibid, 146). 
The final significant step of this decade was the publication of The Future of Rural 
Society (Commisison of the European Community, 1988). This discussion paper was 
incredibly significant because it signalled a more encompassing approach, by what had 
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been to this point a very inward looking policy community. The paper recognised three 
particular forces of rural change not directly connected to agricultural adjustment: ‘the 
pressure of modern development’, ‘rural decline’, and ‘depopulation and the 
abandonment of some land’. However, ‘there remained a strong, if not exclusive, 
agricultural element to the policies that emerged from this approach. The new emphasis 
on the rural economy led to a focus on new uses for agricultural land and buildings 
through schemes for farm diversification and alternative land uses, launched in 1988’ 
(Winter, 1996: 147). 
The fact that CAP reform was now strongly on the agenda was a significant juncture in 
the history of agricultural politics. It was a clear ‘sign that the strength and exclusivity of 
the agricultural policy community was weakening and that the voices of groups other 
than the farming unions were being heard’ (Woods, 2005: 136). As a consequence, both 
COPA and the NFU, found  that they were forced to engage with a new agenda, and new 
compromises that did not always reflect their members’ preferences, leading to 
increasingly fractious internal politics (Grant, 2000: 97). However, reform efforts had 
still not done enough to bring CAP spending under control, reduce cereal surpluses or 
significantly alter the closed nature of the agricultural policy community. The three 
subsequent CAP reforms (1992, 1999, and 2003) play an important role in the move 
towards a new rural policy.
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5.2 New rural policy 1992-2003?
The 1992 reform, commonly referred to as the ‘MacSharry reform’ after the incumbent 
EU Agriculture Commissioner, was significant on a two levels. Firstly, it recognised the 
pressing need to reduce food surpluses created through intervention buying, and in turn 
limit spiralling budget expenditure. Secondly, the success of the Uruguay round of GATT 
talks was dependent on significant reform of the CAP (Winter, 1996: 161), and for the 
very first time in the history of the CAP, global economic and political pressures 
combined to play a significant hand in the process of reform, and further broadened the 
policy agenda away from the initial objectives of the CAP (Coleman and Tangermann, 
1999). The US was particularly keen to see the eradication of trade distorting farm 
support policies, and wanted to encourage decoupled support, breaking the link between 
support and production (Ackrill, 2000). 
In response, the MacSharry reform shifted payments based on levels of production to 
direct payments, while cereal prices were cut by 29% by 1995/6, beef by 15% by 1993/4, 
and butter by 5% by 1994/5. As a way of compensation a number of measures were 
introduced to soften the blow for farmers, perhaps most significantly, the Arable Area 
Payment Scheme (AAPS) was introduced which provided payments for those farmers 
who agreed to take 15% of their land out of production (Winter, 1996: 162). 
The 1999 reform was largely based around the EU’s Agenda 2000, as part of which the 
Rural Development Regulation (RDR) was launched and heralded as a new approach to 
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rural and agricultural policies across the EU (Dwyer et al., 2007: 874). The RDR was 
quickly depicted as the ‘Second Pillar’ to the CAP, and its objectives closely related to 
those formulated at the Cork Conference of November 1996 (Bryden, 1998; Lowe et al., 
2002). The declaration that emerged from the Cork conference set out ten guiding 
principles that sought to embrace a ‘new start’ in rural development policy (Dwyer et al., 
2007). These included: a multi-sectoral and territorial focus; sustainability, particularly 
relating to natural and cultural resources; the importance of building private and 
community-based capacity governing structures at the local level, through 
decentralization and improved participation throughout the policy making process; and 
the need for monitoring and evaluation involving a wider range of stakeholders (Dwyer et 
al., 2007: 874). 
An important feature of the Cork Conference was the emphasis on Structural Fund 
Programmes and Community Initiatives, in particular the LEADER programme and its 
specific approach to rural development. This is more than clear in those principles that 
were developed at Cork, and which emphasise territorial sensitivity, devolved delivery 
and community participation (Shucksmith, 2000; Dwyer et al., 2007).
The rhetoric surrounding the development and launch of Pillar 2 of the 
CAP has drawn heavily on the experience of the policy community that 
has developed to shape and deliver the Structural Fund programmes and 
their associated Community Initiatives, rather than a predominantly 
CAP-focused rural clientele (Dwyer et al., 2007: 883).  
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The 1999 reform, under pillar 2 of the CAP, led to the introduction of Rural Development 
Plans (RDPs). RDPs can either be delivered through a single national plan (i.e. Sweden, 
France, Austria), through regional programmes (i.e. Germany, UK), or through a 
complicated mixture of both (i.e. Spain). This approach is designed to meet the rural 
development goals, and reflect the varying nature of rural areas (ibid, 877). However, 
despite the potential of this new approach to rural development, Dwyer et al. (2007) 
indicate that there was a high level of variability in the quality of RDPs, with the 
tendency for member states to hang on to existing initiatives driven by old institutional 
conservatism relating to the CAP.
The 1999 reform did a great deal to advance rural development as an important policy 
issue across the EU. Structural Fund Programmes and Community Initiatives, in 
particular the LEADER approach had played an important role in advancing new ideas on 
the future of rural policy at the Cork Conference. The important role played by the 
LEADER approach is commonly overlooked, and more generally the significance of the 
LEADER programme is often belittled because of its relatively small budget. This 
cynicism is still clear to see, and attached to the institutional conservatism closely related 
to the CAP and the core of the agricultural policy community. Nevertheless, the 
LEADER approach has provided the basis for advancing rural development programming 
and delivery and continues to do so. An interview with a Defra representative was quite 
revealing in this regard.
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It has been hard to convince other people, whether it’s been in the 
department, or in other departments, the value of softer targets, social and 
community based stuff rather than just job creation, raising incomes or 
whatever, which is easier to measure and sounds better in the headlines. I 
must admit I used to feel, certainly earlier on, that we were quite isolated.
We were pretty much on our own dealing with it, and any body else who 
worked on bigger programmes was quite dismissive of it, but they have 
perhaps had to pay more attention recently. I think it has been more 
successful than anybody anticipated. Also the fact that the model is going 
to be mainstreamed for the next programme means people have to pay 
more attention to it. I think there will always be a bit of resistance to
delivering those kinds of soft outputs (Defra representative).
Some of the other features of the 1999 reform measures included an attempt to make the 
budget more stable through increased direct payments and the ‘stabilized expenditure 
scheme’, which was another attempt to limit CAP expenditure. However, many of the 
challenges facing the EU, due to its impending enlargement from 15 to 25 countries on 1st
May 2004, and the increasing pressures within the WTO to resolve issues relating to 
agriculture were not dealt with by the 1999 reform. 
Following these failings, it came as no surprise that the CAP was subject to another 
reform in 2003. The European Commission (2003) set out its objectives clearly, by 
stating that the reform will:
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i. be geared towards consumers’ and taxpayers’ interests while continuing 
to assist farmers;
ii. safeguard the rural economy and environment;  
iii. keep budgetary costs stable and manageable;
iv. help in negotiating a World Trade Organization (WTO) agricultural 
agreement that meets the needs of EU agriculture and society (European 
Commission, 2003)
There are two key elements of the 2003 CAP reform. These include: Firstly, what the 
Commission call ‘more market orientated, simpler and less trade distorting support’ via 
the introduction of the Single Payment Scheme (SPS). The SPS involves the decoupling 
of payments from production, meaning support is no longer related to what a farmer 
produces. The scheme requires farmers to agree to a process of ‘cross-compliance’ 
whereby farmers are expected to keep all farmland in good agricultural and 
environmental condition in return for economic support. ‘Cross-compliance’ is also 
linked to a series of environmental, food safety, animal and plant health and animal 
welfare standards. Secondly, the reform also guarantees that rural development receives a 
greater level of funding; this has been secured partly through the process of ‘modulation’, 
which directs some of the funds that larger farmers would have received in the past 
toward Pillar 2 of the CAP. (European Commission, 2003). 
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Former European Commissioner for agriculture Franz Fischler outlines the significance 
of the 2003 reform:
This decision marks the beginning of a new era. Our farm policy will 
fundamentally change. Today, Europe has given itself a new and 
effective farm policy. The bulk of our direct payments will no longer be 
linked to production. To our farmers, it offers a policy which will 
stabilise their incomes and enable them to produce what the consumers 
want. Our consumers and taxpayers will get more transparency and better 
value for money. This reform also sends a strong message to the world. 
Our new policy is trade friendly. We are saying goodbye to the old 
subsidy system which significantly distorts international trade and harms 
developing countries. Today’s decision will give Europe a strong hand in 
the negotiations on the Doha Development Agenda. The EU has done its
homework, now it’s up to others to move to make the WTO trade talks a 
success (European Commission, 2003).  
The emphasis here is on meeting the demands of the Doha round of WTO negotiations, 
but the wider objectives of the 2003 reform emphasise the broader scope of the CAP, in 
particular consumer concerns relating to food safety, the environment and the wider rural 
economy. 
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5.3 British rural politics: any signs of change?
Over the course of the last 15 years CAP reforms have mirrored a number of changes 
within the British rural economy, not only does this indicate the massive influence the 
CAP has had on British agriculture, but it is also indicative of the wider global economic 
pressures on this sector. Yet, despite the influence of the CAP and wider pressures, 
agriculture and rural policy remains a domestic issue, it still has political ramifications for 
governments, and the electorate is still sensitive to the vagaries of rural politics. 
Furthermore, many of the new schemes relating to Pillar 2 of the CAP, such as England’s 
Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS), have been developed around consultations 
that took place in England, and are orientated toward regional RDPs.
The outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease in Britain on 19th February 2001 provides a 
good example of not only how rural issues can still come to dominate domestic news 
coverage and political debate, but also how policy arenas at the national level still hold a 
crucial and strategic role in directing policy and averting crises. British attempts at 
ensuring the FMD outbreak was handled effectively were judged to have failed largely 
because FMD was framed as an agricultural problem, and as such the control strategy 
was commanded solely by the agricultural policy community (Ward et al., 2004). As a 
consequence the protection of agricultural interests was prioritised, and any potentially 
negative consequences beyond agriculture were deemed unfortunate but necessary (ibid, 
2004). It is now clear that the agricultural policy community was ill equipped to manage 
the FMD outbreak effectively, with their strategy completely failing to take account of 
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the wider rural economy, in particular the tourist industry which was reported to be losing 
around £100 million each week by the end of March 2001 (Woods et al., 2005). 
The FMD outbreak was soon redefined as a national crisis during the week of 21-27 
March, command of the control strategy was removed from MAFF, and passed over to 
the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR); signalling that FMD was not just an 
agricultural issue (Woods, 2005: 155). Woods (2005) sums up the significance of these 
events for the agricultural policy ‘community’ as follows:
The Foot and Mouth epidemic proved to be a watershed event for 
agriculture in Britain. At one level, within infected areas, sympathy for 
farmers who saw their stock destroyed helped to rebuild connections 
between farming and the rural community that had been eroded by social 
and economic restructuring. Yet, at the broader level, the Foot and Mouth 
‘crisis’ marked the end of farmer exceptionalism in government (2005: 
157). 
This ‘watershed’ was marked by the abolition of MAFF, and its responsibilities passing
to the newly formed Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). 
The omission of any reference to agriculture in the title was seen as highly symbolic, 
‘signifying that the countryside was to be constructed in new terms’ (ibid, 157), and acted 
to reinforce those discourses that seek the pluralisation of the rural policy arena and the 
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breaking down of old ties. Defra is deemed to be a more encompassing institution and 
representative of a new rural order and a more heterogeneous countryside.  
The realisation that agriculture is no longer the dominant economic activity in many rural 
areas has allowed policy makers to reflect on the role of agriculture within the rural 
economy, and acknowledge that a diverse range of stakeholders exists. However, 
although many of these economic stakeholders do not directly rely on the agricultural 
industry for survival, it is widely held that agriculture provides a host of multifunctional 
goods. This has been termed by some as a shift from the ‘productivist’ to the 
‘consumptionist’ countryside through the commodification of rural life (Squire, 1993; 
Urry 1995; Hoggart and Paniagua, 2001). Through this set of typologies agriculture 
remains important for preservationist reasons but is no longer seen as the principal 
economic activity in rural areas. The paradox is thus: the rural economy has become 
increasingly dependent on economic activities other than agriculture, yet agriculture still 
dominates rural space, while many of these other economic activities are somewhat 
dependent on farmers to preserve and enhance this valuable commodity. 
Fish et al. describe how ‘different languages and discourses are beginning to emerge 
which raise alternative images of what the future holds for rural landscapes and how 
these might be explained in terms of different registers of power’ within the current spate 
of rural restructuring (Fish et al., 2006: 3).  These different registers of power are the 
source of re-spatialisation within the rural economy. For example, agri-environment and 
rural development schemes have brought about new associations of power or new 
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networks of interaction (Winter, 2005: 33). The bringing together of new interests has 
helped promote a new interactive policy process, and as a consequence the re-
spatialisation of some power relations within the rural policy arena. 
Taken as a whole a distinct shift within rural policy has taken place towards increasing 
heterogeneity. The environment, rural cultures, economic diversity, and landscape are 
increasingly covered within the remit of rural policy. Rural policy now appears to include 
a more diverse range of actors than ever before. As a consequence the policy process has 
developed along new lines beyond territorially defined networks that no longer reflect 
national economies and old Fordist ties. The current discourse on rural policy promotes a 
new policy agenda that reflects European and global challenges beyond agriculture. The 
success of the new rural order is dependent on the ability of new policy networks to 
interact or even subsume long standing discourses and socio-economic structures (See 
Murdoch, 2000). These discourses and structures hide the differentiated nature of the 
rural economy.
Closed agricultural policy networks have for a long time been seen as the source of these 
discourses, and the relative stability of these networks has been founded on the ability to 
keep the number of actors within them limited. However, the opening-up of the 
agricultural policy community, and the development of a more heterogeneous rural 
economy has ensured that programmes like LEADER, previously ‘isolated’ from the 
conservative institutions that house the CAP, can begin to have an ever greater influence 
on rural policy. The next significant challenge for rural policy is to ensure that a far 
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reaching policy agenda continues to be pursued and that new governing structures engage 
broadly based interests. This is much easier said than done, a point amplified in the next 
section as I look to at how New Labour’s “grand project” in rural policy has faded toward 
“technocratic managerialism” despite a wider rhetoric on partnership and participation in 
the policy process (Ward and Lowe, 2007).
The changes identified above within the rural policy arena have been augmented by the 
emergence of New Labour as a political force in the mid-nineties. New Labour, were 
actively drawn into rural policy making, despite it not featuring strongly in their initial 
manifesto (ibid, 412-413). New Labour was drawn into this area partly through concerns 
over CAP expenditure, the FMD crisis, and in turn the failings of MAFF, all of which are 
outlined above. It was also felt that New Labour’s stance against hunting with hounds 
could broaden the party’s popular appeal, and increase opposition to the pro-hunt lobby. 
However, Labour was also aware that many of its MPs held rural and semi-rural 
constituencies, and as such it was important that a positive rural policy agenda was 
developed. This agenda was set out in the Rural White Paper published in November 
2000. 
From the perspective of broader symbolism and electoral appeal, the 
promotion of a progressive rural policy helped New Labour to present 
itself as combating the forces of rural reaction marshalled in defence of 
hunting and to project a One-Nation populism that transcended the 
entrenched urban-rural divide (Ward and Lowe, 2007: 414). 
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The changes in the rural policy sector took place in conjunction with a number of other 
political shifts, as new Labour attempted to reconcile the shortcomings of the market with 
a more socially orientated polity. One aspect of this was Labour’s decision to establish 
new Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in the English regions, as a means of 
bringing socio-economic development closer to ‘the people’. This triggered rural 
institutional change, as the RDAs were made up of the staff of English Partnerships -  the 
government’s regeneration company – and the Rural Development Commission. The 
policy, research and advocacy functions of the Rural Development Commission were 
merged with the Countryside Commission, and this resulted in the establishment of the 
Countryside Agency, which was deemed a new progressive force in rural policy (ibid, 
413).  
However, this progression towards a more pluralistic rural policy agenda is deemed to 
have taken a number of steps backwards following Labour’s initial march toward 
progression. The FMD crisis highlighted the dangers of falling back upon a rural agenda 
that was dominated by agricultural interests, in fact there was widespread 
acknowledgment that the isolated nature of the agricultural policy community increased 
the crisis that emerged out of FMD, and yet from this point onwards there was clear 
retrenchment (see Ward and Lowe, 2007). 
This was evident in both the Curry report, which led to the Governments Strategy for 
Sustainable Farming and Food: Facing the Future in England of December 2003; and 
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the Haskins review, which resulted in the Rural Strategy 2004. The Curry report put the 
emphasis back on agriculture, and attempted to show how agriculture could “(re-)capture” 
those funds passed over to rural development through agri-environment schemes (ibid, 
416-417). The Haskins review, on the other hand, set about looking for means of 
streamlining the rural policy making and delivery apparatus. The focus of the review was 
the institutions regulating and funding agriculture and land management, out of which 
came a new agency (Natural England) developed to oversee environmental payments to 
farmers and ensure the widespread conservation and enhancement of the natural 
environment. It said little on wider rural issues, and the agenda for rural areas set out in 
the Rural White Paper three years earlier (ibid, 418). New Labour’s ‘grand project’ had 
been derailed. 
Despite many platitudes about decentralisation and public involvement, 
the Strategy failed to provide any greater clarity and coherence over how 
decentralisation might work below the regional level. There was nothing 
on the role of local authorities, and very little in the way of specific 
decentralising reforms. On the initiatives in parish renewal, localism and 
community development that the rural white paper had promoted, there 
was a deafening silence. The sense that Labour was charting a socially 
progressive agenda for rural areas, which pervaded the white paper, was 
lost (Ward and Lowe, 2007: 418). 
168
The Rural White paper offered a great deal in the way of progress towards a new rural 
policy, and shares many values with the LEADER approach to governance. LEADER, as 
a Community Initiative, is protected somewhat from retrenchment back toward 
agricultural exceptionalism, but just like any policy initiative, the LEADER programme is 
dependent on those institutions responsible for its implementation at the national level. 
New Labour promised an engaged rural policy, a community based approach that reflects 
each and every locality, but has since fallen back towards ‘technocratic managerialism’. 
The next section of this chapter explores in greater detail the New Labour project and as 
part of that its approach to governance. This offers a means to look more critically at its 
management of the LEADER programme, and its commitment to the LEADER approach. 
5.4 Governance and New Labour
The victory of New Labour, headed by Tony Blair, over the Conservative party in 1997 
heralded a ‘new’ era in public policy and administration in the UK. At the forefront of 
this new epoch were the ideas brought forward through a ‘Third Way’ between the 
market neo-liberalism associated with the outgoing Conservative government, and their 
NPM reforms, outlined above; and the state-centred Labour governments of the past, 
associated with collectivist Welfarism and Fordist modes of regulation. At the heart of 
the New Labour project was the changing perspective on state-society relationships, after 
it became obvious that politics was becoming increasingly pluralised, and the 
dependencies of the state had become stretched to include actors and organizations from 
the public, private and voluntary sectors (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 4). New Labour, 
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ushered by the principles of the Third Way, recognised that state-society relations were 
changing, and as a means to take advantage of this they would be required to re-position 
themselves within the evolving power relations of the state, and present themselves as a 
‘new’ dynamic force in terms of the economy and the public sector. 
The ‘Third Way’, according to Newman, ‘was a metaphor used in the USA and some 
other European states to help forge political settlements that combined a recognition of 
the increasing importance of the global economy with attention to the importance of 
social cohesion’ (2001: 2) As such, the Third Way was not just about looking for an 
alternative to the state and market, but sought to overcome some of the harsh realities of 
the market, and its effect on society as a whole, by addressing issues of civil society and 
cultural values (ibid, 2). Within the UK this aspect of the Third Way was put into action 
by New Labour through a new emphasis on citizenship, democratic renewal,  social 
inclusion and consensual forms of decision making (ibid, 2); principles that were put into 
practice through, inter alia, partnership and community engagement. This engagement 
with civil society and cultural values was counter balanced by the belief that these values 
had economic benefit in terms of social and cultural capital, and as such, the sanctity of 
the neo-liberal state and the drive for economic efficiency provided a powerful 
‘underbelly’ to the verbosity of the social and cultural benefits, advanced by the Third 
Way (ibid, 42).
In terms of the imperative for change, documented through the birth of New Labour, and 
particularly the Third Way, Blair states:
170
The driving force behind the ideas associated with the Third Way is 
globalisation because no country is immune from the massive change that 
globalisation brings... What globalisation is doing is bringing in its wake 
profound economic and social change, economic change rendering all 
jobs in industry, sometimes even new jobs in industries, redundant 
overnight and social change that is a change to culture, to life style, to the 
family, to established patterns of community life.  (Blair speech in South 
Africa, January 1999 in Newman, 2001: 48).
The significance of globalisation on the development of the Third Way, and in the UK, 
New Labour, has been criticised and with this criticism has come the feeling that this 
claim only hides the fact that the UK is more ‘globalised’ than other nations because it 
has positioned itself as a less active state in terms of its willingness to regulate capitalist 
economic processes (Newman, 2001: 49). This view is explored along with the 
importance of global economic processes over the extent to which governments can 
regulate the global economy (Newman, 2001: 49; also see Held et al., 1999; Hirst and 
Thompson, 1999; Jessop, 1998). The way Blair engages with the discourse on 
globalization, through the active construction of an emerging epoch, suggests the positive 
engineering of a discourse on globalisation that overlooks the complexity of the political 
and economic processes that constitute the current transnational economy, synonymous 
with globalisation (ibid, 49; also see Clarke, 2000; Fairclough, 2000; Jessop 1998). Under 
this light we are able to ‘see’ the importance of a free and open global economy to New 
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Labour, and the strategic way it is seen to engage with the discourse on globalisation, and 
position the UK directly under this rubric, arguably as a means to support the neo-liberal 
project and show the voter how it has a clear understanding of the policies required for 
the ‘global age’.
5.5 New Labour and its governance mechanisms
5.5.1 Partnership and networks
The aspects of the Third Way that are of great interest here are those that look to place a 
set of civic values alongside the free character of neo-liberalism. I would now like to 
briefly explore these in more detail, and show how they have shaped a form of 
governance embedded in the principles of partnership, inclusion, networks and 
consensual democracy. These principles are at the heart of the LEADER programme, and 
so it is important that they are introduced and understood before I explore them in more 
detail through the LEADER programme in the next chapter. I also hope to show how 
these forms of governance do not always sit comfortably alongside the demands of the 
market, and the expectations of representative democracy. 
The notion of partnership, and its adoption into the process of public policy adopted by 
the Conservatives in the eighties and early nineties was new within the realm of British 
politics. The Conservatives had introduced public/private partnerships as a means to halt 
the dominance of public sector power and bring new forms of investment for public 
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services, and their management (ibid, 105). This was on top of the increasing 
collaboration of public/private partners through government agencies, along with local 
government initiatives in partnership making to assist urban regeneration and community 
governance (ibid, 105). The distinction between the outgoing Conservative government 
and the incoming New Labour government was the new focus on partnership as a means 
of governance, as opposed to a market dominated approach (ibid, 105). Labour expanded 
the use of public-private partnerships, and also opened the policy process up to the 
voluntary sector. Partnerships became seen as a means to tackle complex policy issues, 
through increasing horizontal integration (ibid, 106). This was significant principally 
because it indicated that government began to accept that it did not have all the resources 
necessary to tackle issues like social exclusion, child poverty and housing issues. New 
Labour was openly accepting its dependency on outside sources from the private and 
voluntary sectors. Partnership, linked to the need for increasing horizontal integration, 
became a central element of the new ‘network’ governance. As such, networks not only 
grew in importance through the development of ‘partnership’, and attempts to ‘join-up 
government’, but they also became increasingly recognised as the new playground for 
public policy, through which it was felt policy could be ‘steered’ (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 
2000). 
Steering involves government learning a different ‘operating code’ which 
rests less on its authority to make decisions and instead builds on its 
capacity to create the conditions for positive-sum partnerships and setting 
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or changing the rules of the game to encourage what are perceived as 
beneficial outcomes (Stoker, 2000: 98)
As such, the organisation of partnerships, and their institutional make-up became 
important to government, and any control it had over this process became increasingly 
significant. 
This became evident through changes to the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet 
Office as a means to better coordinate policy across government (Newman, 2001: 107). A 
number of task forces were set up, such as the Social Exclusion Unit and the Performance 
and Innovation Unit with an emphasis on developing new policy initiatives through 
integrated local action through partnership. The need for vertical collaboration between 
central and local government, communities and users was also stressed in government 
rhetoric (ibid, 107). This should undoubtedly be seen as an attempt by government to 
reposition the apparatus of the state in an attempt to steer networks. 
Newman (2001) argues that the government developed a more pragmatic approach to 
partnership based on an assessment of the ‘potential costs as well as the benefits of 
collaboration’ (2001: 125).
There appeared to be an increasing emphasis on partnership and 
collaboration as tools to be used selectively – within the overall rubric of 
‘what works’ – rather than as a universal panacea for defects in the 
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design of policy and management systems. That is, partnership working 
became embedded as a politically legitimated but essentially managerial 
strategy to be selected as appropriate by government as it learned from its 
experience (about the costs as well as the benefits of partnership) and 
adopted new political priorities (2001: 125). 
The extent to which the dynamics of partnership working can be controlled by the state is 
open to interpretation and something that will be looked at in the next chapter. What 
should be questioned here is the ability of the state to control partnerships and networks 
effectively in the ‘network society’. It is possible that some networks have become too 
highly integrated for government to have any ability to ‘steer’ them; or that the role of 
partnerships in the ‘hollowing-out’ of the state has brought about the ‘further dispersal 
and penetration of state power (ibid, 125). It is also possible that the importance of 
partnerships and networks as a mode of governance has been overemphasised, both  by 
government in an attempt to substantiate the New Labour government and the Third Way 
to a public sick of the harsh realities of the Market; and by academics prone to producing 
normative theory out of empirical research. As stressed the notion of partnership will be 
discussed in the next chapter, and these issues will be readdressed through my own 
empirical research. 
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5.5.2 Inclusion and representative democracy
Central to New Labour’s engagement with partnership and networks has been the 
objective of promoting civic engagement and attempting to resolve the fracturing 
tendencies of the Conservatives Neo-Liberal agenda (ibid, 143). New Labour set out on 
an ambitious programme to try to redevelop the relationships between state, citizen and 
community (ibid, 143). This involved attempts to build social capital, to promote 
community leadership and enhance community capacity through policies on 
neighbourhood renewal and social inclusion (ibid, 144-145). The concept of social 
inclusion was also a part of European economic and social policy, appearing regularly in 
the EU’s Social Chapter. New Labour’s discourse on social inclusion overtly invoked a 
form of governance based on interrelated concepts of partnership, networks and 
coordination (ibid, 154). This was evident through New Labour’s attempts to enrol the 
socially excluded with the deliberate extension of networks to include community based 
partnerships and ‘self-governance’, along with the better coordination of existing policies 
(ibid, 154).
Attempts to improve the connection between the state and citizen through more inclusive 
policy making has brought forward the idea of democratic innovation and more general 
issues with regards public participation. The mechanisms of partnership and networks 
developed by the Labour government require direct political involvement and deliberative 
and consensual forms of decision making that challenge the traditional system of 
representational democracy (ibid, 127). It is perhaps no surprise that these forms of 
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democratic innovation have arisen in conjunction with governance and the pluralisation 
of the socio-political system, and the greater engagement between the state and civil 
society. However, important questions still remain unanswered in terms of the 
relationship between representational democracy and its innovative counterparts. These 
innovative modes of democracy have become an important part of the ‘new’ governance, 
especially through partnership and network arrangements. Decisions are being made that 
affect the lives of citizens through unconventional channels, channels that many people 
are unfamiliar with, and yet in theory these channels represent a form of decision making 
which is much closer to the people. The rationale of New Labour in bringing about 
democratic innovation must be looked at more closely, and whether these innovative 
practices are simply a means to provide the mechanisms for network forms of 
governance. There has certainly been some care taken in ensuring that innovation is 
contained within the boundaries of local initiatives or marginal policy areas, rather than 
extending innovation to the mainstream (ibid, 142). This strategy overlooks the potential 
for institutional habits to breed, to grow legs, or to carve out a culture based on poorly 
defined democratic principles. 
5.6 Conclusion
The new rural order has been framed in Britain through a rich discourse on the diversity 
of the rural economy and the potential for new forms of interaction. The LEADER 
programme adds to this discourse, and offers a way to break down traditional social ties 
relating to agricultural exceptionalism. New Labour continues to relate network forms of 
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governance with partnership and inclusion, both of which are perceived to be features of
the LEADER programme. This is indicative of the widely held belief that partnership 
governance offers a way forward in terms of reducing the harsh reality of market led 
forms of coordination, by inducing more socially balanced forms of decision making. 
However, these partnership functions are not only reliant upon socially contingent 
structures, and their effective management, but a favourable political climate that 
embraces democratic equality and modernisation. The ‘rural policy arena’ has taken steps 
towards modernisation, and this is mirrored through a series of subsequent CAP reforms, 
but at the national level there are clear signs that momentum has been lost, and the 
modernising agenda scrapped in favour of ‘cost-cutting’. This has wider implications for 
LEADER, relating to the wider importance attached to new and progressive forms of 
rural policy implementation. It is also a obvious example of the non-linear progression of 
politics and policy discourses, and these remain important conditioning elements in the 
new governance.  I draw upon LEADER in the next chapter to show that retrenchment is 
widespread within the political system, by highlighting the tensions that exist between 
powerful discourses on area-based partnerships and the quality of the ‘new’ governance. 
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Chapter 6: ‘Bottom-up’ rural development: ‘spin’ democracy?
6.1 Introduction
The trend towards partnership and network governance mechanisms within public policy, 
as I have explained, has widespread significance across numerous policy sectors. In this 
chapter I want to look specifically at partnership and network governance at the local 
level through the LEADER rural development programme. Local level partnerships are 
synonymous with forms of community governance that rest heavily on the perceived 
benefits of strong networks of association discussed in chapter three. I will show how the 
LEADER programme has been presented as a means to enhance local governance 
through enhanced deliberative and inclusive policy making and implementation at the 
local level through the notion of ‘bottom-up’ rural development. The design of the 
LEADER programme in terms of governance and democratic anchorage has wider 
significance for the increasing use of community forms of governance within public 
policy. It is then imperative that the tensions within this mode of governance in terms of 
democracy and the quality of the governance system are explored. This importance rests 
on the potential for disparity between government rhetoric or discourse and the narratives 
of those people involved in local governance, its design, implementation and operation 
through their participation in LEADER and its LAGs.
Chapter three explored regional development theory, and how constituent notions of 
‘bottom-up’ or endogenous rural development can be linked to the LEADER programme. 
179
This chapter further explores the ways in which LEADER is presented as ‘bottom-up’, 
and more fundamentally how we are encouraged to understand this concept. From this 
initial investigation I want to talk in more detail about partnership governance, and then 
relate this back to LEADER and the notion of ‘bottom-up’ rural development. This then 
provides the basis to look at how this concept is interpreted and enacted by actors along 
the LEADER network. The narratives brought forward by these actors will be used to 
open up a broader discussion on the tensions associated with emerging forms of 
democracy. The chapter concludes by looking at partnership governance, and issues of 
democratic anchorage within the governance framework.
6.2 Interpreting LEADER as ‘bottom-up’ rural development
The Guidelines for the Evaluation of LEADER+ Programmes (2002) outlines broadly 
what the central aspects of a ‘bottom-up’ approach are in the case of LEADER. These 
guidelines were first formed in conjunction with LEADER I.
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(The Guidelines for the Evaluation of LEADER+ Programmes, 2002)
These ‘guidelines’ offered by the European Commission on the principle of bottom-up 
rural development indicate that at the heart of this principle is the aim to ‘encourage 
participatory decision-making at the local level’ through the involvement of private, 
public and voluntary individuals and organizations. This participation can take place 
directly, through wide based community participation in the LAG; or through 
representatives of ‘collective’ interests. The link between this bottom-up approach and 
the idea that local ground level participation in the policy making process encourages 
capacity building is clearly made.
Bottom-up approach
The bottom-up approach aims to encourage participatory decision- making at the 
local level for all those concerned with development policies. The involvement of 
local players is sought and includes the population at large, economic and social 
interest groups, and representative public and private institutions.
Capacity-building is a strategic component of the bottom-up approach:
- awareness raising, training, participation and mobilisation of the local 
population to identify the strengths and weakness of the area (analysis)
- the participation of different interest groups in the strategic choices of the 
rural innovation programme;
- transparent criteria for selecting the actions implemented
Participation may take place at different stages of the programme (prior to the plan, 
during implementation, after its conclusions); it can be assured through direct 
participation or through the medium of representatives of collective interests.
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The original guidelines, as outlined in chapter 3, add little to our understanding of the 
‘bottom-up approach, other than clarifying the make up of the LAG partnerships, and the 
need for these to be territorially based. Defra’s interpretation of those guidelines, below, 
differs little from the official guidelines.
(England LEADER+ Programme 2000-2006, 2001)
The flexibility afforded the member states, through the EU guidelines on the programme, 
are presented as being based strongly on the idea that local communities should have the 
freedom to develop their own governing processes through the LAG partnership; while 
the composition of the partnership should be tailored towards the local strategy. This 
Local action groups must consist of a balanced and representative selection of partners drawn 
from the different socioeconomic sectors in the territory concerned. At the decision-making level 
the economic and social partners and associations must make up at least 50 % of the local 
partnership.
The members of a LAG must show that they are able to devise and implement a development 
strategy for the territory together.
The relevance and effectiveness of the partnership is to be assessed in terms of the transparency 
and clarity in the allocation of tasks and responsibilities. The capacity of the partners to carry out 
the tasks assigned to them, and the effectiveness of the operational and decision-making 
arrangements must be guaranteed.
The members of the LAG shall be locally based and must:
- either, select an administrative and financial leader with the ability to administer public 
funds who will be responsible for the satisfactory operation of the partnership,
- Or, come together in a legally-constituted common structure, the formal constitution of 
which guarantees the satisfactory operation of the partnership and the ability to administer 
public funds.
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approach is seen as a means to ensure that those practices that best suit the local 
community can be most appropriately developed in line with local needs and cultures. As 
one senior EU official confirmed. 
In our guidelines we do not define the local partnership too much, but we 
do say that you should have representative actors that are also 
representing the content of the strategy. So if the strategy is very limited 
towards a certain domain like tourism, of course the composition of the 
partnership should reflect, a little, the orientation of the strategy. If the 
Local Action Group is a regional development agency with a more broad 
approach you should have all the partners, so it depends. (...) Normally 
the LAG population will be up to 150 thousand inhabitants, and we want 
to keep them local, and at the regional level...it should remain exceptional 
that we keep the local action local and the partners should be local 
(...)We need the partnership to remain local, to be close to the citizen, to 
be the expression of local community, but in terms of composition it’s a 
freedom because it will be up to the partnership to decide a strategy, and 
to define itself, to define its territory, and to define its partnership (DG 
Agri Representative)
The LAG partnership is the key component of ‘the LEADER approach’ to rural 
development. From the perspective of the Commission, the LAG represents the means by 
which the ‘bottom’ is found, where community needs can be identified and development 
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can be tailored towards these needs.  However, there is an inherent tension within the 
LEADER approach. This tension rest on the freedom afforded by the EU guidelines on
the composition of the LAG, and the means by which identification of the LAG territory 
takes place; compared to the quality of these processes at the LAG level. For example, 
the extent to which the LAG territory is inclusive of a homogenous community or group 
of communities, and how much the partnership itself represents the territory, its 
communities and the local strategy should be questioned. Given the freedom of the EU 
Regulation and its guidelines, it seems clear that the Commission has little capacity to
ensure the quality of the bottom-up approach. This sentiment is enforced through the 
following observation by a representative of the Commission:
As far as the Commission is concerned we see ‘bottom-up’ as delivery 
through the LAGs, we set a framework in place through the regulation, 
and as long as the managing authority can demonstrate that the criteria 
have been met, the Commission is then satisfied. Now if it’s made up of 
the local elite in a local area, the Commission don’t really have any great 
say if the regulation is being adhered to. Because that’s the legal basis 
and the Commission can’t say to a managing authority you’re doing 
something wrong, the Commission can have an opinion but they can’t 
actually influence the managing authority outside of the regulation (DG 
Agri Representative).
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This observation was mirrored through Defra, England’s managing authority, during an 
interview of a representative:
The rules are quite general, and then within that, how these rules evolve 
in each area is quite organic. And you will always get a lot of variation, 
because it depends on the support of the organisations involved, and the 
style and the quality of individuals. I suppose that is all part of the bottom 
up approach, you can only get consistency everywhere if you have some 
quite strong central, top down direction and control (Defra 
representative)
The flexibility the EU offers the LAG partnership is respected at the national level. The 
quality of the partnership and the processes through which decision making is made rests 
heavily, as recognised above, on the quality of the organisations and the individuals 
within the LAG. This means that not only is the LAG dependent on actors to bring 
something to the table in terms of social capital, but also in terms of a knowledge of civic 
engagement and decision making practices.
According to Giorgio Osti the method of ‘bottom-up’ rural development is based on two 
principles: ‘decisions should be taken by bodies located as close as possible to the areas 
of intervention (subsidiarity principle); and the hierarchy of decision-making functions 
should be  replaced by negotiating mechanisms which theoretically involve all bodies on 
an equal footing (partnership principle)’ (2000: 172). The former should be linked with 
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the concern, through LEADER, for capacity building at a territorial level. Subsidiarity is 
a important principle within the EU context and rests on a belief that ‘the Community 
must not undertake and regulate what can be managed or regulated more efficiently at 
national or regional levels’ (Moussis, 2004: 30). Participation is closely aligned with the 
principle of subsidiarity, as it is seen as a means through which local people can develop 
the capacity of a local economy through strengthening the ‘knowledge, skills and 
attitudes of people so that they can establish and sustain their area’s development’ 
(Mannion, 1996: 2). The LAG is then seen as a ‘partnership of local organisations and 
people who live or work in the area, know it inside-out and have the drive, desire and 
commitment to push through improvement’ (Defra, LEADER; 2005). This is closely 
related to Osti’s latter point, which identifies the importance of a non-hierarchical
decision making processes at the local level by engaging with the potential offered by 
partnership in building local capacity. 
The process of ‘bottom-up’ rural development is a poorly defined term within EU 
legislation and guidelines, and policy discourses at the EU and national level.  It 
represents a call for participatory decision making at the local level, with no guidelines on 
what ‘democratic’ processes and structures should be employed. The omission of which 
is presented as a belief in the notion that this kind of flexibility will best encourage 
processes and structures that are the most suitable to the partnership in question, and as 
such are seen as the most effective means to build local capacity. The extent to which this 
is evident needs to be explored through a better understanding of the bottom-up approach, 
and under what conditions local capacity is best built. However, the relationship between 
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this approach and the building of local capacity cannot take place within the context of 
LEADER without referring to the aim of participatory decision-making across the 
population of the LAG territory at large, bringing together a range of private, public and 
voluntary representatives.
The extent to which the LEADER partnerships are to be representative of the LAG 
territory is loosely worded within the EU guidelines. The wider discourse alludes to the 
notion of representation loosely but this still has the effect of presenting LEADER as a 
representative process.  Policy documents on the subject are made up of statements, such 
as; ‘participatory decision-making can ensure, insofar as it functions efficiently, a wide 
and fair representation of all groups of interest, thus creating an occasion for building up 
a consensus, dealing with conflicts and fostering interrelationships between sectors and 
groups’ (LEADER European Observatory, 1999). Defra outlines that ‘The extent to 
which the partnership is a balanced grouping (number and nature of participants), 
genuinely locally based (i.e. living or having a significant work interest in the local action 
group area) and representative of the area and the wider community’ (Defra, LEADER; 
2001) would be taken into account in the selection of bids from LAGs to host the 
programme. An evaluation of the LEADER II programme funded by the Commission 
reported that the success of the bottom-up approach partly rested on a ‘representative 
partnership’ (European Commission, Agriculture Directorate-General, 2003). 
Given the flexibility afforded the LAG partnership, in terms of its composition, there is 
undoubtedly a risk that the partnerships do not attain the standards expected through the 
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‘bottom-up’ approach. The standards associated with the LEADER approach to rural 
development may not be enforced through EU law, but the wider discourse and rhetoric, 
as presented, constructs an approach that rests on community wide participation through 
the LAG. Given the flexibility in the regulations, and the nature of the bottom-up 
approach, participation is important not only in terms of collective agency and interactive 
regeneration, but also as a means to ensure that there are some democratic checks in place 
within this deliberative system. This works on the principle that,
A broad and diverse partnership is a good thing, because if you do get 
people who start to monopolise [the partnership] it’s fairly clear. As you 
tend to find people get dissatisfied and start withdrawing from the 
partnership, and it would just fall flat on itself (Defra Representative).  
This belief in partnership, and its ability to ensure a widespread and fair ‘democratic’ 
process was a widely held belief among those representatives I spoke to at Defra.
It’s very hard to police without having an army going in there, but I think 
in some ways you do rely a lot on the fact that there is a range of people 
in this partnership, and if there is that and the Programme Monitoring 
Committee keeping an eye on things, hopefully they are responsible and 
proactive, you are relying on the fact that it is a partnership and that 
people are keeping each other in line, it is certainly not going to 
guarantee that you do not have some kind of power struggle, or some 
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more powerful individuals and organisations using the partnership to 
their own ends (Defra representative)
The LEADER approach to bottom-up rural development presents well functioning 
participatory decision-making as a means to ensure effective representation within the 
LAG partnerships. It is the discourse surrounding this aspect of the LEADER approach 
that gives the impression that the governance of LEADER carries some democratic 
anchorage and structure, and as such it is important to examine the interconnecting 
themes that characterise the LEADER approach. 
6.3 Territory and Community
Collective capacity building through the LEADER programme also rests on the concern 
for territorial capacity building through the construction of ‘territories as communities’. 
Shucksmith criticizes this approach, and is concerned by the potential of the territorial 
approach ‘to mask inequalities and power relations between social actors within a 
‘community’ by employing a consensus perspective’ (2000: 209). He argues that the 
process of symbolic construction can create a dominant form of cultural identity that 
excludes and disempowers those residents that have limited affinity with what has been 
constructed (2000: 210). This can have the effect of obscuring differences such as class, 
ethnicity and gender that require a development approach that also builds the capacity of  
individuals (ibid, 209).
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It is apparent that the discourse of LEADER elides community with 
territory, as an unproblematic and homogenous ‘community of place’. 
Yet it has long been established that communities of place are far from 
homogenous and include many ‘communities of interest’, with highly 
unequal capacities to act. And is it only the capacity of ‘communities’ (of 
place or of interest) that is to be built, or might development seek to build 
also the capacity of individuals (especially disadvantaged individuals) to 
act? (ibid, 208).
There is evidence to suggest, based on my research, that the focus LAGs network did not 
stretch evenly across its territory. A representative of a high profile community based
charity gave the following reference to their involvement with the focus LAG, and their 
attempts to develop a project within its territory.
We have had difficulties operating up there because there are natural 
tensions between local organisations who have been very inward looking, 
and feeling as though they have ownership over activity in their area, so 
we found it quite difficult, we have found it quite challenging to engage 
them at times. When you get an organisation like that [a LAG] they can 
be quite inward looking and they can be quite territorial, and they can 
lose the kind of innovation and expertise that can come from outside and 
from other parties by looking outside the box and seeing what else is 
going on. I guess the danger is just that it becomes a body which is as 
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much about maintaining itself and its own infrastructure, as about 
working with the community, and not necessarily as engaging as well as 
with other partners and being aware of other ways of doing things. Some 
things they wouldn’t have the critical mass to do, but in principle I am 
not against such organisations (Community based charity representative)
This representative was giving reference to their own involvement with the focus LAG, 
and their attempts to develop a project within its territory. The problems this charity 
faced, in what was eventually a successful project, indicates that the focus LAG can 
represent a ‘closed’ policy network which can be difficult for those not within it to 
access, despite inhabiting the LAG territory. There is also a sense that outside interest is 
not actively welcome, and deemed a threat to the stability of the policy network. As 
indicated in chapter 3, the focus LAGs committee meetings are closed to the public, and 
as I discovered, access to these is dependent on the management team seeking approval 
from its supervisors within RegCo.
A closer look at the geographical location of the projects within the LAG territory reveals 
which areas of the focus LAGs territory benefit the most. By looking closely at the 
‘Business Support and Development Grant Scheme’, which has a budget of £429,000 (not 
including match funding), the highest out of all the grant schemes available; and the 
‘Community Projects Grant Scheme’, which has a budget of £63,750 (not including 
match funding), it is possible to see that a geographical bias exists. Table 1, which relates 
to the Business Support and Development Grant, indicates that Bideford, where the LAG 
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and its management team are based, has the highest level of projects with 36. This 
represents 28.6% of all projects funded through this grant, while Bideford’s population 
only represents 11.5% of the wider population living in the LAG territory. The next 
nearest number of projects is 14 in Ilfracombe, representing 11.1% of all projects under 
this grant.  This is a more balanced ratio compared to the size of the population, which 
represents 8.6% of the wider population living in the LAG territory. Overall 60.5% of 
grants were given to individuals and organisations in only 7 parishes, out of the 105 
parishes of the territory, representing just over 40% of the population10.
                                                          
10 The population of the focus LAG territory is 125, 749, that is made up of 66, 748 in North Devon District  
(excluding Barnstaple), and 58, 965 in Torridge District (Devon Libraries Local Studies Service, Devon 
County Council).
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Table 3. Business Support and Development Grant Scheme
Parishes with five or more successful grant applications (Total number of grants = 126)
Parish Successful applicants % of total Population % of total 
territory 
population
Council 
District
Bideford 36 28.6% 14, 407 11.5% Torridge
Illfracombe 14 11.1% 10, 840 8.6% North Devon
Holsworthy 6 4.8% 2, 256 1.8% Torridge
Braunton 5 4% 7, 510 6% North Devon
Hartland 5 4% 1, 676 1.3% Torridge
Northam 5 4% 11, 604 9.2% Torridge
South 
Molton
5 4% 4, 093 3.3% North Devon
Total 76 60.5% 52, 386 41.7%
Source: North Devon LEADER+ Information – March 2007 and Devon Libraries Local 
Studies Service, Devon County Council
Table 2 refers to the Community Projects Grant Scheme, which is only made up of 24 
grants. Bideford, again, received the most number of grants, representing 20.8% of the 
total, with the next highest number of successful applicants living in Northam (12.5%), 
which lies less than two miles north of Bideford. Interestingly, the majority of the 24 
grants were given to parishes in Torridge district (66.6%), with individuals and 
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organisations in North Devon district only receiving 33.3% of all grants in this scheme. 
This is similar to the breakdown for Table 3, where 68.4% of the 76 projects represented 
were in Torridge, compared to only 31.6% of successful applicants in North Devon. This 
indicates that there is a clear bias towards Torridge, despite North Devon having a 
slightly larger population. 
Table 4. Community Projects Grant Scheme
Parishes with 2 or more successful grant applications (Total number of grants = 24)
Parish Successful 
applicants
% of total Population % of total 
territory 
population
Council 
District
Bideford 5 20.8% 14, 407 11.5% Torridge
Northam 3 12.5% 11, 604 9.2% Torridge
Holsworthy 2 8.3% 2, 256 1.8% Torridge
Instow 2 8.3% 786 0.62% North Devon
Lynton/Lynmouth 2 8.3% 1, 513 1.2% North Devon
Totals 14 66.5% 30, 506 24.3%
Source: North Devon LEADER+ Information – March 2007 and Devon Libraries Local 
Studies Service, Devon County Council
Based on this evidence, funds are not allocated in a geographically balanced way. There 
is clearly a concentration of funding in Bideford, and the district of Torridge. This 
indicates a positive relationship between the LAGs location in Torridge and the number 
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of successful applications there. There is evidence to suggest that this bias exists because 
Torridge was the focus of the LEADER II programme (1995-1999), which did not 
encompass North Devon. This programme was again managed by RegCo, and based in 
Bideford. 
The previous programme provides the basis for embedded network relations that are 
structured around a pre-existing policy ‘community’. This might help explain the focus of 
funding in Torridge. In particular, public awareness of the opportunities offered by the 
LEADER programme is more likely to be concentrated in this area. It is also likely that 
LEADER has become strongly identified with Bideford. In effect, because the focus LAG 
is based in Bideford, local groups and individuals are more familiar with it, have a better 
grasp of what it does, and are more likely to know someone who has benefited from it, 
and as such are more likely to pick up the telephone, or drop an e-mail to the management 
team, to find out more. It is likely that the policy network associated with LEADER II in 
Torridge built up some, if not all, of the following network characteristics: “embedded 
routines”, “habits and norms”, “local conventions of communication and interaction”, 
“reciprocity and trust based on familiarity” (Amin, 1999). At the outset of the current 
programme there was little effort to extend the policy network into North Devon, with the 
pre-existing policy ‘community’ playing an important role in shaping the current 
programme. An existing member of this ‘community’ describes the consultation phase for 
the new programme. 
We knew a lot of people anyway having operated on the ground for a few 
years, and so it was relatively easy really, we knew all the actors and 
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anybody who wanted to participate, and just added on anybody that
might be of interest (LAG member).  
This indicates that the pre-existing policy network was drawn upon heavily to inform this 
consultation phase. In fact, the original LAG partnership was made up of 40 people from 
Torridge (75.5%), and only 8 from North Devon (15%), the remaining 9.4% came from 
outside the LAG territory (5 people) (NW Devon LEADER+, 2001). 
This clearly shows that the LAG partnership has not been extended significantly to 
engage with, or represent, a good cross section of the LAG territory. This defies the 
principles of the LEADER approach set out in chapter 3, and suggests that crucial 
elements of the ‘bottom-up’ approach to rural development have been overlooked.  The
management team have failed to counterbalance the pre-existing policy community based 
around Bideford, by taking the LEADER programme to ‘the people’ and extending the 
policy network to the wider LAG territory, encompassing North Devon. As a result, 
North Devon is at a disadvantage, and this underlines the difficulty of converting the 
powers of association across a policy network to a specific territory. 
This narrative implies that the construction of state territories and eliding these 
constructions with community, conditions power relations in a specific way. These 
relations can potentially exclude those individuals and groups who have limited affinity 
with, or access to, the dominant relations of power. This may, as a consequence, engender 
a belief that their objectives cannot be met, potentially leading to a lack of interest in 
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these governing structures.  LEADER type partnerships may actually begin to advance 
the problem of apathy towards the political system. This is ironically the very problem 
some commentators believe deliberative democracy may help overcome. The ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to rural development attached to LEADER becomes politically mobile through 
the discourse on participation, collective capacity building and the LAG territories. This 
discourse (re-)enforces a number of political tensions by poorly observing fundamental 
democratic principles, principles that are so poorly developed in the official 
documentation.
We should see the territorial approach as an initial attempt to reconfigure a new rural 
compromise not centred on traditional structures of power. Initially LEADER was 
conceived in the 1980’s out of a desire for social and economic cohesion, in an 
increasingly liberalized world. The ability to compete even within the confines of the 
European Community (as it was then) varied greatly from region to region. The extent to 
which some rural regions had moved away from a peasant based society varied greatly, 
especially with the advent of the Southern European States into the EC in 1986. 
LEADER, although initially on an experimental level, was developed to improve 
cohesion across the Community, and as such should also be seen as an attempt to develop 
the rural economy. In turn, the LEADER initiative has sought to re-define relations of 
power through an inclusive policy process. A retired member of the Commission, who 
played a key role in the development of the Cork Conference (1996) and the LEADER 
approach, spoke of this process:
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The problems inside agriculture stem from the fact that the CAP is a 
sectoral approach, LEADER is important because it’s purely a territorial 
approach...  On the one hand you have Mrs Thatcher pushing for 
liberalisation and one big single market, on the other hand was Jacques
Delores. The broad context is the following one: We are going back to 
1985 or 1986 and Delores [came along and] said ok that’s fine, but he was 
a socialist and a French man very much concerned about those that would 
not be able to be competitive in a single market. He saw the difficulties 
which a big single market would create, applying survival of the fittest, 
and he questioned what would happen to those people that would not be 
able to adapt in time, to be competitive, which was certainly the case for a 
lot of areas in France suffering, at that time, from migration to urban 
centres. Villages were becoming deserted, and so his concern was on the 
one hand to work for the single market, and on the other hand to work on a 
counter weight, and this is the origin of two concepts found in the Single 
European Act, the concepts of economic and social cohesion. (Former 
senior official to the Commission)
There is undoubtedly an attempt through the discourse on LEADER to reconfigure the 
power relations existing in rural policy, and this seems to be taking effect within the LAG 
partnership.
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We get the odd person who have pushed farming, farming, farming, 
farming, farming, and that’s ok because people are clever enough to 
understand now that this single issue is not the be all and end all, it’s just 
part of everything else in rural areas (LAG representative)
LEADER is representative of a shift in rural policy, and it has developed in line with the 
increasing impetus behind changing power relations in this area. It may represent one 
attempt at further redesigning the rural policy network and its key actors.
The potential reconfiguration of rural power relations has wide implications in terms of 
the shape of the rural policy arena. The territorial approach is a significant development 
in rural policy given the dominance of the CAP, and its implications in terms of 
positioning sector interests at the forefront of rural policy. This is not to say, however, 
that LEADER has the ability to reconfigure power relations on its own, nevertheless it 
may go some way in empowering or mobilising those changes that New Labour deems 
attractive. At the heart of the territorial approach is a desire to bring the decision making 
process to ‘the people’, but this rests heavily upon effective processes of partnership and 
participation, and it is to these I now turn.
6.4 Evidence of partnership and participation in LEADER
Partnership and participation have become synonymous with the perceived shift to 
network governance. Vivien Lowndes and Helen Sullivan (2004) have examined the 
199
relationship between partnership and public participation. They contend that participation 
and partnership have “co-evolved” as key instruments of New Labour’s programme for 
the ‘modernisation’ and ‘democratic renewal’ of British public services (2004: 52).  
However, these terms should not automatically be placed together as there is no certainty 
that partnership working does indeed promote participation better than traditional 
bureaucratic structures, or market alternatives (ibid, 52). At the same time there is also 
tension between participatory forms of democracy associated with the emerging 
‘partnership governance’, and representative forms of democracy associated with 
traditional bureaucratic structures. 
Christopher Ray has discussed the relationship between participative and representative 
forms of democracy within the context of the LEADER programme. He states:
The ‘problem’ for initiatives such as LEADER is that their rhetoric includes 
an invitation to populist participation but their implementation requires the 
political and financial support of the organs of the orthodox politico-
administrative system (1999: 528).
Ray goes on to add that LEADER has been accused of being undemocratic, especially 
when the programme has been implemented through the private sector or where the 
geographical boundaries have not conformed to those of local authorities. The legitimacy 
of using private sector bodies to implement the LEADER programme does not 
necessarily equate with being undemocratic. There is no reason why a private body, such 
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as RegCo, cannot oversee the machinery of democracy, but as with the state, standards 
must be upheld, and the quality of the system monitored. The design of governance, and 
in particular the nature of the relationship between partnership governance and the 
orthodox politico-administrative system, must be clearly defined. 
The focus LAG was shaped by a number of centrally driven demands, principally those 
relating to monetary issues. These demands undeniably had an influence on the quality of 
the democratic anchorage present and the legitimacy of the partnership. As one manager 
for a South West LAG indicated:
There are two arms to LEADER, one to be frank is about spending the 
money because you have got to, but the other, and for us I think the more 
significant is this process of local governance. I think the problem is, as 
for all of the programmes that Defra have been overseeing, there is 
obligation to spend the money, there is an obligation to spend the money 
within a particular time frame, but there has been no kind of similar 
obligation to look at, or to seriously take on board, the process of local 
governance, to really look at the positive and proactive things you can do 
in your area.  It does feel like a large proportion of LEADER groups have 
not paid that any regard and have missed the opportunity, because there 
was no emphasis on that from a Defra level, the emphasis has been on 
spending the money (LAG manager in the South West).
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The concern over LAG spending, and the pressure felt by LAG managers in particular to 
spend the funding available comes from a wider concern over the efficiency of the LAG 
partnerships as a delivery mechanism. A regional level actor responsible for monitoring 
the programme noted that:
From my monitoring point of view government procedures where clearly 
concerned with where the money was being spent, and whether it was 
being spent in the right place. I was not looking at how they were getting 
information from the community to develop these projects. These 
monitoring reports are very typical of a lot of the monitoring reports out 
there (Former RDS employeee)
It is possible that this concern for the efficiency of the partnership has an effect on the 
level of participation and in turn the quality of the partnership. This sentiment is reflected 
by one LAG manager I interviewed:  
It’s not just about spending the money, it’s also about developing the 
process and that process is a process of supporting and developing local 
governance and encouraging people to take control and encouraging 
people to get involved and encouraging people to be able to make a 
positive difference, and that does seem to get lost in some programmes 
which are run just as though they were just grant programmes (LAG 
manager in the South West).
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This concern for economic efficiency over the democratic processes attached to 
partnership is reinforced through scepticism towards deliberative decision making. This 
scepticism certainly existed among the focus LAG, and following comments by one of its 
members highlights some of the potential pitfalls of a deliberative approach to decision 
making and policy implementation in respect of partners’ capacity to devote their time, 
especially in line with questioning related to the potential for a more inclusive LAG. 
I think with a big broad LAG, it can get too broad and you spend a long 
time in conversation, you are going to get meeting fatigue and people are 
going to start falling off fairly quickly, or turning up to meetings where 
there is something that is a clear interest to them. The other problem is 
the capacity of people to give up their time (LAG representative)
There is clearly a tension here in terms of the demands placed upon individuals through 
their participation in governance partnerships. This point is quite often overlooked in the 
literature. The capacity of individuals to be able to spare the time to partake in 
partnerships is seen to be a problem, and it is felt this capacity would be further stretched 
if the partnerships were larger, and more inclusive, as the decision making process would 
potentially take longer, especially through deliberation. This kind of tension can be 
resolved through improving the partnership process, and the decision making element 
within it. It was common for my interviewees to stress the demands placed on their time 
by being involved in the focus LAG. This reflects a culture of ‘non-participation’ in this 
203
country, where the vast majority of individuals are not prone to giving up their free time 
to civic functions. There are, of course, many people that do, but there was widespread 
agreement among my interviewees that these people tend to be “older retired people”, 
which is common in a local level voluntary programme such as LEADER.
The focus LAG did not seem to carry the same concern with participation as other LAGs. 
The following passage underlines the importance attached to the process of bottom-up 
rural development, the same level of importance was not attached by the focus LAG.
For us it was just really essential that if we were talking about a bottom-
up programme then we actually had to involve local people in that 
decision making process, and it had to be transparent and open as 
possible, so that all the other local people in the area, who were not 
necessarily wanting to get involved in the LAG, but may have wanted to 
know what was going on, or may have wanted to apply for some money, 
they knew exactly what was going on, they knew how the decision 
making process was working, they could come along to meetings, they 
could here the kind of discussions, so that everything we did as a 
programme was completely open and accessible to everybody in the 
area... LEADER shouldn’t just be another grant scheme because its not 
just about spending the money, it’s also about developing the process and 
that process is a process of supporting and developing local governance 
and encouraging people to take control and encouraging people to get 
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involved and encouraging people to be able to make a positive difference, 
and that does seem to get lost in some programmes (Chalk and Cheese 
LAG representative).
No one I spoke to from the focus LAG suggested that the partnership process was a high 
priority, instead it was identified as problematic in nature, and there seemed little interest 
in engaging new strategies to turn this around. A representative of the focus LAG 
management team described some of the particular problems in getting the partnership 
together and keeping participation high. 
We put out adverts in local community newspapers and things like that, 
we asked members to put forward people that they thought might be 
appropriate. We do try and approach a cross section of society, if 
possible, but the nature of people who have time to volunteer in this area 
is that they tend to be older retired people… The time of our meeting at 
the moment is 10am on a Friday which isn’t ideal, we have looked at it, if 
we change it to the evening we are not necessarily going to pick up any 
extra people because in the summer people are out doing things or those 
among the agricultural sector are out working, in the winter no one wants 
go out on a dark windy night to go to a meeting (Focus LAG manager)
There is no doubt that the process by which the partnership is formed and held together is 
not an easy one. The level of participation within the focus LAG has dropped 
significantly since the outset of the current programme, and as the programme draws to a 
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close the LAG appears to be at very low ebb. This is a problem because it means a great 
deal of hard work will be required to build the programme up again as bidding 
commences for the new round of LEADER. I found a great deal of variation on the 
quality of the partnership process throughout my research, with some LAGs having a 
very proactive and positive approach to local participation, while others did not. The 
focus LAG I would say can be placed somewhere in between these two poles. The LAG 
partnership I witnessed was made up of individuals from the local community, 
representatives of local organisations and business, including charities and environmental 
groups, and the majority of these actors seemed to be positioned as carrying some form of 
expertise. 
There was not a great deal of local authority involvement in the partnership, other than on 
paper through the statutory roles of both Torridge and North Devon District Councils and 
Devon County Council. The vast majority of council officials I spoke to did not feel as 
though they had time to attend LAG meetings, and were more focused on the overall 
strategy for delivering policies in their respective districts.  The accountable body for the 
NW Devon programme, RegCo, seemed heavily represented in the LAG, probably 
because of the relatively low turnout at the LAG meeting I attended, and some of these 
representatives were only there in an administrative capacity. The meeting was organised 
well by the LAG Chairman, who promoted an active debate, and I cannot find fault with 
the partnership process in question. However, I do think that there is plenty of room for 
improving the level of participation within this LAG, and the wider concern for the 
practices of ‘bottom-up’ rural development. The description of the process by which the 
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focus LAG describes the enrolment process and some of the problems with engendering 
widespread representative participation of the LAG territory seemed somewhat weak. It 
would however, be fair to acknowledge that the capacity for the LAG to be able to do this 
does not necessarily come down to the quality of the LAG manager, but the resources 
available, the culture of participation in the area, and the institutional trends enforced 
through RegCo. The LAG manager was new at the outset of the current programme, and 
had no prior experience of running a LEADER programme. This may have resulted in 
greater reliance on the knowledge of existing members of the LEADER policy 
‘community’ in Torridge, and in turn reinforced this community’s position and in turn 
limited the geographical scope of the programme. 
Nevertheless, the focus LAG and its management team did not seem concerned with 
using LEADER as a means to induce greater participation across its territory, and seemed 
more concerned with fulfilling its technocratic functions. The focus LAG had a closed 
feeling not conducive to civic engagement. The premises from which the focus LAG 
operate is not appropriate for a public body. Not only is the entrance to the building 
difficult to find, but public access is restricted, and by appointment only. There is no 
indication that LEADER is being operated from the building within the reception area, 
which is fronted by reception staff who have little, if any, knowledge of LEADER. 
Furthermore, gaining access to the LAG meetings was a drawn out process, and by no 
means guaranteed, with the LAG manager having to ask permission from officials within 
RegCo. To add to this poor record of public access I had no response from the managing 
authority (RegCo) to discuss their role despite several attempts to get a response, and the 
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quality of the minutes of the committee meetings was very poor. In fact, they were so 
poor they provided little initial insight into the decision making process. The minutes 
resembled a series of very brief bullet points describing what was discussed at each 
meeting, they did not state who said what, and at what time, and failed to provide any 
clear detail on how discussions had unfolded and how decisions were made. 
6.5 The nature of participation: expert versus collective action
Given the freedom of the LAG partnerships to adapt the LEADER approach to their own 
ends it would not be surprising to find some innate tensions in how this approach is 
applied. In the focus LAG it seems there exists a theoretical tension within how the 
bottom-up approach is interpreted across the LEADER network. In this debate, we see at 
one side the view that the LAG partnerships should be made up of a broad and 
representative body within the LAG territory, while on the other side resides the view that 
these partnerships should be predominantly made up of professional experts, and actors 
with an organizational remit.
A member of the focus LAG argued that the participatory principles of the bottom-up 
approach should be tempered through the expertise of professionalism. 
You have got to have a professional level of input into designing the 
projects so that they will work, and there is that knowledge of whether it
has been tried elsewhere? Did it work? And if not, why not, and how do 
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you sort of improve on that? So the bottom-up approach is good for 
generating the ideas and ownership, but at some point there is a 
professional thing that comes in and says that’s great but that won’t really 
work, but it might if you did this (LAG Representative).
Another LAG member, for example, with wide strategic influence in the area through 
their influential position in local policy delivery questions whether those actors without 
an organizational remit should participate, because they carry no ‘standing’ or ‘remit’ of 
accountability.
If, for example, your partners are going to be made up of, the chamber of 
commerce, or the federation of small businesses, or the local council, or 
environmental groups, at least they represent a range of interests or 
businesses, at least they have got a platform from which to speak, the rest 
of them say uncle Tom Cobley from the street, they don’t have any remit, 
they don’t report back to anybody, they have got no standing if you like, 
and you question whether that is right (LAG Representative).
This sentiment is representative of some of the concerns over participatory forms of 
decision making in respect to issues of accountability, and the lack of prudence that can 
envelop a partnership that does not carry a suitable level of ‘expertise’.
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However, this issue does beg the question where the line should be drawn between expert 
involvement in these partnerships, and simply wide and territorially representative 
participation. This point is amplified by the simple reality that a lot of the experts sitting 
around the table do carry an organizational remit, and their expertise is influenced by the 
objectives of that organization, and not necessarily based entirely on expert local 
knowledge, and community interests. Many of the individuals sitting around the table, 
“say uncle Tom Cobley”, who do not carry ‘professional expertise’, may indeed have 
other forms of knowledge that develop the potential for the production of ‘capital’. This 
capital may be further developed through these individuals because they don’t have the 
same organizational or institutional restraints carried by the ‘professionals’ and it makes 
for a different ‘quality’ of input. Significantly, I question whether a governance 
partnership without these people involved can claim to be either representative or to 
improve local democracy.
There are certainly a number of actors across the LEADER network that does support an 
inclusive approach to partnership, as a means to enhance rural development.
It’s only over the last 20 years or so that there has been such an emphasis 
on the involvement of local people, ordinary people directly involved in 
public policy, and I am strongly in favour of it. I think there are three 
reasons why it’s important. One is that you are able to get extra thoughts 
and ideas that otherwise you completely miss out, an extra perspective on 
the situation. The second is by involving people, people feel involved in 
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the process, and as a consequence you may be able to mobilise them. The 
third reason is that a policy is likely to be accepted more if people have 
been involved. And then I suppose there is a fourth reason, a certain 
social justice in saying well it’s my area as much as yours and I have the 
right to influence its development as much as you (LEADER research 
body representative). 
This debate, across the LEADER network, can be aligned with the wider debate among 
social capital theorists about the potential of the concept in economic and social terms. 
What should be the last point here is that LEADER is an attempt at social and economic 
cohesion and as such the approach employed toward social capital should mirror this, if 
we are to believe EU rhetoric. 
6.6 Strategic Imagination of the State
Edwards et al. believe that the “strategic imagination of the state is evident in the 
formulation of official discourse of partnership working which bestow on partnerships 
meanings consistent with the wider regulatory objectives of the state” (2001: 306). This 
may explain why the LAG partnership falls short of offering a fully participative agenda. 
My data suggests that the state conditions the LAG through its strategic demands. The 
state is able to mediate this relationship by ensuring local actors do not threaten the core 
interests of the state (ibid, 306). This situation is reinforced through the states domination 
of channels of financing, resourcing and rule setting (ibid, 306).  This conjecture does not 
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account for the role of the EU, and this is something that must be considered in the next 
chapter.
The role of local government in terms of the wider strategy of the state deserves some 
attention. It was clear through my research that the local authorities did not play a direct 
role in the LAG partnership. However, the lack of direct influence from local government 
in the focus LAG does not mean that the local authority was not engaged with the LAG. 
In fact, the focus LAG was seen to play an important role in public policy delivery 
despite there been a clear separation between the local authority and the focus LAG. A 
representative of the Local Authority, who had a strategic focus, described how they saw 
this relationship between partnership governance and local government.
We see it more of a delivery agency than a governance agency to be 
honest. Yeah, I mean it all helps; I mean you can’t govern unless you 
have got a means to deliver. So the two functions aren’t completely 
separate, the emphasis within LEADER, within the regeneration 
company is delivery. The emphasis within local authorities is 
governance. It is an interesting relationship, but it does help to deliver in 
rural communities and its part of our purpose as local authorities to 
deliver. (...) LEADER+ helps us to deliver those priority areas, so it’s a 
very good alignment (Local Government representative).
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The LAG is seen by the local authority as purely a delivery agency. Now there does 
appear to be some confusion over the role of the LAG in terms of local governance in this 
statement. However, this representative does accept the LAG does play a role in the 
process of governance, but clearly, this role is seen as coming second to its principal role 
as a delivery mechanism. While the local authority believes that in strategic terms, the 
governance of governance (meta-governance) is the domain of the local authorities at this 
level. 
An experienced political analyst, with a great deal of knowledge of the LEADER 
programme described the important role these partnerships can play.
I think these partnerships are an extension of local government to some 
extent. There has been this general trend away from government to 
governance at the local level with a lot of other agencies being embraced. 
The situation is almost too complex now for the local authorities to do 
everything, so it is an extension of it or from it (Political analyst).
This insight offers the view that the LAG partnership may well be an extension of the 
local authority in some way. By claiming that the LAG partnerships may well represent 
an ‘extension of’ local government  ‘or from it’ implies that this is not necessarily a 
consequence of strategy coming from the local authority, but instead implies that it may 
be born out of local government’s struggle to comprehend new and complex challenges 
in public policy and its administration. From where this impetus comes is the focus of the 
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next chapter. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw the following conclusion: local 
authorities appeared to have little strategic influence in the focus LAG, despite claims to 
the contrary.
It is necessary to add that in terms of the strategic operation of the ‘state’, partnership 
governance has no constitutional requirement to be democratic. Partnerships were born 
and have developed out of neo-liberal attempts to devolve decision making away from the 
state, ensuring there is sufficient separation between the state, and market mechanisms. 
However, the nature of partnership has changed in line with political ideology, with the 
shift from NPM to the Third Way. Partnerships like those associated with LEADER, are 
founded upon new forms of collective action. This is often perceived as a response to the 
harsh realities of the market, and its inability to tackle complex social problems. In line 
with this, partnerships, as set out above, are increasingly being associated with new forms 
of inclusive and deliberative decision making. In the previous section I discussed the 
tensions connected with these mechanisms through the focus LAG. The most striking 
feature of these practices was the level of freedom the partnership had over these 
mechanisms, and the lack of democratic rigour within the LAG. This conclusion is based 
on the assumption that these mechanisms should be an extension of those same standards 
of democracy associated with the liberal democratic state. However, perhaps it is 
inappropriate to measure the quality of these mechanisms through those same standards. I 
would argue that in line with partnerships developed under the NPM, new partnership 
arrangements are seen to be most effective if there is separation between the state, and 
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these new partnership arrangements. This point is partly supported through regional 
development theory, discussed in chapter three, which supports an argument for local 
associational forms of governing based upon local cultures and norms. However, this 
theoretical work does not go as far as saying that this form of development is dependent 
on a formal separation of powers between the state and governing partnerships.
Nonetheless, a great deal of separation appears to exist between the state and the focus 
LAG in certain areas of the programme’s delivery. The state’s primary focus is ensuring a 
cost-effective delivery process, leaving other aspects of the policies delivery, such as 
decision-making, completely to the LAGs discretion. This makes for very cost efficient 
policy delivery mechanism, but fails to ensure the programme is delivered effectively. 
This does not mean that the state does not have good intentions by embarking on 
partnership forms of delivery, but too many compromises (especially in terms of 
resources) have been made to enable this process to follow the same standards associated 
with those traditional processes at the heart of the liberal democratic state. 
6.7 Network governance and democracy: a theoretical synopsis
In the section above, I try to show some of the tensions that are evident in the LEADER 
approach to partnership. As a result the focus of the chapter so far has been the much 
vaunted ‘bottom-up’ approach presented through the discourse attached to LEADER. 
This approach is reinforced through wider government rhetoric and in relation to 
partnership and participation. In the following section I want to consider how democracy 
relates to network governance, and the strategic restructuring of the state. Klijn and 
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Skelcher offer four conjectures on the relationship between governance networks and 
democracy. I use these here to explore more generally whether the new governance and 
democracy are inappropriate allies.
The first conjecture rests on the notion that representative democracy and governance 
networks are incompatible. First, governance networks represent a multilevel system, 
where sovereignty is shared between sub-national, national and supranational institutions. 
This challenges the hegemony of the state, and as a consequence, the construction of ‘the 
people’ as the self regulating sovereign (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007: 593). The focus of 
LEADER is a set of local level partnerships that are deemed to hold sovereignty over the 
decisions it makes. Nevertheless, the focus LAG can be placed within a wider context, 
framed by the wider LEADER network, its dominant narratives and a set of highly 
politicised interactions. In other words, this is an EU programme shaped by a multilevel 
policy network. In this context, sovereignty is a political construction designed to frame 
the practices of the state, but any sovereign body is continuously under attack from 
discourses of power. The level of ‘sovereignty’ that exists at the local level, in the context 
of the LAG, is contingent upon the influence of those interactions across the wider 
network. These interactions will be explored in the next chapter, but it is important to 
recognise that  political sovereignty, instead of being an expression of ‘the people’, is a 
contested area shaped by powerful discourses and interactions of power across the policy 
network (ibid, 593). As part of the new world order, developed in the previous chapter, 
sovereignty may be increasingly contested by ever more extensive policy networks. This 
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may make using the term theoretically problematic within the new network society, as its
association with the political stability of the state under the countenance of ‘the people’ is 
no longer entirely applicable. 
Sorensen, also argues that the involvement of public administrators in facilitating and 
coordinating governance networks has put the role of the public administrator within the 
process of democracy under a new light (ibid, 593). This gives public administrators the 
leeway to re-construct governing structures and norms, while also conditioning 
democratic practice in line with governance objectives. This is a clear advantage of 
partnership governance from a public policy maker’s perspective, while this scenario may 
not be wholly acceptable under the terms of traditional representative democracy, given 
that traditional theories of representative democracy rest on a separation between the 
political system and society. As such, governance networks are seen to challenge this 
separation, especially through the perception that they are presented as a means to engage 
multiple actors across the boundary between state, market and civil society (ibid, 593). 
Within this perspective the closed nature of decision making is explored along with its 
sectorization (or the compartmentalization of policy making in separate policy sectors) 
(Klijn and Skelcher, 2007: 593). Klijn and Skelcher add:
[This] stresses the limited accessibility of decision-making arenas for 
non-specialized non-organized interest groups. The relatively closed 
nature of decision making and the characteristics of the sector result in a 
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dominant involvement of sector specialists and tends to increase the 
participation of technical actors and specialists appointed to quasi-
governmental bodies at the expense of elected politicians (2007: 593).
This has implications for accountability within public administration, as the primacy of 
politics and the political accountability of ministers and other elected executive office 
holders is interfered with and threatened by the sectorization of governance networks 
(ibid, 593). The emphasis of this point should be slightly different in the case of 
endogenous governance networks, but the overall point is the same: policy networks are 
very malleable to dominant relations of power. This is identified above through my own 
empirical work where the focus LAG partnership represents a relatively closed policy 
network, based on professional expertise, and lacking the level of accountability expected 
through those norms attached to traditional representative democracy. This poses as much 
a threat to the primacy of politics and executive office holders as it does to individual 
interests. 
A number of critics disagree with the prescription that network governance and 
democracy are incompatible. Papadopoulos (2000) argues that this argument has two 
main weaknesses. Firstly, this critique is based on an idealized or classical view of 
representative democracy that does not take account of the recent modifications within 
the theoretical and empirical literature. Secondly, this prescription takes little account of 
the complexities surrounding issues of accountability within contemporary liberal 
democracies. It also fails to recognise that governance networks may offer one means to 
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enhance accountability because of its potential to enrol more actors into a process of 
deliberative policy-making and implementation. However, if the deliberative process does 
not encourage widespread participation from all sections of the community, then the 
claim that deliberative policy making improves accountability, as demonstrated through 
the focus LAG partnership, is void. 
A number of governance network theorists also disagree with the prescription that 
dangerous tensions exist between governance networks and democracy, and this is the 
basis for the second conjecture. Again, the enrolment through networks of a wider range 
of actors in the policy process is cited as a positive element of network governance. This 
is seen to help lubricate and assist the functioning of representative democracy. For 
example, Rhodes argues that governance networks represent a supplement to the 
territorially organised institutions of representative democracy (1997: 9). Furthermore, 
Jessop argues that governance networks play a pivotal role in the development of 
democracy through linking different forms of democratic governance (2000: 17); while 
Kooiman, sees governance networks as a means to enhance the flexibility of our 
democratic institutions (1993: 36; 2000: 143). 
This view is based upon the hypothesis that representative democratic processes cannot 
cope with the contemporary complexities of governance in advanced liberal democracies 
(Klijn and Scelcher, 2007: 594). These complexities are identified to exist in two ways. 
Firstly, complexities emerge through the development of new policy arenas, where public 
policy has had to acknowledge new and changing relationships of power and interest. 
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These are associated with global socio-economic demands and advances in (bio)-
technology (ibid, 594). Secondly, further complexities are said to emerge because these 
new arenas of interest are superimposed upon those cleavages in society, around which
the constitutional arrangements within advanced liberal democracies were first founded 
(ibid, 594). This is shown by Lijphart (1984) in his analysis of governmental systems. For 
instance, the Netherlands constitution set out an agreement that enabled collective 
decisions to be made across religious and cultural divides; while in the US the 
constitutional agreement set out to manage the relationship between individual liberty and 
public purpose. As such ‘new cleavages in society around religion, ethnicity, cultural 
orientation, sexuality and so on pose challenges for representative democratic systems 
based on older constitutional settlements’ (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007: 594). 
Governance networks are seen to contribute to democratic anchorage and legitimacy in 
several ways (See Papadopoulos, 2000; Fung and Wright, 2001). First, the development 
of new institutions is seen to offer better opportunities for participating in the policy 
process. This is bred from the belief that it offers citizens the opportunity to re-engage 
with democratic practice, while also giving government better quality information on its 
citizens needs (ibid, 595). Second, partial preferences are seen to be better accommodated 
within the policy process when developed on the basis of deliberative democratic 
practices and a positive democratic ethos (ibid, 595). Third, there is a belief that the 
structure of governance networks and the nature of its institutions enable participation 
across the different phases of the policy process, from agenda setting, consultation and 
implementation (ibid, 595-596). Finally, proponents of network governance, as outlined 
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above, contend that it builds social capital through its semi-formal (having few 
constitutional rules) and semi-public (typically meeting beyond the view of the ordinary 
citizen) processes of deliberation (ibid, 596). 
This complementary thesis rests on the assumption that the core institutions of the state, 
despite the pressures of the global epoch, still provide the most effective means of 
legitimately resolving public policy issues. Governance networks are held to create arenas 
around the periphery of the representative system that can accommodate the changing 
nature of society and the complexity of policy issues it faces (ibid, 596). However, the 
state is able to retain its hegemony through a series of constraints on the jurisdiction of 
governance networks institutions. These constraints are believed to be set by the 
legislature and the political executive, ensuring that issues of high politics or fundamental 
value choices remain the domain of the representative system (ibid, 596). This argument 
could be applied to LEADER, as LEADER is a relatively small programme with limited 
scope in terms of resource distribution. However, the concern is that if certain processes 
are not observed, within a system that lays claim to be at the forefront of economic and 
social policy making within an EU context, then the very foundations of liberal 
democracy are at threat from a covert and sinister beast. This argument attempts to align 
network governance with managerial issues, and suggests that the perceived problem of a 
democratic deficit may be irrelevant, because these are low-level decisions at the edge of 
the constitutional system.
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This approach fails to acknowledge the influence of market and hierarchical led modes of 
governance in creating and expanding cleavages within the state, and the potential of 
network governance to do the same. It also ignores the ability of the executive to adapt to 
these cleavages over time through improving representational democracy. It may be 
argued that ‘governance networks offer a flexible means of institutional design to mediate 
the relationship of representative democracy with citizens and other parties, thus 
ameliorating the problems set out above’ (ibid, 595). However, this non-executive based 
mode of consensus may not offer the democratic stability, protection for ‘the individual’ 
and level of accountability that an improved representational system can. The claim that 
low-level decisions require little democratic legitimacy ignores the fact that low political 
decisions can have a huge impact on ‘the individual’ and their quality of life. If a hybrid 
system is to develop then surely rules of democratic engagement must be developed to 
address the cleavages within society at whatever level they are found. My empirical 
research shows first hand that poorly designed systems of governance do little to improve 
widespread community engagement, and as a result cleavages are unlikely to disappear.
Sorensen and Torfing believe that instead of writing off network governance as 
‘inherently undemocratic’, there is a need to attempt to enhance its democratic 
performance (2005: 202). They argue that:
[T]he problem is that the very idea of exercising political control with 
governance networks is flawed. Governance networks are defined in 
terms of their capacity for self-regulation and cannot be controlled 
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through the exercise of sovereign power within a hierarchical system 
based upon the giving of orders, detailed instructions and unconstrained 
overruling of discretionary decisions made by governance networks (ibid, 
202). 
Sorensen and Torfing go on to look at meta-governance as a means to facilitate and 
constrain the policy process through self regulating networks, without necessarily 
retreating to hierarchical ‘command and domination’ (ibid, 203). They distinguish three 
forms of meta-governance that they believe politicians must draw on interchangeably to 
enhance democratic legitimacy (See Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997, 2000). The first is 
network design, ‘which involves deliberate attempts to shape and structure governance 
networks’ (ibid, 204). In the process of governance network formation it is possible that 
meta-governing politicians have the ability to influence how the lines of inclusion and 
exclusion are drawn, either directly via the means of laws and regulations or indirectly by 
writing in conditions that ensure public cooperation. This is possible, for instance, by 
stipulating through the terms of funding that certain actors are included or excluded (ibid, 
204). Network design can also selectively empower some actors, over others, by 
distributing important resources and capacities that can turn them into powerful actors in 
governance networks (ibid, 204). Network design can also include, importantly, the 
ability to determine the scope, decision-making competences and internal procedures of 
governance networks (ibid, 204).  Expanding the capacity of governance networks to 
include significant political issues and delegating political competences that make 
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possible a proactive rather than reactive engagement in the policy process, which is vital 
for mobilizing the energies of the network actors (ibid, 204). 
The second form of meta-governance that can be identified as a means of improving the 
legitimacy of democracy in network governance is network framing. This involves the 
formulation of political objectives to be pursued by governance networks (ibid, 204). 
Network framing also involves the allocation of fiscal and other resources to governance 
networks, this might also include a legal framework that either acts to facilitate or 
constrain the ability of self-constituting governance networks to develop (ibid, 204). It is 
also important to acknowledge the significant role that can be played through the 
discursive framing of governance networks. ‘Story telling either in terms of public 
political accounts about societal problems, moral values and common futures, or in terms 
of the propagation of ‘best practice’, can be used deliberately to influence the policy-
making processes within governance networks’ (ibid, 204). The ability of governance 
networks to remain self-regulating can be preserved to the extent that the overall policy 
objectives are broadly defined (ibid, 204).
The third form of meta-governance that can increase the democratic legitimacy of 
governance networks is network participation. The direct participation of politicians in 
governance networks gives them ‘detailed knowledge of the ideas, plans and activities of 
the governance network and this facilitates critical evaluation and political intervention in 
the policy-making process, especially in the early phases where decisions are easier to 
modify or change without overruling and upsetting the entire network’ (ibid, 205). It is 
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also felt that direct participation in governance networks might also allow elected 
politicians to counteract, or even stop, the predominance of narrow sector interests by 
using their influence to foster an inclusive policy agenda (ibid, 205). Finally, through 
participation in the internal processes of deliberation and bargaining could allow the 
policy decisions of a particular governance network to be aligned with the objectives of 
other governance networks, and ultimately the overall goals of the government through a 
process of ‘joining-up’ (ibid, 205).
The meta-governance thesis, when applied to LEADER, offers a fascinating insight into 
why certain norms are (re-)constructed by the state, and how these might be significant in 
terms of governance. In the case of LEADER I would question whether network 
participation by government actors would be actively pursued as part of a meta-
governance strategy. I would also contend that the government’s limited approach to 
network design and framing in the case of LEADER is a strategically managed position. 
It ensures LEADER is cost efficient, and owing to government’s lack of network 
participation, its level of accountability is reduced and its job becomes easier. In other 
words, perhaps the government has actively pursued a strategy of ‘governance at a 
distance’ to keep costs low, and reduce government responsibilities. In the next chapter I 
focus on the power relations that exist along the LEADER network, from the focus LAG 
upwards, and it is in these relations that the use of meta-governance will become more 
evident. 
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Another conjecture on the relationship between governance and democracy rests on the 
idea that governance networks are part of a transitional process from state-centric 
government to a network form of governance consisting of decentred, and pluralised 
nodes of authority (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007: 596). This transitional conjecture posits that 
democracy becomes more a societal model than a representational model.
Democracy becomes a process of deliberation that has to be organised 
and guided carefully to enhance its open character. In addition, it 
becomes a model that has to be supported by multiple forms of 
accountability and not only by political accountability by means of the 
primacy of politics. In the transitional conjecture, democracy is a design 
task to be implemented in real-life practice of governance networks. It is 
both a high ideal but also a very pragmatic managerial task (ibid, 598).
Empirically this conjecture is very difficult to explore. It rests on an end-game type 
assumption, based on the prescription of the re-articulation of the state. It is not for me to 
challenge this assumption, but neither is it to reinforce it through unwittingly assimilating 
it with my empirical data. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of its existence, and 
perhaps acknowledge that if LEADER represents an early attempt to guide this societal 
model, then hopefully it has a long way to go before its potential is realised.
The final conjecture considered here is shaped by the idea that powerful governmental 
actors use networks as an instrument to increase their capacity to shape and implement 
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public policy in a complex world (ibid, 598). This instrumental approach ‘can be located 
either in a notion of local elite strategies or the wider debate about changing forms of 
social regulation in a neo-liberal context’ (ibid, 599). In both cases there is a belief that 
‘the interests of governmental actors are relatively immutable and exist prior to any wider 
engagement with stakeholders’ or networks, as a means reinforcing these dominant 
interests (ibid, 599). Empirical studies in England based on critiques of the ‘governing 
without government’ thesis challenge two of its key principles (See Bache; Davies 2002; 
Skelcher et al. 2005). Firstly, they challenge the idea that networks are self-organizing; 
and secondly, that government is one of many players in a game of resource exchange 
(ibid, 599). Drawing on case analysis of governance networks at regional and local levels 
they argue that the role of the national government is somewhat different to that 
presented, in particular by Rhodes. They conclude that national government remains a 
powerful actor through the creation and manipulation of networks (ibid, 600). Thereby, 
governance networks are believed ‘to come after rather than before the definition of 
political projects and are associated with a powerful and legitimate political actor 
proactively creating or reshaping networks’ (ibid, 600). This conjecture rests the most 
closely with the supposition made above in relation to the potential significance of meta-
governance. However, all these conjectures will be carried forward into the next chapter 
as I aim to explore the significance of the power relations or the paths of power towards 
the governance of governance. 
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6.8 Conclusion
In summary of this chapter, the LAG partnership, and the EU’s notion of the bottom-up 
approach, suggests the need to question the strategic functioning of the programme. The 
flexibility found within EU regulations and guidelines on LEADER provide member 
states with a significant amount of flexibility on how the LEADER approach should be 
interpreted. Defra draws upon a set of powerful discourses relating to democracy and 
endogenous development to frame the LEADER programme. These discourses were 
compared to the democratic practices employed within the focus LAG and the wider 
concerns for their implementation across the wider policy network. Two key problems 
were identified: Firstly, there was a poor level of participation within the focus LAG, 
enforced by relatively closed policy networks at the local level; and secondly, there was a 
lack of direct involvement by the state in ensuring the governing processes are fair, 
democratic and accountable. This implies that the programme is a ‘self-governing’ 
process at the local level built on very flexible foundations. At this stage it is tempting to 
conclude that the LAG represents an implementation tool, developed around strong 
discourses. These discourses are enhanced by New Labour’s highly tuned aptitude for 
democratic ‘spin’, which creates a smokescreen for low-cost public policy. As a result the 
workings of local governance in terms of participation and representation are limited in 
nature. It appears as though a democratic mandate has been constructed to mobilise and 
enforce a partnership governance approach to public policy. In other words, the LEADER 
approach, based strongly on social and economic cohesion, has been hijacked by a neo-
liberal policy agenda. This supposition will be explored in the next chapter as I attempt to 
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look more closely at important sites of interaction and the potential for the governance of 
governance (meta-governance). 
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Chapter 7: Multilevel governmental power play 
7.1 Introduction
In chapter four I explored governance and governance theory in order to be able to 
comprehend the significance of the ‘governance turn’ in relation to the changing function 
of the state. In the same chapter I briefly introduced some theoretical work on ‘European 
governance’.  I aim to expand these theories in this chapter, as a means to interpret the 
forms of multilevel governmental power play evident through the governance of the 
LEADER programme. This chapter explores the role of the EU, the state and the sub-
national level in the governance of the LEADER programme. This will be done 
principally by using the empirical data I gathered through tracing the LEADER network 
and interviewing actors along it. Following this, I show that some of the particular design
features of the LEADER approach, explored in the previous chapter, represent a 
particular means of meta-governance (‘the governance of governance’) that favours some 
actors along the LEADER network over others. 
7.2 EU governance ‘systems’ explored
Chapter 4 differentiated between multilevel governance and ‘European Governance’. The 
former, as implied in the title, refers to a shared system of co-ordination involving 
regions, states and the EU; and no assumptions exist over the strategic role of the state. 
The latter theoretical conception views governance of the EU as a more complex affair, 
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non-hierarchical and not necessarily multilevel, underlined by a host of complex 
regulatory forces. The multilevel governance perspective has become widely applied 
within studies of EU policy making, and the term itself has found itself applied, often 
uncritically within all manner of academic and public discourses. It would be a logical 
step to closely follow this theoretical perspective through my research on LEADER, 
given that multilevel governance was born out of studies on cohesion policy (see Marks, 
1993; Hooghe, 1996; Wallace et al., 2000), of which LEADER is a component. As such, 
a number of the observations with regards to cohesion policy that frame the multilevel 
governance theoretical perspective are identifiable in the governance of the LEADER 
programme, which will be discussed shortly. However, it is important to recognise that as 
a Community initiative the Commission has more direct control over the LEADER 
programme than cohesion policy, more generally. This is not to say, however, that the 
European Governance perspective does not hold important insights into the governance 
of the LEADER programme. I would argue that although multilevel governance offers a
good framework from which to consider the forms of governmental power play at work 
in the governing of LEADER, it is equally as important to recognise that this power-play 
is conditioned by inferences of power with varying degrees of regulatory force which do 
not necessarily conform to traditional understandings of multilevel governance. These 
features will be explained in more detail as the chapter progresses, but in the meantime I 
would like to promote a multilevel governance framework which acknowledges that the 
flows of power do not always run in a linear manner, and that governance is a complex 
phenomena conditioned by political dyspraxia, a term I have adopted to describe the 
complexity of governance and its discourses, and the effect these processes have on flows 
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across policy networks. Political processes never flow in a linear way, these processes are 
constantly being adapted by people and their interests as they are passed across the 
network, they can easily stall, or take on a completely new form influenced by the 
cultures and traditions that exist around them. This understanding of these processes is 
especially pertinent now as part of the ‘new’ governance; where power ebbs and flows 
through a whole host of state, and non-state actors; where political processes are 
dominated by market relations on the one hand, and on the other, policy makers looks to 
alleviate social and economic inequalities produced through these market relations. In 
sum, political dyspraxia refers to the confusion within the policy process, heightened by 
the complexities and contradictions of governance by market, hierarchy and networks, 
and the inevitable potential of policies to change and be moulded by powerful discourses 
that many actors fail to critically understand. 
It is also important to consider the ability of ‘the powerful’ in the governance of 
governance (meta-governance), and their ability to influence the character of the policy 
process and network design. I would like to show how the Open Method of Co-ordination 
(OMC), discussed in chapter four as a feature of the European Governance perspective, 
can be identified in the LEADER approach. This implies that the LEADER approach 
signifies a particular means of meta-governance grounded through the EU principle of 
subsidiarity. 
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7.3 Cohesion policy and multilevel governance
As stated previously, the concept of multilevel governance was first developed by Marks 
through his work on cohesion policy in the EU. Multilevel governance was formed 
through this critique of the debate between functionalists and neo-functionalists on one
side and realists, neo-realists and intergovernmental theorists on the other. The former 
argued that the process of European integration takes place through a process of 
institutional innovation where state autonomy and sovereignty is compromised as power
is passed to supranational institutions, which shape institutional competencies, resources, 
and decision making rules (Marks, 1993: 391). In contrast, the latter argued that member 
states and their executives dominate decision making (ibid, 391). Marks argued that 
[A] convincing analysis of institution building in the EC should go 
beyond the areas that are transparently dominated by the member states: 
financial decisions, major pieces of legislation, and the treaties. Beyond 
and beneath the highly visible politics of member states bargaining lies a 
dimly lit process of institutional formation, and here the Commission has 
played a vital role (1993: 392).
He also argues that the early debates surrounding European integration missed a critical 
element in developing an understanding of the EU, specifically, ‘the increasing 
importance of sub-national levels of decision making and their myriad connections with 
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other levels’ (1993: 392). In line with this observation Marks puts forward his theory of 
multilevel governance.
I suggest that we are seeing the emergence of multilevel governance, a 
system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several 
territorial tiers – supranational, national, regional and local – as a result 
of a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation 
that has pulled some previously centralized functions of the state up to 
the supranational level and some down to the local/regional level (1993: 
392).
Marks found that despite the dominant role of the member states over key decisions, such 
as the size of the budget allotted for cohesion policy, the member states did not dominate 
decisions over the implementation of policy, and in deciding how the budget was spent 
(ibid, 395). For example, he found that the system of governance operating in cohesion 
policy provided the Commission with sufficient latitude to formulate and implement 
policy. Marks discusses a system that is based on the principles of programming, 
partnership, and additionality; principles the Commission has been identified as having a 
great deal of leverage over within cohesion policy (ibid, 395). 
The programming of cohesion policy refers to the design of the policy programme; 
including an outline of how the approach meets specified political objectives and 
identifies the actors to be involved (ibid, 396).  The principle of partnership has become a 
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guiding light for cohesion policy. However, Marks acknowledges that ‘the Commission 
lacks the authority to enforce participation of the social partners in structural decision 
making against the wishes of the member state’ (ibid, 396).  Nevertheless, the 
Commission consistently attempts to improve participation, within the member states, 
through a rich discourse on ‘social partnership’ (ibid, 397). The Commission is also able 
to influence the allocation of fiscal resources through the principle of additionality, which 
refers to the idea that member states should not decrease spending in poorer regions as the 
EU increases its funding (ibid, 398). The first two of these three principles can be linked 
to the types of meta-governance identified in the previous chapter: network design, 
network participation and network framing. This exemplifies how the Commission is able 
to influence policy by shaping and structuring governance networks (network design), 
target the political objectives and direct the allocation of fiscal and other resources 
(network framing), and influence participation (network participation).
Marks concludes his work by indicating that it is his belief that intergovernmental and 
neofunctional perspectives are lacking in one important respect: ‘they conceive the 
systematic outcome of institution building in the EC in terms of a single dimension 
ranging from national state domination at the one extreme to a supranational polity at the 
other’ (ibid, 407). Marks is able to draw this conclusion by showing how the Commission 
has played a central role in designing the institutional framework for cohesion policy, and 
strategically placing itself as a key actor in the process of policymaking and 
implementation (ibid, 399). The Commission, according to Marks, has used this strategic 
platform to open up the policymaking process to include a broader range of social 
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partners, resulting in a ‘centrifugal’ process. This reinforces the idea held by 
neofunctionalists that the Commission has a high level of autonomy (ibid, 407).
Structural policy in the EC does not fit along a continuum running from 
continued national state predominance to the emergence of a Eurostate. 
Instead, it appears to be a two-sided process, involving decentralization 
of decision making to subnational levels of government as well as 
centralization of new powers at the supranational level. If we encompass 
the experience of structural policy in our notion of the future European 
polity, it can be viewed as the leading edge of a system of multilevel 
governance in which supranational, national, regional, and local 
governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks. 
Instead, of a centripetal process where decision making is progressively 
centralized in Community institutions, in structural policy we see 
centrifugal processes in which decision making is spun away from 
member states in two directions: up to supranational institutions, and 
down to diverse units of sub-national government, instead of 
unambiguous allocation of decision making responsibility between 
national and supranational governments, we see the institutionalisation of 
contested spheres of influence across several tiers of government (ibid, 
402). 
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Marks’ notion of multilevel governance has since been applied more widely to the EU 
beyond cohesion policy, although this arena, arguably, forms the best empirical example 
to date.  For example, Marginson and Sisson (2004) link the integration of industrial 
relations into European policy-making through the theory of multilevel governance by 
showing how industrial relations at the EU, sector and company levels are becoming 
increasingly integrated. Smith (2004) provides another example, by plotting the 
relationship between institutional development and the multilevel governance of EU 
foreign policy, as represented through common foreign and security policy (CFSP). He 
argued that ‘the EU’s comprehensive approach to South Africa [following the end of 
apartheid] epitomized the optimal multilevel governance’ (2004: 755). 
Marks et al. (1996), attempt to further outline the significance of the Commission within 
multilevel governance. This significance is particularly seen in its role as an agenda setter 
within the EU, through its formal power to initiate and draft legislation, and its role as a 
think tank for new policies (ibid, 356). Marks et al. argue that the influence of the 
Commission extends beyond this formal role because of its unique position. On the one 
hand the European Council only provides the Commission with general policy mandates, 
as opposed to specific policy proposals. This is down to the fact that the European 
Council meets rarely, with a limited permanent staff. As such, this provides the 
Commission a flexible basis to develop legislative programmes (ibid, 357). However, this 
should not hide the fact that agenda-setting is an increasingly shared and contested area, 
with EU institutions competing for control, along with an array of interest groups and 
sub-national actors jockeying for position (ibid, 359). On reflection, it can be said that the 
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ability of the Commission to set the policy agenda is ultimately dependent on its ability to 
guide and influence the policy arena, anticipate and mediate demands, promote 
operational efficiency, and take advantage of its own expertise (ibid, 359). 
The Commission, under the principle of multilevel governance, is seen to play a 
prominent role throughout the policy process; including, notably, the implementation 
stage (Marks, 1993: 395). To this end the Commission, along with national, regional local 
and social actors has been prescribed through the 1988 reform of the structural funds, to 
be involved in the selection of priorities, choice of programmes, allocation of funding, 
monitoring of operations, evaluation and adjustment of programmes (Marks et al., 1996: 
396). 
However, there is a risk that the role of the Commission is overemphasised within the 
governance of the EU, presenting a largely neofunctional line of argument. It is important 
to acknowledge that the ‘historic’ decisions and ‘distributive’ arrangements of cohesion 
policy have been dependent on high-level bargaining between the member states (Allen, 
2005: 221).  Furthermore, reforms of the structural funds in 1993 and 1999 are seen as an 
attempt by the member states to reassert themselves upon the implementation process, 
following the 1988 reforms which are believed to have taken the member states largely by 
surprise (ibid, 215). 
Furthermore, although the Commission has the political mandate to take decisions, 
develop policies and in theory implement them across the EU, the ability of the 
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Commission to implement policy and direct the policy apparatus of each member state 
needs to be considered. The LEADER programme provides a good example of a policy 
programme put together by the Commission. In an attempt to ensure that the principles 
behind the policy are protected the Commission has gone as far as outlining what 
apparatus the member states should use to implement the programme at the local level, 
through its guidelines on the formation of the LAG partnerships. As discussed in the 
previous chapter the member states were able to control important aspects of the 
programme due to the flexibility built into it. Furthermore, in the case of the focus LAG, 
localised policy networks were able to command the structures and processes of the LAG 
in potentially detrimental ways. On this evidence, the ability of the Commission to direct 
the policy apparatus in an effective way at both the national and sub-national level is 
called into question. 
In this respect a study by Hooghe (1996) looks at the impact of partnership arrangements 
across the member states as a means of exploring the extent an EU polity has infiltrated 
the member states. She attempted to look closely at two interrelated questions: ‘have 
diverse territorial relations converged under pressure of this uniform EU policy, hence 
moving towards a systematic involvement of subnational authorities in all member states? 
Or are uniform European regulations being bent and stretched so as to uphold existing 
difference in member states? (ibid, 2). Hooghe found that the resources commanded at 
different levels of governance varied greatly across the member states and this influenced 
the ability of different partnerships to implement policy. This also resulted in a diverse 
range of different partnerships being implemented throughout the EU (ibid, 2). Bache and 
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George argue that in centralised member states, there is sufficient scope for governments 
to be able to dominate partnerships, and act as ‘gatekeepers’, if they so wish (2006: 472). 
Britain is seen as a prime example of subnational actors having been mobilised, but not 
necessarily empowered by government to act effectively (ibid, 473). Undoubtedly 
variations exist, but a good example of this in England is through regional government 
apparatus, but it is also a very fitting criticism in the case of LEADER. 
In this case, Defra has developed a strong rhetoric to support community engagement and 
decision making as part of the LEADER approach to rural development, but 
empowerment has been limited because, as we saw in the previous chapter, the 
partnership process has failed to engage the whole territory of the focus LAG, and there is 
widespread confusion within it and its management team over what community 
participation is and how it should be achieved. In fact, democratic concepts fail to enliven 
the technocratic approach evident in the management of the LAG. As we saw in chapter 
6, there is evidence that other LAGs have done better in this respect, that they have 
attempted to actively engage the whole community, and so partly the focus LAG and its 
management team is to blame. There should be an imperative for them to go out and take 
the project to the community, engage people, and encourage them to improve the 
deliberative process. This did not happen, perhaps in part due an institutional culture of 
technocracy within RegCo, and the in-built conservatism of the policy community, but I 
think most critical was the lack of in-depth guidelines, from above, on what the 
democratic process should look like. In this sense, the process could have been improved 
with more direction from above, along with suitable resources, both regulatory and 
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financial, to help empower the process and give it some momentum to engage with the 
powers of association in the Latourian sense. 
This perspective has also changed over time through the reform of cohesion policy; and 
changing political ideologies in the member states, associated with the coming and going 
of different governments. Taking the former point first, the 1999 reform of cohesion 
policy is significant because the Commission outlined a new role for itself, which saw it 
taking a lesser role in the day-to-day management of the funds (ibid, 476). This involved 
removing its officials from partnership activities below programme monitoring 
committees where, prior to this, involvement had been the norm (ibid, 476). The 
Commission defended this change by outlining their belief that the Commission was 
required to play a more strategic role (ibid, 476). It is also likely that a fifth principle 
added at this time to cohesion policy – efficiency – played its part in limiting the 
Commission’s direct involvement in the day-to-day running of the policy. The second 
point is supported, again with Britain cited as an example, with governments coming 
increasingly to see the advantages of the partnership principle (ibid, 478). Britain which, 
in the past, had been highlighted for the role it played in the ‘gate-keeping’ of its 
subnational partnerships began to accept them as a tool of implementation that improved 
managerial efficiency. The British government had for a long time controlled the level of 
involvement subnational actors had in the decision-making process. The rise of New 
Labour in 1997 saw a new commitment towards decentralisation, particularly through 
holding successful referendums on devolution in Scotland and Wales, while policy 
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preferences showed signs of greater convergence with the Commission especially towards 
partnership relations (Bache, 1999: 41).
Andy Smith believes that there are a number of factors that limit the Commission’s 
contribution towards cohesion policy, and I would like to outline two of these (1997: 
719). Firstly, Smith, exploring the French translation of the structural funds, found that at 
the regional or sub-regional level, Commission desk officers only had effective influence 
if the local ‘partnerships’ allowed them to be actively involved (ibid, 720). He found that 
a good sign of closed local networks was when Commission desk officers had to invoke 
EU law on the structural funds, which stipulates that the role of the Commission must go 
beyond negotiation (ibid, 720). Secondly, again relating to the role of Commission desk 
officers, Smith found that in order for them to be effective in the potentially hostile 
environment of monitoring committees, they required great skill and the security of 
knowing that they were backed up by the Commission’s hierarchy (ibid, 720). Smith 
found, in the French case, that some desk officers found themselves isolated against 
pressures emanating from the French government, suggesting that in many cases these 
officers did not receive effective support, and as such, they were not able to put forth the 
Commission’s ‘constitutional’ interests effectively (ibid, 720). 
In the case of LEADER, the Commission is clearly restricted to the amount of direct 
action it can take by the framework set out in the regulation of the programme. A member 
of the UK’s desk office stated:
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The Commission are concerned to see bottom-up delivery through LAGs, 
they set a framework in place through the regulation, and as long as the 
managing authority can demonstrate that the criteria have been met the 
Commission is then satisfied that they have a LAG in place. Now if the 
LAG is not representative of the local area, the Commission don’t really 
have any great say. If the regulation is being adhered to, that is the legal 
basis, and the Commission can’t say to a managing authority you’re
doing something wrong. The Commission can maybe have an opinion 
but they can’t actually influence outside of the regulation (Commission 
representative)
This is despite concerns among senior staff within the Commission over the quality of 
LAGs:
I look at a lot of websites of LAGs, some are well organised and 
transparent with all the meetings of the LAGs and the minutes, decisions 
why a project was rejected etc. Other LAGs don’t have information at all, 
so I don’t see if there is any communication. Some good LAGs also have 
plenty of publications and leaflets... Do the managing authorities really 
examine that all the LAGs are working? I have my doubts because for 
them what is important is their consumption of the budget (Senior 
Commission representative). 
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The ability of the Commission to shape the way the LEADER approach is implemented 
in the member states is highly restricted. The broad nature of the regulation, as discussed 
in chapter 3 and 6, ensures that those principles at the heart of the LEADER approach can 
be interpreted in ways that do not meet the expectations of its founders in the 
Commission. 
In this section I have explored the development of multilevel governance. I felt this was 
necessary given that this theory was based upon empirical findings on research into 
European cohesion policy. This is relevant given that the LEADER programme is part of 
cohesion policy across the EU. Nevertheless, I have shown that although the multilevel 
governance perspective offers important insights into the EU system of governance, this 
perspective remains contested. In an attempt to develop and critique the debate between 
neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists, the multilevel governance perspective goes 
some way to showing that the lines of this debate are outdated by exploring the new 
policy networks and actors within the EU system. However, it fails to recognise the 
differentiated nature of EU governance, and the variations from one polity to the next. 
The LEADER programme is indicative of the variations possible within a policy sector 
(i.e. cohesion policy). Further, this approach overlooks the ability of actors and 
associations of power to coordinate EU governance, and influence the Commission. The 
reality is that EU governance is a highly complex and contested arena, driven by 
interactions that take place on a series of different levels, between different sets of actors. 
If a process of multilevel governance is evident across a policy network then it must be 
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assumed that associations of power from the subnational level upwards support it and 
have an interest in doing so.
7.4 Why do states agree to multilevel governance?
I have already outlined the debate between neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists 
with respect to the significance of multilevel governance, specifically in the context of 
cohesion policy. One question that is often overlooked in this debate is ‘Why do states 
agree to multilevel governance? (Jordan, 2001: 202). This question obviously rests on the 
assumption that some form of multilevel governance exists within an EU setting.
As a means to contextualise this discussion I want to frame it around two particular 
models of capitalism: the ‘European model of society’ (neoliberalism) and regulated 
capitalism (Hooghe, 1998: 3). These models have also been referred to in the context of a 
conflict between a neo-American and a social democratic model of capitalism (see Wilks, 
1996). Neoliberals (or neo-Americans) contend that Europe’s markets should be insulated 
from political interference, ‘a haven for unfettered capitalism’, through combining 
European-wide market integration with national governments holding sovereignty for 
political regulation (Hooghe, 1998: 3). The sovereignty of national governments over 
political regulation is seen as a means to generate competition among the member states, 
which in turn provides attractive conditions for mobile forms of production (ibid, 3). 
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For proponents of regulated capitalism (or Social Democrats), the single market should be 
regulated to make sure that values like solidarity, partnership and dialogue are respected 
(ibid, 3). These values were very much at the heart of Delors’s ambition for cohesion 
policy and European integration, and it is these values that formed the backdrop for the 
Commission in its conception of the LEADER programme.  Regulated capitalists support 
market competition, but at the same time they believe the state can play a positive role in 
regulating market forces. However, there is much debate over the extent to which this 
regulation should stretch among proponents of this approach (ibid, 3). The 1988 cohesion 
policy reform seems to have represented a significant constitutional package put forward 
by the anti-neoliberal coalition, around which multilevel coalitions of actors were 
perceived to have gathered (ibid, 3). However, subsequent reforms of cohesion policy can 
be interpreted as a backlash against regulated capitalism, as national governments have 
attempted to increasingly find the means to regulate coalitions of power found at multiple 
state levels. 
As a word of caution it seems unlikely that a neo-liberal policy agenda is likely to 
completely placate the political project begun by the Social Democrats, unless cohesion 
policy is drastically reformed through the European Council. The social democratic 
elements of cohesion policy are protected by EU law, and supported in the treaties, 
namely through concepts like subsidiarity, proportionality and partnership. In addition, it 
is also clear that despite the constitutional support for social democracy in the EU, these 
constitutional elements are not immune from the political ideologies of each member 
state, or the global economy. As a way of covertly overcoming these constitutional 
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requirements we may find that the local level is increasingly important to governments 
and other powerful groups, providing scope for meta-governance. 
The programming of cohesion policy ensures that it is safe from the adjustments of 
‘history making’ decisions within the current policy programme. This means that those 
national governments with a particular ‘capitalist’ agenda cannot push wholesale changes 
to a programme once it is up and running as it is part of EU legislation. In a sense, 
political interests, such as a particular capitalist agenda, are best supported through 
attempts to try to influence the way policy is implemented at the local level. With respect 
to LEADER, the flexibility surrounding the regulations and guidelines, and the ability to 
openly interpret the partnership governance process allows the state to frame policy 
around its own political ideologies. However, it is unlikely that this is the case universally 
across all policies, or that this approach is effective in ensuring that member states are in 
control of their own political destinies.  On reflection there is no getting away from the 
fact that the member states continue to devolve power over policy to the EU. 
Marks et al. outline two sets of reasons that help explain why government leaders may 
wish to shift decision-making to the supranational level: ‘the political benefits may 
outweigh the costs of losing political control or there may be intrinsic benefits having to 
do with shifting responsibility for unpopular decisions or insulating decision-making from 
domestic pressures (Marks et al., 1996: 349). In the first instance shifting competencies to 
the EU may be an effective means of lowering the costs of providing information and 
other resources to formulate, negotiate and implement policy (ibid, 349). This perspective 
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takes account of the fact that political leaders hold office for a short period of time, and 
are more likely, in an effort to prolong their stay, attempt to make decisions that have 
immediate impacts in term of policy output and efficiency, at the expense of state 
sovereignty (ibid, 349). 
This leads us to another important question, ‘are states in control of devolving powers to 
the EU?’ Marks et al. argue that states are ‘losing their grip on the mediation of domestic 
interest representation in international relations’ (ibid, 341). 
One cannot assume that those serving in national governments give 
priority to sustaining the state as an institution. This is an empirical 
matter. Institutions influence the goals of those who hold positions of 
power within them, but it is unlikely that political actors will define their 
own preferences solely in terms of what will benefit their institution. The 
degree to which an actor’s preferences will reflect institutional goals 
depends, in general, on the extent to which an institution structures the 
totality of that individuals life, or how positively or negatively the 
institution is viewed, on the strength of contending institutional, personal 
and ideological loyalties, and on the length of time in which the 
individual expects to stay within the institution (ibid, 348).
This strongly implies that national governments risk losing autonomy over the policy 
process, even in areas where some control is desirable, because they are unable to 
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command national representatives’ loyalties when these are exposed to other political 
ideologies and institutional practices. Marks (1993) also highlights the fact that the 
pluralistic patterns of integration taking place within the EU are incredibly difficult for 
the member states to police. This emphasises the fact that EU governance operates in a 
non-linear way, and this underlines the need to trace interactions of power along policy 
networks.
Liberal Intergovernmentalists, such as Moravcsik (1993), assume that political leaders 
have pursued European integration as a means to secure their national economic interests. 
There are a number of points to make drawing on this perspective. Firstly, Moravcsik 
argues that states are in control of the integration process because ultimately it is the 
bargaining between states, in an intergovernmental setting, that determines the course of 
integration the EU takes. Secondly, it is argued that a principal task of the state is to 
aggregate national societal preferences. These preferences are then taken to the 
international level where states negotiate for the policies they deem necessary; and as a 
result ‘permitting them to achieve goals that would not otherwise be possible’ (ibid, 485). 
Undoubtedly there are winners and losers in the negotiating process. In fact, the history 
of the EU is littered with examples of compromise, where member states have lost 
ground negotiating in one area; they have invariably gained in another. The final point, 
made by Moravcsik, that I would like to draw on is the view that integration strengthens 
states, because states use the EU as part of a ‘two-level game’ to overcome domestic 
opposition to unpopular decisions by passing them through the EU. 
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Moravcsik’s argument overlooks the influence EU institutions can have on national 
representatives in the negotiating process. There is, of course, room for distinction here 
between different policy concerns, and the level of power devolved to the EU institutions.  
However, as I argued above, the member states do not have a ‘panoptican’ view of what 
goes on in the EU institutions on a daily basis, and throughout the policy process. 
In the case of LEADER, the member states do have room to influence the implementation 
process, if they so wish. The regulatory processes that provide the basis for LEADER and 
the guidelines relating to its implementation, as has been stressed in previous chapters, 
are broad in nature. In the next section, I attempt to link this feature to the notion of meta-
governance and advanced liberal government. In doing so I hope to identify how the 
British state is guilty of employing the LEADER approach as a resource efficient 
implementation device. 
Moravcsik’s view on why states agree to multilevel governance shares a great deal with 
Marks et al. in terms of why states choose to ‘devolve’ power. The two arguments differ 
in terms of the level of control member states have over the integration process. I hope to 
be able to add to this debate by using my own research data to show how, in relation to 
the implementation of LEADER, numerous actors and associations of power have the 
ability to control the implementation process because of the flexibility written into the 
policy process, and the lack of concern by the British government on the nature of the 
partnership process at the local level. 
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7.5 Reflections on meta-governance 
I discussed the importance of meta-governance in the outlining governance chapter. I 
would now like to develop the importance of this concept, and the means by which actors 
are able to deploy it as a mechanism of control in the governing of the LEADER 
programme. This theoretical perspective will be based on the flexibility of EU law that 
forms the basis for LEADER’s partnership approach to governance (the LEADER 
approach). This perspective will help us to understand whose hands ‘power’ passes 
through in relation to the governance of the LEADER programme. This standpoint is 
based on a fluid conception of political power within the EU, whereby success is 
measured by the ability of actors to achieve set objectives; rather than a zero-sum game 
between actors, where definitive lines are drawn between the winners and losers in the 
games that are being played (Marks, 1996: 351). 
In chapter four I draw on Jessop to show how meta-governance can be used to help frame 
the ‘complexity, plurality, and tangled hierarchies’ found in the ‘new governance’. This is 
possible through the governance of governance, or the ‘organization of the conditions of 
governance’, as previously outlined, this involves the ‘judicious mixing of market, 
hierarchy and networks’ (Jessop, 2002: 242). There is a dual nature to meta-governance 
that is typical of advanced liberal government: the approach at the same time enables and 
opens up new possibilities for its subjects, and restrains these subjects as they are made 
subjects of a certain ‘calculative and disciplinary’ regime (Haahr, 2004: 209). This 
reflects the way in which governance has become a part of the new world order. 
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Governance represents the processes of steering and co-ordination or co-ordination 
through a mix of market, hierarchy and networks. In contrast, Max Weber’s 
understanding of the modern state was based around highly organised relations of power 
(Weber, 1968: 8), through which broad assumptions can be based on its mediation and 
intended objectives. Reflections on the LEADER programme make it clear that no such 
assumptions can be made on the way power is mediated, and objectives formed, by the 
actors involved. The LEADER approach underpins this particular policy programme. It is 
a feature of the EU that policy domains carry with them an ‘approach’ or ‘method’ 
through which actors can be made aware of the restrictions within the policy field, and the 
rules by which they are required to follow. In the case of LEADER, ‘the approach’ is 
presented by policy makers as something unequivocally good for ‘the people’, but behind 
this rhetorical facade lies a political playground, underpinned by an approach much closer 
to ‘liberal capitalism’ than many of its proprietors would care to admit. The LEADER 
programme was designed to be a cohesive force across Europe, as a means to counteract 
the harsh realities of market liberalism, and protect valuable rural cultures and traditions. 
However, market mechanisms have become a central part of the new governance, and as 
such a great deal of the integrity of the LEADER approach has been lost within the remit 
of advanced liberalism. 
These are forms of government which embody a notion of structured and 
conditioned freedom, and which govern through the manipulation of 
techniques and mechanisms, rather than more directly through the 
classical liberal or Keynesian welfarist manipulation of processes, or the 
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early modern ‘dispositional ordering of things’. Advanced liberal 
government is a reflexive ‘government of government’ (Haahr, 2004: 
215). 
Advanced liberal rule reflects the changing relationship between citizens as individuals 
and in their associations, and the national state (Dean, 1999: 150-9, 164-71). The 
changing understanding of society, in line with advanced liberalism, heralded a form of 
government that is concerned with ‘securing governmental mechanisms, and acting 
through ‘free subjects’ and their associations’ (Haahr, 2004: 215). As such, ‘government 
consists of establishing and securing the mechanisms which can effectively unleash the 
energies of society’ (ibid, 215). This replaces the traditional conception of the 
government of society, associated with the ‘welfare state’ and concerns over social, 
economic and demographic processes (ibid, 215). The mechanisms of advanced 
liberalism can be described as thus:
[A]dvanced liberal practices are ‘practices of liberty’, practices which 
establish and facilitate liberty but which also discipline and constrain the 
exercise of it: they contract, consult, negotiate, create partnerships, 
empower and activate forms of agency, liberty and the choice of 
individuals in their different capacities. However, they also set norms, 
standards, benchmarks, performance indicators, quality controls and best 
practice standards, to monitor, measure and render calculable the 
performance of these various individuals or agencies. Thus the concept of 
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a ‘free subject’ has in advanced liberal government taken on the meaning 
of a potential technical instrument in the achievement of governmental 
purposes and objectives, being an entity which can be constructed and 
shaped by governmental practices. Advanced liberal rule operates 
through our freedom, through the way this freedom is structured, shaped 
predicted and made calculable (Haahr, 2004: 216).
Dean takes this perspective further by arguing for the existence of authoritarian 
liberalism, the features of which can be related to the implementation of LEADER. 
Contemporary liberal rule manifests the recurrent emergence of illiberal 
practices and rationalities which occur in the name of liberalism and in 
the defence of its values. I argue that it is necessary to put aside the 
liberal assumption of a fundamental opposition between liberalism and 
authoritarianism forms of rule. Authoritarianism is not simply that to 
which liberalism is implacably opposed and against which it offers 
safeguards. Nor is it the ever-present danger against which liberalism 
must be vigilant. Rather I contend, it is a permanent pole of liberal rule 
made possible by the liberal view of government as limited by the sphere 
of civil society external to it and the liberties of autonomous individuals 
within the sphere... The upshot of this analysis was to show that the 
authoritarian side of liberal governing is intrinsic to liberalism itself and, 
further, that at least one version of current forms of liberal rule might be 
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better thought of as authoritarian liberalism rather than neo- or advanced 
liberal rule (2007: 200).
In summary, a liberal view of government opens the door to authoritarian forms of 
control, and herein, it becomes an intrinsic feature of the liberal conception of 
government, best framed as authoritarian liberalism. 
The mode of rule employed to govern LEADER has a number of similar characteristics to 
‘advanced liberalism’. Partnership governance, in this case, represents the pooling of 
resources (local knowledge, and interest) to tackle economic and social challenges within 
the rural sphere. This should be placed centrally within the conception of those citizen-
nation state relations that underline the governance project. The ‘bottom-up’ approach is 
in line with the principle of subsidiarity, which ensures that decisions are taken as closely 
as possible to the citizen and that checks are regularly made regarding whether action at 
Community level is justified given the options available at national, regional or local level 
(Treaty establishing the EC, Article 5). The ‘LEADER approach’ represents an attempt 
by the European Commission to set an effective framework for an integrated and 
cooperative approach to rural development across a European wide network (LEADER 
Actions 1-3). Subsidiarity theoretically conditions this approach by ensuring that 
partnership mechanisms operate at the loci. However, the way in which the approach is 
interpreted at the local level is guided by each individual member state. This ensures that 
the state has a powerful position under the conditions of advanced liberalism through its 
ability to steer the technologies of agency and performance (albeit under the observance 
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of the Commission). This undoubtedly conditions the ability of citizens at the local level 
to some extent, to effectively unleash deliberative practices (‘bottom-up’), and in turn 
deploy valuable local resources in pursuit of development. In the case of LEADER, and 
its implementation in the focus LAG territory, the state is able to condition the policy 
process, despite talking openly of partnership and participation, and invoking great 
optimism through its discourses on the potential of these principles, it does little to 
empower the local community, to develop new policy networks, or provide the resources 
to do so. As a result, the state continues to condition and control policy, and yet it has the 
advantage of being largely unaccountable for it. The question is, to what extent is the 
state a successful proponent of advanced or authoritarian liberalism within the 
implementation of LEADER? The answer to this question lies largely in the relationship 
between the state, and the local level (i.e. focus LAG and its policy community), and the 
level of influence exerted by both these forces. This relationship will be looked at more 
closely using my empirical data in the following sections, but I think it is important to 
recall at this juncture the level of influence held by the policy community attached to the 
focus LAG, and the effects it had on the quality of civic engagement across the LAG 
territory, discussed in the previous chapter.  
Technologies of agency are contemporary technologies of government that seek to deploy 
our potential for agency, and as such they must be understood if we are to reflect further 
on the issues so far outlined in this chapter (Dean, 1999: 167; see also Swyngedouw, 
2005). Technologies of agency can be broken into two distinctive forms: ‘technologies of 
citizenship’ (Cruikshank, 1993, 1994) and a ‘new contractualism’ (Yeatman, 1998). The 
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former is made up of various techniques that are employed as a means to empower and 
involve certain groups and individuals within the policy making process, principally in 
consultation and negotiation (Yeatman, 1994: 110). The LEADER approach, enrols 
‘technologies of citizenship’ through its ‘bottom-up’ approach, by actively constructing 
individuals as active citizens. However, this is not used by government, necessarily, as 
part of a community engagement agenda. Instead, the technologies of citizenship might 
be seen as a smokescreen to hide the informal and poorly defined processes at the heart of 
the government’s policy strategy, while freeing-up important government resources to 
ensure cost efficient policy delivery. 
Haahr (2004: 217) discusses the technologies of agency and performance, what he terms 
the ‘technologies of involvement’, in relation to the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC). The OMC was introduced as part of the Lisbon Strategy to make the EU the 
world’s most competitive knowledge-based economy by 2010 (Friedrich, 2006: 368). The 
OMC is seen as a ‘soft law’ approach of the ‘new governance’ in the EU, which aims to 
achieve common European goals, but by not using the traditional means of European 
integration, such as regulations and directives (ibid, 368). A number of lines can be drawn 
between the OMC and the LEADER approach, as both can be understood as advanced 
liberal government (or more appropriately ‘authoritarian liberalism’), constituted by the 
‘practices of liberty’ (Haahr, 2004: 209). These practices are dependent on subject 
‘participation’, through which, subjects are both enabled and conditioned through the 
interactions that result within authoritarian liberalism.
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The ‘new contractualism’ describes the proliferation of extra-juridical and quasi-juridical 
forms of contracts (ibid, 217). These are commonly found in the ‘contracting out’ of 
public services to private companies or community agencies, along with ‘performance 
agreements’ or ‘development contracts’ between central government and a wide array of 
non-state actors (ibid, 217). Haahr argues that contractualism takes place within the OMC 
through quasi-juridical forms. Haahr describes this through the use of OMC in the labour 
market field:
The contractual element consists of the formulation of objectives which 
are contained in the [Employment] guidelines and in the obligations 
specified in conjunction with the intention to attain these objectives. The 
document thus stipulates in writing a set of mutual commitments, at the 
same time leaving it to the committed parties to decide on the measures 
that are required to live up to these commitments (ibid, 217).
There are clearly links here, in the application of the OMC, with the way LEADER is 
presented to the member states in guideline form. These guidelines are passed to the 
member states who play an important role in designing a partnership process to 
implement the programme through the LAGs, while at the same time respecting the 
commitments in the guidelines. However, it is important to recognise that these guidelines 
cannot be considered without reference to the guidelines laying down the general 
provisions on the Structural Funds (Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/99). This 
legislation, however, remains relatively broad.
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Technologies of agency rest upon the existence of ‘free subjects’, not as individual 
citizens, but as active participants within the network economy (Haahr,2004: 218). These 
technologies are contingent upon technologies of performance (ibid, 218), which act to 
reinforce advanced liberalism. These ‘can be viewed as the plural technologies of 
government designed to penetrate the substantive domains of expertise fostered under the 
welfare state and to subsume these domains to new formal calculative regimes’ (ibid, 218; 
see Rose and Miller, 1992). Technologies of performance that shape the conduct of actors 
include such tools as budget devolutions, benchmarking exercises, best practice examples 
and the setting of performance indicators (ibid, 218). A particular feature of the LEADER 
programme is the use of the audit method. This approach has grown enormously as a 
technology of performance over recent years, and involves the bringing together of 
various indicators and measurements as a means to scrutinise actors along the policy 
network (see Power, 1994). These technologies of agency and performance will be kept 
in mind, as I now turn to consider my own empirical data within the context of LEADER. 
7.6 LEADER: the basis for power play and the potential for fracture
The basic governance structure of LEADER was outlined in chapter three. The key 
features of the approach identified here revolved around two broadly defined yet 
distinctive features: a bottom-up approach and top-down juridical guidance and 
monitoring. The former is based on local partnerships whose function is to delegate funds 
to applicants by the way of deliberative decision making. The latter reflects a top-down 
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regulatory process. This process begins at the EU level and is then passed on to the 
member states, who as discussed, receive juridical guidelines on the implementation of 
the programme, and its monitoring in line with EU legislation on the structural funds. The 
process of LAG formation is also delegated to the national level, and it is here where the 
member states have a flexible mandate.   In the following section I want to add flesh to 
this basic outline by attempting to plot how power operates within the ‘confines’ of this 
basic structure, and whether this structure binds power to certain paths as it travels 
horizontally and vertically across the LEADER network; or whether as implied above, 
power passes more fluidly between actors, passing through basic governance structures 
far more subtly than has been otherwise acknowledged. This is aided by the technologies 
of the powerful, and the contingent paradox within advanced liberalism that can be best 
described as liberalism with an authoritarian vestige. 
LEADER was conceived at a time when the theory of globalisation was becoming an 
important influence within public policy circles. A former senior official of the 
Commission described the importance of the theory of globalisation during the 
emergence of LEADER in the following context:
[In the commission] we have a very simple sentence...: ‘think globally act 
locally’. You have to see things in the global context in order to increase the 
competitiveness of these small local areas, therefore you need rural 
development, and you need your LEADER projects in order to make them 
resist this global tendency. (Former senior official to the Commission)
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[T]he primary aim was indeed in the global context of rural development, 
seen in the global context of cohesion,...[it] was to say lets help the people to 
be more competitive in a global context, to increase their quality of life at the 
local level, and OK develop a territorial approach. I would say the basic aim 
was to get away from a sectoral approach, which was agriculture, to a 
territorial approach at the local level, by asking the people to work together to 
give them a certain confidence, but at the same time you have the 
responsibility to do something, and for that we give you some small financial 
means (Former senior official to the Commission).
This principle (‘think globally act locally’) is closely allied with that of subsidiarity, very 
much evident in the LEADER approach. This can be further linked with the tendency 
within states for power to be devolved, which is often seen as a means for states to 
command greater resources and develop policy that meets global challenges. This trend 
has been recognised within the context of LEADER, by a senior official of the 
Commission:
The general trend in Europe is that at a constitutional level you have a federal 
state, you have a state that gives a lot of competence to the regional level, and 
the European level. In European policy, through the social funds, our policy is 
also influencing governments by giving a role to the local people by trying to 
involve them. I think LEADER is exemplary of this method. I would qualify 
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LEADER as a participant in centralised decision making, a process, a way of 
implementing policy. (Senior official in the Commission)
This insight indicates that LEADER works for the member states ‘as a participant to 
centralised decision making’ while at the same time the Commission plays a conceptual 
role that helps frame a participative approach to policy making. This view is supported in 
the earlier LEADER programmes, where the distinction between facilitator and the basis 
on which LEADER represents a concept formed within a European policy making type 
‘laboratory’ is outlined.
[W]e played quite an active role in the concept; we played quite an active 
role in the follow up of the elaboration of LEADER. As far as the 
LEADER work is concerned we didn’t intervene, that is of course the 
bottom-up approach, it’s their business, you see, but we had a concept and 
a follow up (Former senior official in the Commission).
This conceptual role may be interpreted as a means through which the Commission can 
give the EU wider legitimacy. There is certainly evidence to suggest that its objectives do 
not just rest with providing member states with effective support in the implementation of 
policy. In fact, some of its unwritten objectives may be deemed highly political, and at 
odds with national objectives.
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[Through] LEADER we have given a message to the people that the European 
Union is not only there for big business, that they are not only there for the 
big industries, or the big farmers unions, or the cereal people in France, but 
that the European Union is there to help the people at the local level to do 
something, to increase their quality of life, because that is what it is about. So 
with small money, with pocket money in fact, in terms of the overall budget, 
we have spread the European idea at the local level. I think that’s the main 
success as far as I see it, of the LEADER experience (Former senior official 
in the Commission).
Success in these terms is ultimately dependent on the extent to which the member states 
invest in the LEADER approach. I made clear in the last chapter that the focus on 
participation within LEADER is lost to some degree within the English programme, and 
this is possible because of the flexibility written into the LEADER approach, which is to 
the benefit of the member states, giving them the ability to control important aspects of 
the programme. This means that the ‘technologies of involvement’ have a dual level 
existence. At one level the EU commands the LEADER approach, which rests heavily on 
the technologies of involvement and territorial formation through the LAG. On another 
level, the member state is responsible for interpreting the guidelines that set out the 
approach, and herein lies the avenue from which government can dictate policy and stop
the Commission taking the lead framing role. This does not mean that national public 
policy institutions are not accountable to the Commission. These institutions are subject 
to EU monitoring, but the concern here is primarily financial, and there is little 
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monitoring that takes place that actively supports the LEADER approach, and ensures its 
effective implementation. This will be discussed further below. 
7.7 Supranational influence, national preferences, and the emergence of subnational 
powers
It should be noted that the role of the Commission has changed within the LEADER 
programme, in line with the reforms of the structural funds. As I outlined previously in 
this chapter, these reforms saw the member states trying to claw back power from the 
Commission. This meant during the first LEADER programme the Commission played 
an active role, not only at the ‘European level’, but also at the national level by attending 
the majority of meetings relating to LEADER11. In the current programme the 
relationship between the national level and the Commission is very different, with the 
Commission now being much less of a physical presence at the national level.
We have never had that much of a relationship with [the Commission]. We 
have been out to visit them; we have had two different desk officers. We went 
on one visit to meet and greet, they are invited to every Programme 
Monitoring Committee, and they probably come to two out of three, as an 
                                                          
11 ‘In the mid nineties we had the role of supporting the LAGs and bringing them together at the European 
level. So every time, for instance, there was some meetings in a member state, we always tried to send our 
people over there to give the full information about what our aims are, what we are looking for, so on and 
so forth, to discuss the operation etc’. (Former senior Official in the Commission)
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observer rather than a member. They quite often get involved in answering a 
few questions (Defra representative)
I mean they have to approve the annual report, but generally, we were told by 
them, that because they don’t consider us a problem programne they don’t 
have to look at it in great detail. If we were considered a problem programme
then they might. I think the rule is that three months after receipt if you do not 
hear anything or get a letter saying that it is approved then it is considered 
approved. That is normally the process. We have to liaise with them over 
modifications to the programme, so we recently modified some budget 
profiles. We have to send that to them, and it takes months for the approval to 
happen. It can be quite a slow process with the Commission. If you want 
advice, it can take a long time to get any advice back, and everything has to 
be done quite officially, sending formal requests by letter or whatever, and 
then a reply comes back saying this is not formal advice you cannot count on 
it. You have to wait longer for formal advice, and quite often when it does 
arrive you think what does that mean? (Defra representative)
This perspective was reinforced at the EU level through a representative of the 
Commission, who had experience working for a managing authority within a member 
state:
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I have found through my experience that some desk officers based here, that 
look after member states, have an attitude that the managing authorities 
should be aware of all the regulations, and it’s up to them to take 
responsibility to understand the rules and it’s not the Commission’s 
responsibility to be always telling them what the rules are, it’s up to the 
managing authority to manage that programme that is what they are meant to 
do (Representative of the Commission).
In this context Defra has a primary role in the implementation of the LEADER 
programme. The relationship between this level and the Commission is highly judicial. 
This is the case even in respect of the advice Defra receives on the implementation of the 
programme. The Commission does not appear to be attempting to reinforce the LEADER 
approach in the implementation process through these kinds of institutional interactions. 
This point can also be made with respect to the relationship between Defra and the 
Commission at the beginning of the current programme. It was Defra’s responsibility to 
interpret the guidelines passed on from the Commission12. This process was carried out 
early in the current programme, which in itself leads to confusion within Defra, with the 
current managers of the programme not involved at that stage.
[M]ost of the interpretation has already been done, or was done very 
early on in the programme. And I think some of the guidance notes that 
were issued at the start of the programme were not quite as clear as they 
                                                          
12 ‘We also had to interpret the EU regulations in relation to the scheme, and deal with lots of enquiries and 
stuff like that, and get the network sorted out so that it was delivering what the groups wanted’ (Defra 
representative)
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could have been and should have been. As such when we have read them 
we have had to ask what does that mean? (Defra representative). 
However, despite some of the confusion over the guidelines put together at the national 
level, it seems that asking the Commission for advice on the implementation of the 
programme does not take place on a regular basis. As is pointed out here, the Commission 
does not respond to calls for advice speedily, and this may be one reason the national 
level does not make requests on a more regular basis. It also seems apparent that Defra is 
far more inclined to request advice on financial issues with respect to the programme, 
rather than broader issues attached to the approach itself. This situation is likely to exist 
given that the Commission does actively hold the member states to account over financial 
issues within the programme, whereas issues regarding ‘the approach’ and the nature of 
the LAG partnerships within the member states is more of a passing concern. However, 
even within the financial aspects of LEADER the onus is on the member states to get 
things right.
I would like to see a more proactive approach from the Commission with 
regards engaging with us because there has been the odd thing where, for 
instance, altering these budgetary tables, we weren’t aware that we had to do 
it, and there was no, you know year on year, clue from the Commission that it 
was something that you ought to be looking at. So when it came to us 
realising accidentally that we had to change them or we are going to be in 
trouble with collecting our payments for them, it was too late to change them 
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fully, the way we wanted to. There was no flexibility at all, but because there 
was no real engagement in terms of them checking a few essential things 
being done by the managing authority, and every UK country fell into the 
same trap, so it wasn’t as though we were alone (Defra representative)
This insight suggests that there is a paradox in terms of the way LEADER is 
implemented. The member states have a great deal of flexibility over the implementation 
of the LEADER approach, yet when it comes to the financial concerns Defra has very 
little flexibility. This is further evident through the mechanisms the Commission employs 
in monitoring the programme, and this also explains the concern for the same issues 
within the monitoring of the programme at the national level. 
7.8 Monitoring committees and audit
As I explained in a previous chapter the English LEADER programme is governed 
through two principal monitoring committees that met around every six months: the 
Regional Programme Monitoring Committee (RPMC) and the national level Programme 
Monitoring Committee (PMC). The national level committee is made up of regional 
representatives, such as regional government officers or LAG managers; national 
organisations representatives such as the NFU and Business Link; national government 
institutions, such as the RDA and Natural England, and a small element of voluntary 
representation with a regional slant. The secretariat for the PMC is provided by Defra. 
The RPMC has a similar make up, but clearly with a more regional focus, and also 
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includes the LAG managers. The focus of the PMC is primarily financial and it is not 
concerned with individual LAGs and the day-to-day management of the programme:
It meets twice a year, and there are regular things which get sent out to it for 
information or approval, but generally it is looking to approve the annual 
report which goes to the Commission, the Commission require them to 
approve it, any modifications to the overall programme. So if there are 
changes to the budget profile for the programme stuff like that. There could 
be a few other little tweaks here and there. Generally it monitors the financial 
side of things, are we going to meet our plus two target, where basically we 
have to spend a certain amount of money each year or the Commission will 
claw money back. Outputs, you know, quite often the meetings go together 
with the annual report, and we will discuss at the meeting the progress made 
and are there any areas where the outputs are really poor and something can 
be done about it. They also have to approve things like evaluations, like the 
mid-term evaluation.  (Defra representative)
The PMC approved final instructions as they went out; in previous years they 
have actually taken money off groups who didn’t spend it and that was a 
PMC decision. The PMC was involved in making decision about how much 
money they can keep, how much was coming back in, once they had decided 
how that was going to work, once all the money was back in, it was then up to 
groups who wanted more money to put a bid in, it was up to the PMC to 
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decide who got the extra money back out from the pot (Government office for 
the South West representative). 
The PMC would not be concerned with individual LAG management. The 
RPMC, because the programme managers are a part of that group, they would 
obviously be interested in how the other groups are doing. But the PMC 
would assume that the regional people are running after the day-to-day 
management of the programme (Government office for the South West 
representative).
The RPMC in contrast to the PMC plays an important strategic role at the regional level. 
It has to make important financial decisions with the responsibility for approving projects 
in the region that request more than £60,000. It also has the responsibility for approving 
changes within the LAGs. However, the RPMC, other than taking an interest in the LAGs
within the region, does not systematically monitor individual programmes beyond its 
mandate to approve financial outgoings (above 60,000 EAGGF) and operational changes. 
There is nothing to suggest that the PMC or the RPMC plays a role beyond ensuring that 
the LEADER programme operates within its predefined limits and objectives. As their 
title suggests, these committees fulfil their role in monitoring the programme, but there is 
no evidence to suggest that this role has been extended to having a strategic influence. In 
effect, both committees operate judicially, and represent a judicial process that can be 
traced all the way to the Commission through the laying down of Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 438/2001.
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As part of this regulation a ‘sufficient audit trail’ must be taken by the member states. I 
was fortunate enough to be able to interview the officer who completed the audit of the 
focus LAG. This actor at the time of the audit was working for the Rural Development 
Service (RDS) (now disbanded). The audit process was broken up into four different 
levels (1-4). The first two levels represent basic monitoring carried out by the LAG itself, 
while levels three and four were carried out by the RDS. Level three audits where 
undertaken to assess 5% of all individual projects funded trough the LAGs within the 
English programme, while level four refers to the compliance monitoring of all the LAGs
in the English programme. The audit that was undertaken by the interviewee was a level 
four, which can be summarized as follows:
A principal objective of Level 4 compliance monitoring is to ensure that 
LAGs are complying with the terms and conditions of their offer letters 
and have put their own effective management and control procedures in 
place.  This is important because they are effectively responsible for 
ensuring the propriety of the expenditure of final beneficiary projects, 
and, in the case of Action Plan Groups, for making payment, with a 
necessity to check the separation of function of assessment, monitoring 
and payment (Compliance and Monitoring Instructions)
Within this audit there is clearly a concern for two central themes. The first is the most 
common theme running throughout the audit and monitoring process: the financial 
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management of the LAG. The second, although still linked with financial management, 
concerns the ‘separation of powers’ within the process of assessing projects, monitoring 
them and providing them with financial resources. This second concern shows that there 
is some concern with the process that goes on inside the LAG, and in ensuring that the 
process is run fairly. However, this does not ensure that the LEADER approach to 
bottom-up rural development is supported to a level beyond the basic wording attached to
the regulation outlined above, which represents further evidence of the protracted nature, 
and contradictions, at the heart of LEADER.
The RDS officer responsible for carrying out a level four audit within the focus LAG
found that the strict monitoring guidelines they had to follow did not correspond to the 
rhetoric attached to the LEADER approach and the principal of bottom-up rural 
development. 
[W]e didn’t look at a lot of the soft outcomes, although I possibly talked 
verbally about the soft outcomes a lot more than I wrote in the report because 
I wasn’t required to do that... it says bottom-up, but there isn’t a deep concern 
with it (RDS officer).
From my monitoring point of view, yes it was definitely government 
procedures of where the money was being spent, and whether it was being 
spent in the right place [that was important]. I was not looking at how they 
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were getting information from the community to develop these projects (RDS 
officer).
What I was meant to be focusing on was the accounts record and the audit 
trail. That was the main purpose of the visit but, obviously we did look at the
project progress quite heavily as well and made sure that the money that was 
spent met targets. Because obviously one of the concerns is whether there is 
going to be overspend or under spend, because obviously we don’t want to 
send any money back to Europe so that’s another one of the things because 
obviously if there is under spend we want to encourage them to do something 
about it (RDS officer).
These statements reaffirm the lack of concern by government for the underlying features 
of the LEADER approach. This emphasises the ‘empty’ nature of government rhetoric in 
relation to partnership forms of engagement, and the need to question why such a strong 
discourse in relation to community empowerment has been mobilised. This discourse 
appears to get lost in practice behind a smokescreen of financial auditing. These 
procedures are undoubtedly important, but there is clearly a risk that we lose sight of 
what the LEADER approach can offer to the ‘new’ rural governance. 
At the LAG level, and in particular the focus LAG as outlined above, the programme 
manager is responsible for level 1 and 2 audit trails. The focus of each of these is as 
follows:
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 Level 1 monitoring - routine monitoring of a project's progress, normally 
undertaken when processing a claim from the project for payment. All 
projects will be monitored in this way to ensure that they are meeting the 
targets agreed in the offer letter or to identify where targets are not being 
met so remedial action can be taken, and to ensure that expenditure is 
eligible. 
 This monitoring will be undertaken by LAGs (whether they are operating 
under Action Plans or Local Strategic Plans). For Local Strategic Plan 
local action groups, Government Office secretariats will verify this 
monitoring when authorising claims for payment and will also undertake 
their own monitoring checks for all projects over £60,000.
 Level 2 (Article 4) monitoring - on the spot checks carried out via a site 
visit. All projects should receive at least one spot check to verify that 
they are meeting the targets agreed in their offer letter and to verify their 
progress reports. These checks will be undertaken by Local Action 
Groups (LAGs) (whether they are operating under Action Plans or Local 
Strategic Plans). For Local Strategic Plan LAGs, Government Office 
secretariats will undertake their own spot checks on all projects over 
£60,000 (Compliance and Monitoring Instructions).
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The focus here is clearly at the operational level, representing the kind of monitoring you 
would come to expect in this kind of programme.
In addition to this, the LAGs also produced a business plan once a year, which was used 
by Government Office to ensure that the programme was being run effectively in line 
with its objectives, and its budget. It is also interesting to note that the LAG manager 
does not monitor the decision making process within the LAG, and at no point is there 
any review of those practices that make-up the key principles of the bottom-up approach.
This means that these principles are not subject to monitoring or appraisal at any level of 
the LEADER programme, and this questions the validity of these principles further.  
It is also worth highlighting that the flexibility found at the national level passes through 
the Government Office for the South West down to the focus LAG. 
I think the LAG has surprisingly good freedom, and that’s one of the 
refreshing things about it. The decision-making process within the LAG needs 
to be formally approved and passes to Government Office for the South West 
were it just gets checked through as a kind of administration thing and it only 
comes back if there are any procedural problems, I think it’s one of its 
strengths (LAG member)
[W]e are certainly given enough freedom to get on with the job and without 
the government office trying to intervene with what we are trying to do... we 
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have regular south west meetings, that originally started because all the 
programme managers in the south west were new to LEADER. That started as 
means for us to get together and share information, Government Office were 
not invited to the first one, because at first we were not quite sure what our 
relationship was going to be, and as soon as we realised they were quite nice 
and friendly we would let them come along. It worked well because it means 
we can share that information, and guidance, but it is still very much led by us 
by us rather than the government office saying you will meet us every so 
often, you will do this. (Focus LAG manager).
From an EU down perspective I think the concept works very effectively. The 
EU have come up with a stroke of brilliance on a policy level, which Defra 
have chosen to implement in quite a broad framework, and for us government 
office are then working very flexibly to make stuff happen on the ground, on a 
‘working up from us process’.  I know this isn’t the same with government 
offices across the board, some of the LAGs in other areas have had 
nightmares with their’s. Our government office, I think we have been very 
lucky with, they have been very focused on recognising that we are doing, 
what is locally appropriate for each different area, and so how the six of us are 
working is actually quite different, they have taken that on board, and took 
that on board very early, so they have been very focused on making sure that 
they enable us to be able to deliver. So rather than telling us what we can’t do, 
we work together to find a way of doing the things that we need to do, which 
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has been very positive, so they have been very delivery focused, and very 
focused on having that link between the programming documents and the 
criteria and the legalities on what has to be done, and interfacing that with 
actually working on the ground with us, and finding ways of making the two 
fit together. So I think they have worked very well as that interface between 
programme documentation and programme delivery. Defra, we have had less 
to do with, but in relation to previous experiences of them, they have also 
been very flexible about that delivery process, and then our EU perspective is 
even more limited because we have significantly less to do with that..., they 
seem to be delivering or supporting the programme in the spirit of the initial 
programming documentation as well. (LAG manger). 
The Government Office for the South West provides a link between the LAGs and Defra, 
and oversees the running of the programme, providing a check point to ensure the LAG 
projects fit the programme and report back to the national level on the outputs achieved, 
and the costs incurred. It also plays an important networking role by facilitating the LAGs
in the region to come together, and to ensure the best possible transfer of knowledge 
between groups, and between itself and the groups. 
7.9 The focus LAG and ‘local’ governing structures
The focus LAG, in conjunction within the governing processes passed down from the EU 
through the LEADER approach, and from Defra, is also conditioned by local governing 
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structures. The focus LAG, as discussed in chapter three, is managed by a team employed 
within RegCo. RegCo, as outlined in previous chapter has been a part of local governing 
structures for a number of years, and has constructed a strong policy community linked to 
its work. It has its own distinct procedures that differ greatly from other such agencies, as 
was outlined in the previous chapter. In conjunction with this RegCo is core funded by 
two district councils. However, the district councils play little active role in the running 
of the focus LAG, and as a consequence, because LEADER has such a flexible mandate, 
it is possible that actors at the local level have an unrestrained degree of agency when 
putting together its governing structures, resulting in un-codified (or ‘un-codifiable’) 
norms.
One Torridge district council officer spoke of the LAG and the regeneration company as 
one and the same thing, and appeared to view them as a delivery agency to aid the district 
councils meet their objectives. 
We see it more of a delivery agency than a governance agency to be honest. 
Yeah, I mean it all helps, I mean you can’t govern unless you have got a 
means to deliver. So the two functions aren’t completely separate, the 
emphasis within LEADER, within the regeneration company is delivery. The 
emphasis within local authorities is governance; you know it’s called 
democracy (laughing). It isn’t perfect but it does the job. It is an interesting 
relationship, but it does help to deliver in rural communities and it’s part of 
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our purpose as local authorities to deliver. LEADER helps us to deliver 
priority areas, so it’s a very good alignment (District council representative).
However, although this council representative presents the LAG as a delivery 
mechanism, LEADER is not a part of the local authority’s core strategy to deliver rural 
policy. The interviewee is implying that LEADER is part of a wider strategy to improve 
policy delivery in rural communities, and in this broad sense it is easily seen as a delivery 
mechanism. In fact, given the structure of the LEADER programme, and its processes 
outlined in relation to the focus LAG, LEADER has limited dependency on local 
government. This point was reinforced by LAG representative:
We don’t really have any relationship at all with local government... As far as 
local government in the form of... [the district councils], we really don’t have 
a link, there is no string there, there is nothing there to suggest that we are 
working together in partnership, otherwise they would not be inviting me to 
their scrutiny committee because they would know about us and what we do. 
They would know what we do, they would know what our influence is and 
they would be able to say look let’s join our policy to your thinking, and 
perhaps together we can do something, but that just doesn’t happen (LAG 
representative)
The LEADER programme is an example of the new governance, and as such it is 
dependent on a separation of powers at the local level that act to reinforce the 
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technologies of involvement. It is likely that LEADER does reinforce council objectives, 
after all the LEADER objectives are incredibly broad, and it is unlikely that the council 
would be opposed toward the development of the rural economy. This does not mean 
however that LEADER is being steered by the council as the first statement above 
implies. 
The view that the focus LAG represents a delivery mechanism is more significant in 
relation to RegCo. RegCo is core funded by the districts councils, and although the 
district council does not appear to be able to affect its day-to-day working practices, it 
does have a high level of strategic input with regards to the position of RegCo in the 
framework of local governance.  I found that the district councils faced severe criticism 
within the LAG area, and there was a view that their position in local governance was 
weak by interviewees across the LAG network, largely due to their lack of resources and 
constant attempts at cost cutting. This weakness transpired through the strategy it 
employed over local governance and the increasing emphasis on devolving power to 
agencies, and reformulating these agencies to take on a greater role, in an attempt to save 
money. 
[D]istrict councils, not by my reckoning, but by the audit commission’s 
reckoning, are either poor or weak aren’t they, and here they are poor and 
weak, and that sums it up. They are poor and weak, at worse, there is no real 
political drive. They are quite happy to try and get rid of things to save 
themselves money (LAG representative).
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The District councils do not appear to influence the focus LAG beyond the fact that they 
are the core funders of RegCo, which has taken on the management of the LAG. District 
council officers or district councillors do not attend the LAG meetings, and their 
involvement is purely statutory. This implies that the onus of organising the management 
of the LAG rests with RegCo, who in this instance, are the accountable body. RegCo 
offers an important set of resources for the LAG to draw on, and the role this type of 
agency can play has been identified.
The added value of (...) [such agencies] is that when a project comes in they 
have got the knowledge, a much broader knowledge across that particular 
sector, and across that particular theme. Ultimately they don’t make the 
decisions, because there will be a separate decision making panel (Rural 
policy consultant).
My own experiences of RegCo are mixed. I did attempt on several occasions to speak 
with representatives of this agency, outside of the LEADER management team, with little 
success. I received no response after writing letters, e-mails, and leaving answer phone 
messages.  I did manage to speak to three individuals who sat on the committee of 
RegCo, but they were not actively engaged in its day-to-day management, and had little 
to say on its institutional practices. This was disappointing given the important role of 
this particular agency within the governance of LEADER, and the fact that it is handling 
public funds. Furthermore, RegCo effectively acted as a gatekeeper when I attempted to 
attend the LAG committee meetings, as stated previously, the LAG manager had to ask
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for permission from senior members of staff within the agency. This is again 
disappointing given the approach LEADER should conform to. As a result, the closest I 
got to RegCo’s managing team was at a LAG committee meeting, and through interviews 
with the focus LAG management team. On speaking with other LAG managers in other 
areas I found that some followed the same approach as the focus LAG and had closed 
meetings, while others had open meetings, who could be attended freely by the general 
public. This is indicative of the freedom at the LAG level, and the control over the 
implementation of the ‘bottom-up’ approach. However, contrary to the perception that the 
LEADER approach supports governing processes that are based around community 
preferences, it appears more likely that RegCo and the wider policy community, as 
outlined in chapter 6, was largely responsible for conditioning the nature of the governing 
processes involved, and the level of civic engagement achievable. This resulted is a 
‘closed’ programme that has failed to effectively communicate what LEADER is about to 
the whole of the LAG territory. There are no regular newsletters to inform the local 
community, and press releases are a rarity. As a representative of the LAG management 
team testifies:
Where we probably fall down is informing people what we have done and what is 
available. It’s not just the time involved in writing press releases, it’s capacity 
within the office really. I suppose a way around it would be to employ a PR 
person to pass the information on and put it in a press release, a lot of it has come 
down to time (LAG management team representative). 
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Many of these processes fall short of what could have been possible under the vestiges of 
the LEADER approach. In this instance RegCo reflects some of the dangers within the 
new governance framework. The freedom therein allows these agencies too much control 
over policy networks, given the lack of democratic accountability and legitimacy they 
face. They are undoubtedly effective implementation devices, and operate highly 
efficiently, but there is a dangerous significance to their presence in public policy, 
especially when they begin to ‘take a on a life of their own’13.
Well it’s a slightly confusing one isn’t it because they are a separate company, 
but they are a company, a not for profit company, they clearly have a strategy 
that does bear some relationship to other strategies, but it’s not a particularly 
democratic process. But obviously then there are people involved who are 
democratically accountable in some way. I have very mixed feelings, I mean, 
I think partnership companies like that are quite a good mechanism for 
delivering things. (...) I have to say, I think in most of these local strategic 
partnerships, and certainly (...) [the regeneration company], is very economic 
and business focused, more than I think is appropriate (Devon Rural Network 
Representative).
The focus LAG represents an interesting mix of the technologies of agency and 
performance. Agency is a principle at the heart of the LEADER approach, and yet it is 
given little judicial concern through the LEADER network from the EU to the LAG. 
                                                          
13 ‘[T]hey are often set up by local authorities, but they rapidly take on a life of their own (...).They are 
certainly not creatures of the local authority. Local authorities are important to their existence’ (Devon 
Rural Network Representative)
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Despite this it is reinforced through the LEADER discourse, and the freedom over the 
processes employed at the LAG level in respect of the bottom-up approach has ensured 
that some LAGs have fulfilled the ‘soft’ guidelines attached to this approach much better. 
However, the focus LAG has made its own interpretation of this process, influenced by 
the market led management techniques of RegCo. There is little experience here in 
effective deliberative and participative practice. The freedom ensured throughout the 
LAG network over such practices, and the judicial nature of those concerns related to 
financial issues, risks undermining the LEADER approach.
It is difficult to discern who has control over the technologies of agency, there is 
certainly much in the argument that subnational actors play an important function in the 
conditioning of agency. At first sight the government does not seem concerned with the
delivery mechanisms used by the LAG through the LEADER programme. If it did, it 
does have the option to control these mechanisms more stringently through its 
interpretation of the guidelines. Rhetoric on community engagement and partnership 
attached to LEADER stands out as a highly contradictory element within the focus LAG, 
and the wider English programme. The most obvious assumption is that government uses 
this rhetoric in an attempt to condition the agency of the actors involved without having 
to call on the wider and more expensive apparatus of the state. In reality there is little 
attempt to engage rural communities in progressive ways. This is deliberative democracy 
on the cheap! It is possible the government has underestimated the ability of subnational 
actors, or local policy communities, to hijack wider government strategy, and (re-
)condition policy delivery. It is also likely that government is stretched, and does not
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have the appropriate resources or knowledge to empower community engagement 
effectively. 
Furthermore, I contend that the construction of territorially defined communities 
represents a tool that is seen as a means to reinforce and shape conditions of agency, and 
focus the performative element of the programme to specific areas of need. In effect, the 
construction of territory is seen to provide a means to implement policy over the top of 
traditional state boundaries in an attempt to secure more effective policy implementation 
in those areas that need it the most. However, this process breaks down if the processes, 
by which these needs are identified, are not sufficient. In the previous chapter, I outlined 
the problems with this approach, especially the potential for these communities to be 
closed to certain groups within these territories. This point is reinforced through the 
dominant position in the focus LAG of RegCo, and its strategic concerns, that largely 
overlook the importance of a highly tuned democratic process that is inclusive of 
community needs. The danger is that the following approach is employed: 
You have to start when you are writing these things thinking how am I going 
to win it? What is the criteria Defra is setting, and therefore you go for the 
areas in greatest need. (...) I think that you have to be pragmatic, go for what 
the programme is actually aiming to achieve, bid on that and then work on 
how to deliver it to a natural area. If you can join things up at the beginning 
then great, but if you can’t, try and join them up mid way through (Former 
RegCo employee).
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This is indicative of the potential for the LAG territory to be married together, without 
much foresight on the binding of disparate community groups together. 
7.10 Conclusion
There is clearly a tension within the implementation of LEADER between the flexibility 
required to secure an effective approach to bottom-up rural development, and the danger 
that this freedom gives national and subnational actors too much control over the 
implementation of the approach. The result is the emergence of a quasi form of bottom-
up rural development conditioned by the complexities of an open system of governance. 
It is possible that these tensions emerge from those ‘conflicts’ between the member states 
and the Commission over cohesion policy, which has seen national governments 
reclaiming some of the power it lost to the Commission in the late eighties. The 
Commission clearly does not play the role it once did within LEADER, and the early 
years of the programme, which saw LEADER as a ‘laboratory’ for EU rural policy and 
governance is over. Nevertheless, the spirit of LEADER lives on, but it is no longer 
driven by the ideals of European social democrats. LEADER has been hijacked, under the 
conditions of advanced liberalism, within which the technologies of agency and 
performance have been wrestled from the Commission, and are now commanded by the 
member states.
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However, the lack of concern over which governance mechanisms are employed at the 
LAG level by the Labour government, has the effect of empowering subnational actors in 
unpredictable ways. In some LAGs subnational actors play a crucial role in shaping the 
governance structure by promoting civic engagement at the local level. In the focus LAG, 
however, the policy community surrounding LEADER has been empowered to deliver 
rural policy through the existing machinery of RegCo, and a policy community relating to 
the previous LEADER programme. This has ensured the focus LAG is managed in a 
technocratic way, with little concern for the LEADER approach. 
At first sight, the LEADER programme, appears to reflect a form of multilevel 
governance with power passing between the EU and national levels down to the 
subnational level, but as we look closer, we realise that the state continues to play a 
powerful position due to the weak demands, set out in the programme’s legislative 
structure. The British government does not empower the LAGs in a strategic way, or play 
an active role in monitoring the programme in terms of its ‘softer’ outputs. Its primary 
concern is the programme’s budget, and to see that it is spent efficiently and effectively. 
This ensures that the effectiveness of the LAG is dependent on the structures, cultures 
and traditions that already exist at the local level, and the ‘blueprint’ for rural 
development at the heart of the LEADER approach is lost. A more multilevel approach 
may have ensured that the central features of LEADER were not lost within the realms of 
political dyspraxia, by ensuring a clear agenda was set at the EU level and transferring 
this through the member states to the local level. Unfortunately, the complexity within 
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‘European Governance’, and the renationalisation of the structural funds, has seen the 
‘cohesive’ qualities sought through the LEADER programme diminished. 
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8. Conclusion: Positioning ‘bottom-up’ rural development in the ‘new 
world order’? 
8.1 Introduction: the new world order reassessed 
This chapter aims to position my LEADER narrative within the context of the wider 
governance turn, and more explicitly the perception that this turn has led to the 
emergence of a ‘new world order’, first discussed in chapter four. This provides the 
means to unpack and explore some of the tensions that exist within the new governance 
narrative and an opportunity to try to understand some of the peculiarities of the 
LEADER case in the context of the wider governance literature. In a sense, this chapter is 
a means to bring my analysis together and to think critically about broader governance 
issues relating to changing state structure and interactions of power, brought about by 
changing modes of coordination. I begin this chapter by exploring why it might be useful 
to see the governance turn in terms of a new world order, and I go on to relate this 
proposition to the governance of LEADER. I argue that new world order is highly 
significant because it has re-engendered politics by acknowledging the disaggregated 
nature of the emergent political order, at the heart of which lie the globalising forces of 
integration and fragmentation (fragmegration).  
This point has been supported through this research by recognising the following trends 
within the governance of LEADER. First, and foremost, LEADER can be seen as a 
response to the challenges posed by the emerging epoch. The LEADER approach to 
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governance attempts to reconcile these forces by attempting to deal with global 
challenges within a localised setting. The official discourse suggests this is possible 
through a linear process of ‘multilevel’ governance, with both the member states and the 
Commission playing a steering role.  It is at this juncture, where it becomes clear that 
states are no longer willing, or in many cases able, to steer policy networks in a 
systematic way. This is elaborated by a second observation, this being the increasing 
potential for unstable policy interactions, especially through partnership forms of 
governance and the extension of horizontal networks. Governments are no longer the 
dominant organization, they are not able to steer interactions effectively, despite their 
best efforts. This means interactions are potentially driven by actors and organisations 
that are not bound by public forms of accountability.  These unstable interactions 
engender an intricate web of power relations, with different actors and organisations 
playing off one another in numerous ways, the result of which is a set of unfamiliar 
networks relations, unstable in nature, and highly mutable, especially when exposed to 
discourses of power, and subtle techniques of meta-governance. Thirdly, this results in 
the emergence of new dangers within policy making and public administration, given the 
increasing flexibility of policy choices, decision making and implementation. This 
flexibility is built into the LEADER policy network, as a means to meet the challenges 
posed by those processes associated with globalisation. However, the success of this 
approach is reliant upon those actors across the policy network to have the same 
objectives as policy makers. In my explication of LEADER I showed how interactions 
across the network are subject to a complex process of associational dynamics. The result 
been a protracted version of bottom-up rural development, conditioned by a relatively 
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closed policy community at the local level; and through misplaced attempts to steer the 
governance process from the EU/national level predominantly focusing on financial 
outputs. 
In chapter 3 it was made clear how other interpretations of the LEADER governance 
have focused upon the varied or differentiated nature of rural territories and their 
communities. Local forces play a significant role in how territories engage with the new 
governance, and in the case of LEADER these leaves room for a series of different 
potential outcomes. There is potential for territories to build extensive vertical and 
horizontal relations through the auspices of the LEADER approach. However, this is not 
always the preferred option for the dominant groups within a community. I have 
attempted to show how the policy interactions in the focus LAG have been dominated 
and steered by RegCo, and this organisation does not seem to favour opening-up the 
policy community and integrate it into wider networks. This does not mean, however, 
that the potential to do this does not exist. In fact, those interpretations of LEADER 
governance outlined in Chapter 3 underline the potential that exists within the new 
governance for rural territories to take advantage of overlapping network structures. 
Governance as a new world order is contingent upon a set of mobile dependencies that 
are both global and local. The increasing tendency for these polarities to emerge reflects 
those processes of centralization and integration, along with those of decentralization and 
fragmentation (Roseneau, Vol 2, 2006: 74). ‘While these polarities move the course of 
events in opposite directions, they are continuously, simultaneously, and often causally 
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interactive, giving rise to the prime tensions with which individuals and their 
collectivities must contend’ (ibid, 74). In other words, interactions between the global and 
local level are common and fluid with actors now able to cascade through time and across 
space like never before.  The result is a series of global and local policy networks that at 
any one time are connected, disconnected, or erratically swinging from the global to the 
local level. 
This thesis is built on a set of interpretative methods. These methods have been employed 
by placing the narrative that has emerged in my own research alongside existing 
discourses on the new governance, participatory decision-making and the changing rural 
policy arena. This discourse has been made up of a diverse array of themes and ideas 
which at times seem almost unrelated. This has been a necessary exercise in framing
patterns of knowledge that shape the governance of LEADER at the local level and 
beyond. The exercise of looking through an ‘interpretative lens’ has provided a good 
basis from which to show how the narrative formed through this research does not just 
build on existing interpretations of LEADER, but also upon a wider set of narratives and 
discourses that bring new ideas and perspectives to the fore. In many respects this 
research has provided the opportunity to build a greater understanding of the context in 
which the LEADER programme has grown and developed, and build stronger links to the 
emerging narratives associated with the new governance. 
.
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I attempted to show throughout this thesis the extent to which power flows in and 
through both global and local settings. I also hope to have made clear that the tensions 
within the LEADER programme come from the associational flows of power across the 
network. The process of fragmegration is evident within the LEADER programme. The 
EU has been enrolled in the process of rural development, specifically because of its 
global vantage point, and the pre-existing rural policy community at the EU level. Power 
has been consciously passed to this supranational body by member states, as it is seen as 
the most suitable arena to meet the challenges posed by the global economy, and the 
extension of horizontal networks of association. In response, the EU has developed an 
approach to economic development based on the perceived benefits of community based 
interaction, discussed in chapter three. This approach attempts to deal with global issues 
at a very local level by strengthening the quality of interactions and institutional 
arrangements. This has had the effect, in the case of LEADER, of opening up the local 
level to an unstable and complex web of collectivities and actors. In the focus LAG, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, this process has been dominated by a local 
development agency (RegCo), and a set of related associational actors who represent a 
relatively closed policy network. In the case of LEADER the fragmentation process has 
been instigated by the member states and the Commission, and facilitated through stunted 
forms of network design and framing. Unfortunately, the overall success of this form of 
endogenous development has been impeded by strong local institutional ties, an 
unwillingness to open-up the policy network at the local level, and reluctance on the part 
of the government to provide the appropriate resources to empower a process of 
community engagement.
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LEADER has offered a fascinating insight into the new governance, particularly by 
highlighting a set of contingent weaknesses, and the influence of such on the new social 
interactions promoted through partnership, and the extension of previously embedded 
networks.  A key feature of the LEADER governance narrative is the variance offered by 
the particular set of social, economic, political and cultural interactions taking place 
across the policy network. The nature of these interactions, and their influence, vary 
across the network. The varying level of interdependence induced through these 
interactions is reliant upon the level of contact between different actors. As stressed, the 
quality of these interactions is conditioned by the design features of the network; the type 
of actors involved and their willingness to engage fully in these interactions; and the 
culture or pattern of network relations familiar to those actors involved. 
8.2 Disaggregation, the State and LEADER
The emerging global system is framed in chapter four as a ‘dissagregated system of 
diverse transnational collectivities’ within a multi-centric world ‘that competes, 
cooperates, or otherwise interacts with the state centric world’. This system is made up of 
‘a wide range of fast moving, boundary-spanning actors’. Within this context the new 
governance represents a global system that no longer rests simply on the conditions of 
market and hierarchical interactions within international arenas. 
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This disaggregated system implies that regulatory power now resides with collectivities 
of actors, who interact ‘efficiently’ with hierarchical, market and network modes of 
coordination.  The scope for extending networks and the level of interaction within the 
process of economic development is broader than ever. Add to this the scope of meta-
governance, and the potential of ‘powerful’ insurgencies across the network, and it is 
evident that the new governance is a medium that is not solely the domain of state led 
forms of coordination.   The new world order thesis has much to offer in terms of how we 
perceive policy networks from the global to the local and vice versa. In response to this it 
is important to reinforce those narratives that bring attention to the fluidity and potential 
disjointed nature of the emerging political system. The Latourian understanding of power 
employed in this thesis provides a good theoretical basis from which to explore this, and 
to describe the power relations that underpin new network structures. As part of this there 
is a need to understand the potential for differentiation and fragmegration. These forces
underpinned by the nature of power relations within the new governance. 
The state is still able to steer network relations and collectivities of actors within the new 
governance despite the increasingly non-linear nature of flows within the political 
system. Nevertheless, states are finding it increasingly difficult to steer network relations 
effectively due to the way in which authority is being relocated horizontally across 
networks, and undermining the principle of national sovereignty (ibid, 41). In chapter 
four, I drew on Fukuyama to show how the extension of networks has emerged around 
the state’s desire to devolve power, and downsize its primary functions. This has resulted 
in the extension of policy networks, and the active engagement and promotion of more 
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mobile capital and organizational relations. It is possible that the state has underestimated 
the ability of network collectivities to hijack the processes of centralization and 
decentralization away from the state. 
The LEADER programme, as a decentralised policy initiative within an EU setting, is 
characterised by disaggregated non-linear flows of power between the EU level, the 
national level, and the sub-national level. These flows take place against the backdrop of 
a highly contested policy arena framed within the pretext of the multilevel governance 
discourse, as discussed in the previous chapter. The complexity underpinning the debate 
over multilevel governance, in relation to cohesion policy, should not be confused with 
the unique set of complexities surrounding LEADER. LEADER holds a unique position 
as a Community initiative, which sees the Commission commanding special dispensation 
over its operation. Nevertheless, the flows of power that characterise the LEADER 
programme are no less complex.
LEADER is not framed as a disaggregated system within the official discourse, because 
so much emphasis is given to its potential as an endogenous process. This hides the fact 
that the LEADER approach is a highly disaggregated model of governance over which 
the member states coordinate network interactions through forms of meta-governance, 
network design and framing. In the previous chapter I attempted to show that the network 
interactions between the national level and the EU level represented state led forms of 
disaggregation, characterised by relatively linear flows of power, and void of potentially 
dangerous mobile network interactions. However, as developed in the previous chapter 
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disaggregation takes on a different form at the local level, with non-state actors and a set 
of complex social, cultural, economic and political interactions taking place. I developed 
this point in chapter 6 by highlighting the dangers of partnership governance especially in 
relationship to issues surrounding local democracy. It is at this level that the potential for 
‘fragmegration’ is at its greatest, with the non-linearity of policy most evident, along with 
the emerging tensions that reflect a set of mobile or unstable set of policy interactions. 
8.3 Network framing: area based partnership and top-down flows? 
One of the features of the LEADER programme, as discussed above, is the balance 
between top down and bottom-up features of the LEADER approach, and the tensions 
this creates. The state centric features of this approach are constructed as an extension of 
the localised networks in the official discourse, as a means to enhance cooperation and 
innovation. The fact that power flows in the alternative direction is largely overlooked. 
This is indicative of the way a particular perception of the governance system is 
constructed through the discourse, but does not match up to the relations and interactions 
that characterise the flows of power. Top down flows of power play a significant role in 
the LEADER programme, and yet at the same time these forces are atypical and based 
upon a complex set of interactions between the state and the Commission. It would not 
have been possible to understand the complexity of these interactions without employing 
a network approach, and then using the overlapping discourses as a framing device to 
understand the context in which network ‘outcomes’ emerge. 
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The theory of European Governance, discussed in chapter four, highlights the complexity 
within the European system of governance, and is indicative of how the system shifts 
between the state and new power associations formed around the EU. This model reflects 
the view that European policy making can be likened to a pendulum, whereby power 
swings between the Commission and the member states (See Wallace and Wallace, 
1999). This process is very clear in the case of cohesion policy, explored in the previous 
chapter. However, the new world order thesis, explored above, encourages us to consider 
the ever increasing associations of power across horizontal policy networks. In this 
regard, the policy pendulum does not reflect the ever increasing number of collectivities 
and the non-linear flows that are now possible within the new governance. In this sense, it 
might be appropriate to replace the pendulum with a series of interconnected roulette 
wheels that are conjoined at multiple points, whereby ‘the token’ can pass in multiple 
directions, and between various wheels. This reflects rather better the multi-centric and 
multi-organisational character of policy networks and flows of power. This gives further 
reference to a Latourian understanding of power relations, whereby flows are dependent 
upon actors ‘turning the wheel’ and shifting power forward to the next. What happens at 
the next wheel depends on whether the actors that reside there choose to turn the wheel, 
and how far they turn it. The decisions they make are conditioned by the context in which 
they reside, and the discourses that shape their decisions. 
This contention is reflected through the principle of partnership at the heart of the new 
governance.  Partnership is framed around a new ethos of participation, in line with the 
heterogeneous view of power and society underpinning the emergent epoch. This is no 
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more evident than in the discourse attached to LEADER which paints a picture of a 
diverse rural economy, a potential means of innovative development policy, facilitated by 
the LEADER approach and positioned within the context of an area-based partnership 
approach.  However, the new governance opens up new challenges for rural policy 
makers, quite simply because the policy process has to adjust to a new set of policy 
interactions, formed around different sets of actors and organisations. As stressed in the 
preceding chapters, RegCo dominates the LEADER policy network at the local level, and 
it is here where tensions seem most prevalent. 
I developed in chapter four the way in which LEADER represents an ambitious 
programme to try to redevelop the relationships between state, citizen and community in 
rural areas. This comes as part of the wider policy agenda that seeks to develop rural 
economic development by promoting the heterogeneous character of rural space and 
removing the focus away from agriculture. In the case of LEADER, through its bottom-
up approach, the focus has been on promoting interaction at the local level. As I 
developed in chapter three, this focus on bottom-up forms of development is part of a 
wider discourse on the perceived benefits of this approach in dealing with the challenges 
posed by globalisation. The LEADER programme seeks to superimpose a set of complex 
dynamics within the LAG. In doing so it overlooks complex processes and conditions 
required to usher self-organizing systems of governance within the context of bottom-up 
control mechanisms. These are not constructed by top-down control mechanisms, but 
develop out of the shared needs of groups, and lead to mutually acceptable shared 
instruments of control (Roseneau, Vol 2, 2006: 125). 
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Governance does not just suddenly happen. Circumstances have to be 
suitable, people have to be amenable to collective decisions being made, 
tendencies toward organization have to develop, habits of cooperation 
have to evolve, and a readiness not to impede the process of emergence 
and evolution has to persist. The proliferation of organisations and their 
ever greater interdependence may stimulate felt needs for new forms of 
governance, but the transformation of these needs into established and 
institutionalised control mechanisms is never automatic and can be 
marked by a volatility that consumes long stretches of time (ibid, 125).
This implies that attempts at the EU level to impose a system of bottom-up governance, 
as in the case of LEADER, are destined to be strewn with complex tensions at the local 
level. It may have been appropriate to build into the LEADER programme a greater level 
of top-down control as a means to ensure pre-existing local networks did not impede the 
emergence and evolution of the LEADER network. In the case of the focus LAG this may 
involve ensuring that resources are more evenly distributed at the local level, creating 
competition for the RegCo, and ensuring partnership arrangements that are open to all. 
This process is dependent upon a well developed partnership made up of people with 
varied backgrounds and experiences. These actors must show a willingness to break away 
from the shackles of previous institutional experiences and forge a new and deliberative 
approach to policy issues. This experience was also shared by those interpretations of the 
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LEADER governance discussed in Chapter 3. Within the new network governance there 
is room for actors to build new economic and social ties, but as stressed in that chapter, 
this is dependent on territories actively positioning themselves within overlapping 
network structures, while also ensuring their own policy networks are more extensive and 
ready to forge new relationships and take advantage of new opportunities. In chapter 6 I 
showed how the focus LAG relies on the perceived expertise of the ‘usual suspects’, and 
their knowledge of the policy making process. There is a danger here that bottom-up 
processes are not enrolled and the new governance is not monitored to ensure their 
outputs conform, most importantly, with the needs of those local communities involved –
their cultures, traditions, and economies; and that governance mechanisms are not 
operated by powerful associations of actors at the local level whose dependencies are not 
local, or directly accountable. There is a widespread assumption within the LEADER 
programme that by giving the local level the means to make decisions and contribute to 
decision-making, endogenous development has been implemented effectively. This 
assumption reinforces the pre-existing association of power in the focus LAG, and 
removes any pressures that might exist to extend the policy network.
In the previous chapter I showed how interactions at the local level were now framed by 
RegCo. These interactions were limited on account of the closed character of the 
partnership that was set up, and the extent to which the LAG management team attempted 
to engage new partners. There was an unwillingness to look beyond the domain of the 
pre-existing policy network coordinated by the RegCo. This network is made up of rural 
businesses, environmental groups and to a lesser extent charities and voluntary 
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organisations. The network shows no sign of agricultural exceptionalism, associated with 
some other rural policy networks. In fact, RegCo has played a role in removing 
agricultural ties, by actively seeking to reinforce a set of post-Fordist discourses that 
place agriculture on the edge of rural policy concerns. This was evident in the negative 
way agriculture was discussed by LAG members, and reflected by the fact that there 
seemed to be few attempts to engage the agricultural community, and there was little 
support for projects relating to agriculture. The actors within the LEADER network at the 
local level have the particular resources required to operate within the new governance. 
They have the skill and experience of working within a mobile environment made up of 
fluid policy interactions. In this sense, the LEADER programme has reinforced a set of 
pre-existing policy networks. These networks have become dominated by a set of new 
rural protagonists who are highly skilled and resourced, and in the best position to be able 
to take advantage of mobile network interactions. In this sense, the focus LAG has not 
been able to extend the engagement of actors in dramatically new directions. This 
indicates that processes at the local level are both resistant to top-down attempts at 
coordination. Yet, the influence of wider discourses can be seen through the scepticism 
toward agricultural interests. 
The LEADER approach offers the opportunity to go some way in readdressing the 
balance of power in rural areas in favour of non-agricultural interests. It may also be a 
way of putting continued pressure on the CAP, by highlighting the ability of a bottom-up 
approach to engage a whole host of other interests. This view is supported by those 
influences behind the LEADER programme, discussed in chapter three, which framed 
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LEADER as a means to reinvigorate the rural economy, and put right the lack of 
investment in ‘rural capital’. However, the extent to which the balance of power in rural 
areas can be readdressed is questionable given the continuing expenditure of the CAP and 
its ongoing defensive modernisation. The consequence is that policies such as LEADER 
remain limited in terms of their budgets, profile and impact. This is not to say that 
LEADER does not offer a way forward for rural policy. It is clear that the potential 
within the LEADER programme is increasingly being acknowledged by a number of 
different actors within the rural policy arena. In fact, when I interviewed a Defra 
representative he was keen to stress that at first LEADER was subjected to a great deal of 
cynicism from within the organization, but over time the programme has increasingly 
received positive attention.   The mainstreaming of the LEADER programme in the next 
programming period 2006-2013, is likely to open up the potential of the LEADER 
approach to an even wider audience. The biggest danger for the next programming period 
is that the failings of the current programme through the LEADER approach become 
even further embedded within the process of governing rural development. At the local 
level it is also important that LAG partnerships do not alienate the agricultural 
community by positively discriminating against agricultural interests.
There was some concern from the LAG manager with the way the make-up of the focus 
LAG varied on a long term and short term basis. The simple fact is that people come and 
go on a regular basis from this type of partnership. During my interviews, some 
interviewees, particularly from the voluntary sector, suggested that they ought to be paid 
for their participation in the LAG. This suggested that personal resources, in terms of 
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time and money, were put under pressure by their involvement in these partnerships; in a 
different way to those people who could draw on the resources of the business or charity 
they work for. The instability of the LEADER policy network is also reinforced by the 
fact that the partnership that has been brought together for a limited programming period. 
There is no certainty that the focus LAG will be awarded funding for the next round of 
LEADER14. Once the programme is removed, the network breaks down. It might be that 
the local network reforms, in part, under another partnership initiative led by the RegCo, 
but by its nature this policy network is potentially unstable.
It is not surprising that in putting these partnerships together, pre-existing policy 
communities are called upon to draw out interested partners. It is only through calling on 
these pre-existing communities, like that formed around RegCo, that a programme like 
LEADER can find a platform and set of working practices to get off the ground.  The 
habits and effective organisational practices that need time to develop within bottom-up 
forms of development, as outlined above, are heavily restricted by the unstable nature of 
the LAG partnership. Unfortunately, the programming period does not allow these 
practices to take on a life of their own, and develop the bottom-up approach further.  This 
directly implicates upon the potential of bottom-up forms of rural development and future 
programmes. These unstable policy interactions are added to by the dangers in the 
decision making options open to the LAG partnerships. The result has been an approach 
to bottom-up rural development that does not reflect how it is depicted in the official 
                                                          
14 The focus LAG was finally awarded funding under the new LEADER programme (2008-2013) by the 
South West Regional Development Agency (RDA). The LAG has changed its name to Torridge and North 
Devon, and is managed by North Devon+. This new organisation has seen the amalgamation of RegCo with 
the North Devon Marketing Bureau and the North Devon Enterprise Agency.
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discourse, but instead reflects those processes, and collectivities that pre-exist along the 
network.  
The focus LAG runs relatively well, and if it were not for a rich discourse on the bottom-
up nature of the programme, I doubt there would be much room for criticism. All project 
funds are accounted for, the LAG is run efficiently, no money is sent back to the EU, and 
worthy projects are supported. However, the quality of the bottom-up approach, as 
discussed in chapter five, does not meet expectations. In response, an academic discourse, 
discussed in chapter 3, has emerged that continually reasserts the programme’s failings. 
There is every justification for this stance. If a liberal democratic institution, whether this 
be the EU (arguably so) or the member states that make up this supranational body, lay 
claim to a policy initiative that promotes these democratic principles, there is need for 
concern if these principles are not respected. A number of critics have begun to question 
the sanctity of liberal democracy, in relation to new governance forms (See Sorensen, 
2007). The relationship between official discourses and governance outputs within this 
research highlights the subtle pressures on liberal democracy, particularly on the 
changing perceptions of what democracy ought to be. The changes associated with the 
new governance, networks and the emerging epoch are being subsumed within the 
democratic system, principally by advanced liberal democracies. The new governance 
has been defined as a means to re-engender a set of social, economic, political and 
cultural relations. As such, governance becomes a potential platform for new associations 
of power. These associations have the potential to promote new forms of social and 
economic development; but alternatively they may also have a negative impact, as 
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resource dependencies shift back towards the market, the state, or those collectivities that 
save limited resources to achieve democratic governance and positive forms of socio-
economic development. 
The states attempts to impose bottom-up forms of governance on the local level are 
motivated by the perceived benefits of this approach to development. However, as I have 
tried to emphasise, network design and framing at the national level create tensions 
within this approach. In the case of LEADER, the state still holds a powerful position, but 
it is important to acknowledge that decisions are now made over public policy within the 
context of the new governance by an array of different actors, from different 
backgrounds, and with different experiences and levels of ‘expertise’. This means 
decisions are not conditioned by the same processes, objectives and institutional norms 
that are found within traditional top-down systems of government. LEADER is 
conditioned by an increasingly disaggregated political system. This system is made up of 
both top-down and bottom-up flows and interactions. These flows are non-linear and 
reflect the associations of power along the LEADER network, primarily at the EU, 
national and local level. 
In this section, I have explored the tensions between top-down and bottom-up governance 
within the LEADER programme.  These tensions are typical of those associated with the 
emergence of the new world order. They are indicative of the current mobility of actors 
and organizations, the increasing freedom and confidence of non-state actors to form or 
control collectivities (at the expense of the state), and the ability of the state to use this 
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emerging political system as a means to continue to devolve some of its primary 
functions, while simultaneously attempting to steer the political system. The potential for 
unstable policy interactions, new dangers in the flexibility of policy choices and decision 
making, and attempts to ameliorate changing nodes of power through a global economy 
help frame these changes as part of the new governance. The new world order thesis does 
not imply that we are unequivocally entering into a system defined by linear network 
governance mechanisms.
Fragmegrative processes sustain authority flows that are not neatly 
structured and go every which way, emanating from a vast array of actors 
whose rule systems seek to evoke compliance through a variety of means. 
Global governance involves crazy-quilt like arrangements wherein 
authority is exercised partly by hierarchical structures, partly by 
horizontal networks, and partly by oblique links among overlapping 
vertical and horizontal spheres of authority (SOAs). Taken in its entirety, 
the prevailing system of global governance is comparable to a mobius 
strip or web. It is a system marked by patterns that unfold when the 
impetus to steer a course of events derives from networked and 
hierarchical interactions across levels of aggregation among transnational 
corporations (TNCs), international nongovernmental organisations 
(INGOs), NGOs, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), states, elites, 
mass publics, and local or provincial communities, interactions that are 
elaborate and diverse enough to constitute a hybrid structure in which the 
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dynamics of governance are so overlapping among the several levels as 
to form a singular, web-like process that is continuous and, like a mobius, 
neither begins nor culminates at any level or at any point in time. A 
mobius web is top-down, bottom-up and side-by-side governance all at 
once (Roseneau, 2006, Vol. 1: 152). 
The new governance is a global web of diverse network interactions, multi-layered, and 
coordinated by collectivities at multiple sites across policy networks. The shift from 
hierarchical to network forms of coordination (from government to governance) has 
brought about the potential for a set of social, economic, political and interpersonal 
relations to influence public policy in new and more pervasive ways. Power now resides 
through network relations in unconventional ways, governed by new sets of actor 
interactions. A key feature of network coordination is not necessarily the more extensive 
range of actors now present across policy networks, but the channels open to pre-existing 
actors, as a means to influence, steer, channel resources and evade responsibility for 
actions within a policy setting. Power remains resource dependent but there is also much 
to be said for the ability of actors to be able to negotiate there way across the network and 
condition interactions. 
The interactions evident through the LEADER programme are led by governments, based 
on a flexible method of coordination developed at the EU level by the Commission. The 
flexibility set into the system at the EU level is primarily for the managing authorities to 
use at their own discretion. The relationship between the EU, national and regional level 
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appear hierarchical in nature, and as a consequence relatively linear. The interactions 
along this part of the network are primarily technocratic, and based upon predetermined 
rules. In the work of Marks and Hooghe, drawn upon in the previous chapter, the EU 
system was viewed as multi-layered, made up of EU institutions, national government 
representatives (including subnational representation), and a whole host of third sector 
bodies. This system of multilevel governance is held to characterise the EU, and in broad 
policy sectors, such as cohesion policy, there is evidence to suggest that this system 
shapes policy in new and direct ways. However, although LEADER is part of cohesion 
policy, its governance is not characterised by the linear flows of multilevel governance 
because of the tensions and disaggregated interactions that take place at the local level, 
and conditioned by the bottom-up approach. 
The smooth relationship between the Commission, Defra and the regional level tends to 
hide these unstable collectivities. The forces at work here are embedded in a set of area-
based interactions, over which the rest of the LEADER network has little control, and 
dare I say it, interest. The guidelines set out on the partnership process and the level of 
scrutiny and monitoring it receives is limited, compared to the financial side of the 
programme, even at the LAG level. In chapter 6 the freedom entrusted to the LAG to run 
an effective partnership was made clear. However, it is here that the potential dangers 
inherent within the new governance are at their greatest, and the implications of the 
LEADER approach are most closely felt. This is the site at which actors and their 
organisations interact across networks relatively freely from the state. This has enabled 
collectivities, such as RegCo, to dominate the local policy arena and take advantage of 
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the possibilities within the emergent order. The technocratic nature of this organisation 
may limit the level of innovation within network structures, and condition how these 
structures are engaged with. As a result territorial identity and networks are framed by 
extra local tendencies. This not only limits the focus LAG’s participation in wider 
networks, but also shapes relationships at the local level and potentially leads to restricted 
forms of decision making and governance. 
The LEADER network is coordinated by a web of multilevel, state-centric, top-down and 
bottom-up processes. This web is framed by a host of collective, political, economic, 
cultural, structural and interpersonal relationships. It is these relationships that condition 
which mode or modes of coordination are most prevalent or influential at sites across the 
network. In conjunction, the design of the LEADER network, its inbuilt rules and 
operative processes also determine which forms of coordination dominate, and what kinds 
of interaction are permissible. This means we cannot overlook the centralised forces that 
continue to negotiate positions of power within the new governance framework despite its 
bottom-up credentials.  LEADER is a community initiative, and as such the Commission 
has great control over its coordination. However, as we have seen the British government 
has ensured the LEADER network is designed to meet their own neo-liberal policy 
agenda. Through network design and framing the government is highly influential, but it 
shows a striking unwillingness to regulate those interactions at the local level, perhaps out 
of a belief that this is the best way to induce appropriate forms of collective action at the 
local level. As a consequence, interactions at the local level are allowed to enforce pre-
existing norms that may not support wider political objectives. This highlights the 
310
tensions and the dangers of a disaggregated system, and implies there is a need to 
understand that modes of coordination are highly interlinked and constantly under threat 
from those collective forces across the network.
I attempted to show in the previous chapter that the process of devolution attached to 
LEADER, both upwards and downwards, works to the advantage of the British state and 
the New Labour government. The Labour government has been able to take advantage of 
the potential for ‘self-governance’ within the LEADER approach, and marry it to their 
neo-liberal policy agenda.  In effect, the notion of bottom-up rural development, with all 
its potential for wider public participation and inclusive forms of community 
development, becomes a means for the government to pursue its own policy objectives. 
Within this process New Labour, is in part, able to steer the LEADER network in 
directions that meet its own objectives through a stringent process of financial regulation, 
while only paying lip service to the fundamental features of endogenous development. In 
conjunction with this, government is prone to constructing what the networks of rural 
policy should look like through a rich policy discourse on the heterogeneity of rural areas. 
This process sees government engaging with the ‘rural problem’, a problem framed by 
the global market place, and the globalisation of food networks; and yet, the government 
simultaneously disengages with the problems faced by rural areas, by broadly applying a 
‘post-productivist’ discourse to describe the complex and longstanding relationship 
between nature and society, and society and ‘the rural’. 
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It is time that we began to recognise that many of the interactions across the horizontal 
networks that define the new governance are incredibly fluid and none comparable. The 
debate between intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalists that framed the multilevel 
governance framework of cohesion policy has not disappeared within the EU, but this 
system is now perceived to sit alongside a number of other processes. The European 
multilevel governance system is a highly developed mechanism employed by the British 
state to decrease its own primary functions. However, it is important to recognise that 
state power is far more likely to be displaced than in the past, at new and emerging sites 
of interaction within this multilevel governance framework. The non-linear flows that 
characterise the relationship between local level collectivities and those collectivities at 
the national and EU level are central to understanding the flows of power that define the 
way LEADER is coordinated. 
This point is made drawing upon the following observations that best describe the flows 
of power across the network and characterise the LEADER system of governance. 
1. Interactions between the Commission, the state, and the local level are not 
embedded, but prone to change; 
2. The state does not yet understand its new role in the policy process, despite 
having the means to frame networks, its objectives are state-centric and not 
joined-up with other nodal points across the policy network;
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3. The opening up of policy networks at the local level, through bottom-up 
governance mechanisms, is not effective if the interactions that condition
coordination do not comply with the basic principles associated with a bottom-up 
approach. 
In addition, I have tried to develop the idea that that these features are not alone in 
conditioning the flows of power across the LEADER network. These features are 
contingent upon a set of political, social, economic, and cultural interactions. The 
LEADER governance system, emanating in the flexibility of its non-pervasive extended 
networks, is open to manipulation through these contingent processes, along with forms 
of meta-governance, and its subtle pervasions. 
8.4 Positioning LEADER: the final thesis
A great deal has been said in this thesis about the particular system of governance evident 
within the LEADER programme. Much has been made of the potential of the LEADER 
approach at its numerous sites of interaction. This thesis has gone a long way to reinforce 
a pre-existing critique of the LEADER programme. This critique is founded on a set of 
discourses which depicts LEADER as a progressive approach to rural governance, 
through the principle of area based bottom-up forms of development. I have tried to show 
that although this type of approach does indeed carry a great deal of potential, this is yet 
to be fully realised because of a number of weaknesses within the mechanisms used to 
operate the approach. These weaknesses are born out of the flexibility built into the 
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programme and the mobility afforded to its actors. I have attempted to show that this 
flexibility and mobility is greatest at the LAG level and produced through the weak 
structural ties of the programme, and an illegitimate democratic model enforced by a lack 
of community involvement. 
In this chapter, I have attempted to highlight the significance of the new world order 
thesis, while also attempting to show the competing forces, operating within this 
disaggregated system.  These forces help define the character of the new governance. The 
new governance is a complex agglomeration of linear and non-linear flows, led by state 
and non-state interactions, or a combination of both, in variance over time and space. 
This process is shaped by complex sets of dependencies, resource exchanges and 
interests. Within this remit there is no clear example of what the new governance should 
look like, and what the character of interactions across policy networks should be. In 
effect, the new governance does not connote to a set of easily definable structures, 
common rules or interactions. Its defining feature is in fact its disjointed, differentiated 
and yet fluid nature. This ensures that there is increasing opportunities for non-state 
actors to drive the agenda, or maintain the status quo, depending on what best meets their 
agenda. The Multilevel governance framework, first discussed in chapter four, attempts 
to give the flows and interactions, across policy networks, within the EU a greater level 
of structure than is in fact broadly evident. As I have discussed the new world order thesis 
helps to situate the new governance by exploring the non-linear flows and interactions 
that characterise the European system, and its links to the wider global stage. This puts 
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neofunctional and state-centrist features side by side ready to interact, contest and merge 
within various policy fields. 
On reflection, it might be wise to look at what is holding the political system together, in 
many senses the new governance appears to suggest we live in a constant state of flux 
and turmoil. This is clearly not the case, despite the disaggregated nature of the new 
world order. This says a great deal for the ability of collectivities and associations of 
power to organise themselves and operate functionally alongside and within markets, 
hierarchies and networks. These modes of coordination are designed to reinforce and 
develop effective rule by powerful collectivities. In the past this role has been 
predominantly taken up by the state, but the increasing use of markets and networks has 
passed power, and the capacity to rule, to a whole host of non-state actors. The role of the 
state has changed, and it will continue to change, as it finds its place in the new world 
order. However, we need to be careful not to deride the power states hold, the resources 
they command, and the functions they provide. Nevertheless, there is a risk that states fail 
to recognise the true nature of these changes; that they sit by and watch new collectivities 
challenge them for basic resources, undermine the principles of liberal democracy, and 
slowly recondition the state for their own ends. We should not be surprised by this 
possibility; state power has always been subject to change and derision, from powerful 
collectivities within society. However, power is now more mobile, interactions have 
global significance, and there is a general apathy towards the political system, that instead 
of breeding widespread demands for change has bred contempt. There is a distinct need 
for the state to understand the nature of these changes better, to get back to a set of basic 
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principles that reinforce liberal democracy, that bind society into a clear set of beliefs, 
and use this power to steer the political system, direct supranational policy making and 
meet clearly defined objectives. 
These suggestions may seem rather grand based on my empirical research into LEADER. 
I would deflect major criticisms by arguing that these suggestions are based upon the 
narrative I have formed on LEADER in this thesis. This narrative has been formed 
tracing a policy network that carries with it a set of discourses, and these discourses have 
shaped my understanding of the processes that underpin the new governance. As such 
these suggestions are formed out of the narrative formed here, and I would not wish to 
suggest that the same assumptions could be directly formed through looking at other 
examples of the new governance. I am aware that different case studies would throw up 
different results, and this is of course a key feature of the disaggregated system we find 
ourselves in. This is just one narrative, among many potential narratives, it is based 
around one policy initiative, and for these reasons it should not be the basis for broad 
assumptions. Nevertheless, I would hope that these suggestions provide the basis for 
further research, as a means to look at how these assumptions tie in with other features of 
the new world order. 
The LEADER example has alluded to the potential pitfalls evident within the new 
governance, and more widely supports the new world order thesis. LEADER has shown 
the potential dangers of an open system of governance due to increasingly mobile 
interactions, and the potential of existing collectivities to keep devolved networks closed, 
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despite the best efforts of policy rhetoric to open policy networks up. I have also shown 
how this process has been reinforced by the tendency for neo-liberal efficiency to 
override wider policy objectives, and reduce the capacity of the bottom-up approach. 
LEADER is a complex arrangement of collectivities that interact across the network. It is 
founded upon a set of global pressures, and challenges. It reflects the increasing tendency 
towards fragmegration, while the state still has the ability to punctuate the policy network 
and control its flows. There are many processes at work here and, if nothing else, I hope 
to have shown that LEADER and its governance is conditioned by these complex 
processes. It is these processes that at different times and in different combinations speed 
up and slow down the flows of power across the LEADER network. 
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Appendix – Research Interviewees
1. Charlotte Benson – Devon Community Council (November, 2006)
2. Defra Representatives, LEADER Management team, London (January, 2007)
3. Heather Hillman, Devon County Council (October, 2006)
4. Malcolm Moseley, University of Gloucestershire, Countryside and Community 
Research Institute (CCRI) (March, 2007) (Telephone Interview)
5. Penny Archer, Community Accountancy (March, 2007) (Telephone Interview)
6. Natural England Representative (formerly of the countryside agency), Exeter
(December, 2006)
7. Des Shadrick, Devon County Council/LAG member (February, 2007)
8. Jean-Michel Courades, Directorate-General for Agriculture, European 
Commission (March, 2007)
9. Focus LAG manager (February, 2006)
10. Robin Makeig-Jones, North Devon+ (April, 2007)
11. Len Smith, former LAG manager (not focus LAG) (October, 2006)
12. Gordon Morris, former employee of Countryside Agency (October, 2006)
13. Jerry Bix, Bideford Folk Festival (May, 2007) (Telephone Interview)
14. Michael Winter, Director Rural Policy Research Centre, University of Exeter
(May, 2007)
15. Sarah Watson, LAG Manager (not focus LAG) (November, 2006)
16. Clair Sampson, Government Office South West (November, 2006)
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17. Zita Murphy, Country based officer, Directorate-General for Agriculture, 
European Commission (March, 2007)
18. Andy Bell, LAG member (May, 2007)
19. Dane Stanley, LAG member (April, 2007) (Telephone Interview)
20. Greg Jones, South West Office, Brussels (March, 2007)
21. Laurent Van Depoele, former rural development representative, Directorate-
General for Agriculture, European Commission (March, 2007) (Telephone 
Interview
22. Lucy Gaskin, LEADER network, London (March, 2007)
23. Oz Osbourne, LAG member (April, 2007) 
24. Steve Pitcher, North Devon District Council ((November, 2006)
25. Vanessa Vollans, LAG Manager (not focus LAG) (January, 2007)
26. Vivian Gale, focus LAG member
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